The Azimuth, the official training bulletin of the Army National Guard (ARNG), is prepared and published by the Battle Command Training Center at Fort Leavenworth (BCTC-Lvn) on behalf of the ARNG Training Division (ARNG-TR) to provide training insights, feedback, and lessons learned from ARNG Battle Command Training Centers (BCTC), the Battle Command Training Capabilities Program (BCTCP), and the eXportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) program.

This issue, the twenty-eighth edition of The Azimuth, addresses National Guard focused involvement in Civil Support Operations with subject matter emphasis on the recently published (23 July 2010) Final Approved Draft of Field Manual (FM) 3-28, Civil Support Operations.

The next edition of The Azimuth will address the latest updates for Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS). This will be the third edition of The Azimuth covering ABCS. Other editions for FY 2011 will include Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), the new FM 3-0, Operations, and targeting.

From the Chief, National Guard Bureau

General Craig R. McKinley

I am always eager to seize any opportunity that helps me reach out and communicate with Airmen and Soldiers in our National Guard, and during my visit with the Soldiers and trainers at BCTC-Ft Leavenworth I was introduced to The Azimuth as an excellent communication channel.

Our domestic security challenges are complex and unpredictable. Natural and man-made disasters, terrorist threats, and transnational criminal gangs trying to smuggle weapons, cash and people across our border all demand a rapid, multifaceted and tiered response from local up through national levels. And the National Guard delivers, providing our nation with teams of experts that can quickly meet and mitigate a spectrum of threats to include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives. We've also formed unique command and control packages that quickly partner National Guard forces with state and federal agencies that will better organize and target civil response to national and/or multi-state emergencies. Add to this our existing capabilities and the Guard is truly a comprehensive, capable national response force that can meet a broad spectrum of civil support operations.

Successfully executing civil support operations indicates our readiness to support any one of the Guard's top three priorities: security and defense of our homeland at home and abroad; support to overseas contingency operations; and maintaining a relevant, reliable, and ready National Guard that is transformed for the 21st Century. "Always ready, always there" has never been just a bumper sticker; it's how all of us Guard Members need to think and, understandably, is what the citizens of our great nation have the right to expect of us.

This edition of The Azimuth is an excellent primer for Soldiers and Airmen alike who want to understand the depth and breadth of civil support we must be ready to provide on a moment's notice. Commanders and staffs at all levels can also use this issue to determine and design training as well as operational planning. Just like our Minute Man predecessors protected their communities, we are charged to protect our nation and we'll not fail. That is my challenge to you, and I know you'll meet it, just as the Guard has done for nearly four hundred years.

The Training Feedback Bulletin of the ARNG

Vol. 7 • No. 4 • October 2010

Insider This Issue

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………….Page 2
Glossary........................................................................................................................................Page 3
Civil Support Operations Overview.................................................................Pages 4-18
Civil Support Operations and the National Guard........................................Pages 19-30
CBRNE Response and the National Guard......................................................Pages 31-38
National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams....................................................Pages 39-41
CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package.....................................................Pages 42-43
CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces ..................................Pages 44-47
Homeland Response Force..............................................................................Page 48
DART..........................................................................................................................................Page 49
Planning Civil Support Operations.............................................................Pages 50-51
Battle Staff Training Team (BSTT).................................................................Page 52
References and Website Path........................................................................Page 53
Points of Contact...............................................................................................Page 54


THE US MILITARY HAS PROVIDED SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN RESPONSE TO CIVIL EMERGENCIES AND NATURAL DISASTERS DATING BACK TO ITS CODIFICATION IN THE TRUMAN ERA. THE TERMINOLOGY APPLIED TO THIS FUNCTION HAS VARIED OVER THE YEARS: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, OR MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES; MILITARY SUPPORT OF CIVIL DEFENSE; AND EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY RESOURCES IN NATURAL DISASTER EMERGENCIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. ALTHOUGH THE US MILITARY HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN RESPONSE TO MAJOR DISASTERS AND EMERGENCIES SINCE 1951, THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED ITS SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE.

CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS ARE TYPICALLY JOINT AND INTERAGENCY. THE POTENTIAL FOR DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND WORKING AT CROSS-PURPOSES IS HIGH, SO UNITY OF EFFORT requires a common understanding of the purposes and direction of all participants.

ENSURING UNITY OF EFFORT AND EFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES ALSO requires constant coordination. NATIONAL GUARD FORCES ENHANCE UNITY OF EFFORT BY ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES AND BY PROVIDING LIASON ELEMENTS, PLANNING SUPPORT, ADVISORS, AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO ASSIST CIVIL AUTHORITY. IN SOME SITUATIONS, CIVIL AUTHORITY MAY HAVE BECOME SO DIMINISHED THAT THE COMPANY COMMANDER HAS THE MOST EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) SYSTEM IN THE AREA. IN SUCH CASES, COMMANDERS MUST DETERMINE WHERE THEIR OBJECTIVES AND PLANS COMPLEMENT OR CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF OTHER KEY AGENCIES.

THIS EDITION OF *THE AZIMUTH*, WHILE SERVING AS A GENERAL INFORMATION SOURCE FOR CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS, ALSO PROVIDES UNIT COMMANDERS AND STAFFS WITH INSIGHT REGARDING THE NUMEROUS COMPLEX TASKS THEY MAY HAVE TO PERFORM. READERS ARE ENCOURAGED TO REVIEW THE TASK POSSIBILITIES HIGHLIGHTED BY THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS TOOLS FOR DOMESTIC DISASTER RESPONSE (PAGES 24-29) AND CBRNE RESPONSE (PAGES 32-35).

THIS EDITION OF *THE AZIMUTH* WAS REVIEWED BY THE COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC), COMBINED ARMS DOCTRINE DIVISION (CADD).
## Glossary

**A**
- ADVON — advanced echelon
- ALS — Analytical Laboratory System
- ARNG-TR — Army National Guard Training Division
- ASCC — Army Service Component Command(er)

**B**
- BCTC-Lvn — Battle Command Training Center-Leavenworth
- BCTCP — Battle Command Training Capabilities Program
- BCTP — Battle Command Training Program
- BSI — base support installation

**C**
- C2CRE — Consequence Management C2 Element
- CBRNE — Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive
- CCMRF — CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force
- CDC — Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
- CERFP — CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package
- CIP-MAA — Critical Infrastructure Program-Mission Assurance Assessment
- CJCS — Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- CM — consequence management
- CST — Civil Support Team

**D**
- DART — Domestic All-hazards Response Team
- DCE — Defense Coordinating Element
- DCO — Defense Coordinating Officer
- DCRF — Defense CBRNE Response Force
- DHS — Department of Homeland Security
- DSCA — Defense Support of Civil Authorities

**E**
- EMAC — Emergency Management Assistance Compact

**F**
- FEMA — Federal Emergency Management Agency
- FOB — forward operating base
- FSX — Full-Spectrum Exercise

**G**
- GIS — Geographic Information System

**H**
- HAZMAT — hazardous material(s)
- HD — homeland defense
- HRF — Homeland Response Force

**I**
- IAA — incident awareness and assessment
- ICS — Incident Command System
- INMARSAT — International Maritime Satellite

**J**
- JET — Joint Enabling Team
- JFHQ-State — Joint Force Headquarters-State
- JFLCC — Joint Force Land Component Command(er)
- JFO — Joint Field Office
- JOA — joint operations area
- JRSOI — joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
- JTF — joint task force
- JTF-CS — Joint Task Force-Civil Support
- JVB — Joint Visitors Bureau

**K**
- NGO — Non-governmental Organization
- NGRF — National Guard Reaction Force
- NIMS — National Incident Management System
- NRF — National Response Framework

**L**
- OPCON — operational control

**M**
- PFO — Principal Federal Officer
- PPE — personal protective equipment

**Q**
- QDR — Quadrennial Defense Review

**R**
- RDD — radiological dispersion device
- RFA — request for assistance
- RMP — Response Management Plan
- ROC — rehearsal of concept drill

**S**
- SCO — State Coordinating Officer
- SECDEF — Secretary of Defense

**T**
- TACON — tactical control
- TAG — The Adjutant General (National Guard)
- TIC — toxic industrial chemicals
- TIM — toxic industrial materials
- TPFDD — Time-phased Force and Deployment Data
- TSC — Theater Security Cooperation

**U**
- UCS — Unified Command Suite
- USARNORTH — United States Army North
- USJFCOM — United States Joint Forces Command
- USNORTHCOM — United States Northern Command
- USPACOM — United States Pacific Command

**W**
- WMD — weapons of mass destruction
- WMD-CST — Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team
The principal reference for preparation of this edition of *The Azimuth* is the 23 July 2010 Final Approved Draft of FM 3-28, *Civil Support Operations*. While it is not final doctrine, it provides the most up-to-date information on civil support operations available. Civil support operations are the fourth element of full spectrum operations and are similar to stability operations in several ways. Both revolve around civilians on the ground within land areas of operation and both involve supporting tasks that require Army forces to provide essential services and work with civil authorities. However, they are quite different with regard to terms of law, military chain of command, the use of deadly force, and interagency processes. The principal difference is where the support operations occur... within or outside the United States and its territories. Note the following graphic from FM 3-28.

**General**

This edition of *The Azimuth* employs numerous “smart cards” that are intended to highlight key information “takeaways” for commanders and staffs.

**Smart Card**

- The Army National Guard has a dual role during civil support operations... federal capacity under command of the President and when integrated with Regular Army units as part of a federal military joint task force.
- The National Guard provides each state, territory, and the District of Columbia with military capability to conduct civil support operations when directed by their respective Governors, as part of a joint task force-state.
What’s Involved

Primary Civil Support Tasks

There are four primary civil support tasks:

- Provide support for domestic disasters
- Provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives (CBRNE) incidents
- Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies
- Provide other designated support

Examples of missions for each are included in the following smart card.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Smart Card</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provide Support for Domestic Disasters</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Response to natural and manmade disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Response to all hazards except CBRNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provide Support for Domestic CBRNE Incidents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Terrorist attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Industrial accidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pandemic influenza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Human, animal, or crop diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provide Support for Domestic Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Civil disturbances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support during disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Equipment and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- State and federal counterdrug efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Border security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provide Other Designated Support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- National special security events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other special events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Wildfire response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Critical infrastructure protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Augmentation of federal agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civil Support Fundamentals

Although civil support missions are unique, certain fundamentals drive the actions of those who are designated to execute them. These fundamentals are included in the following smart card.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Smart Card</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The primary purposes of civil support are to save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The law defines every aspect of civil support operations: who has jurisdiction; who responds; and the restraints and constraints imposed on Soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Civilian officials direct civil support operations. They set the priorities. The Army supports them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- All cost associated with civil support missions must be documented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The military end state is reached when civilian authorities can fulfill their responsibilities without military assistance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What's Involved (cont)

Key Military Aspects of Civil Support Domestic Environments

**Smart Card**

- Army forces conduct civil support operations only in the United States and its possessions and territories. Army forces do not conduct civil support operations overseas.
- Department of Defense is not in the lead in civil support operations; Department of Defense supports a primary agency.
- The state National Guard is not the primary agency for civil support to its respective state. State National Guard forces support state agencies.
- In civil support operations, numerous relief efforts—local, state, and national—may occur simultaneously. Each has its own chain of command. A city mayor may control a local response. A tribal leader may control a tribal response. A governor may control a state response. The President controls the national response and the federal military response. The Secretary of Defense and supported combatant commander command and control federal military forces.
- Civil support is neither homeland defense nor homeland security. Federal military forces contribute to homeland security by conducting homeland defense and civil support operations. The same is true for state National Guard forces.
- Department of Defense and State National Guard forces work with the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to anticipate requirements. This includes planning, preparation, and training for contingencies involving state National Guard and federal military forces.
- In a civil support operation, a defense coordinating officer coordinates with a federal coordinating officer as the Secretary of Defense's primary agent.
- Federal military forces conduct civil support as part of a joint Service and interagency effort, under the command and control of the supported combatant commander.
- Effective civil support operations depend on coordination with state and federal Interagency partners.
- Military forces conduct civil support operations under state and federal laws.
- Many tactical civil support tasks are similar to tactical stability tasks, with some important differences.
- Military forces receive reimbursement for the costs of civil support missions only if they maintain a detailed record of operations and associated costs.

Key Players

The myriad organizations that comprise the National capabilities to execute civil support operations represent one of the most complex C2 situations imaginable. When considering command and support relationships, command post (CP) operations, communications, liaison, and control measures, the adjustments that must be made to adapt forces to their supporting roles are challenging. It is not unusual during large-scale civil support operations for state National Guard and Department of Defense (DoD) military forces to operate in overlapping areas under separate chains of command. Success when dealing with a parallel command structure depends on close and continuous coordination. Making decisions regarding a particular operation often requires the collective effort of state and federal government and military leaders.

The key players in civil support operations are too numerous to address in any detail within the confines of this edition of *The Azimuth*, so only the State Joint Force Headquarters, Joint Task Force Headquarters-State (JFHQ-State), National Guard components, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), as a combatant command, United States Army North (USARNORTH), as an Army component command, and Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), as a standing joint task force headquarters (HQ), are highlighted.
Key Players (cont)

Joint Force Headquarters-State and Joint Task Force-State

National Guard forces are permanently organized under a joint force headquarters-state (JFHQ-State). The JFHQ-State oversees the administrative requirements for Guard units and coordinates directly with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) in Washington, D.C. There is no standard response organization for Guard elements. In most cases, the State Adjutant General establishes a HQ called the joint task force-state (JTF-State) (see accompanying graphic).

The JTF-State has operational control of all Air and Army National Guard forces from participating states and task organizes them into task forces for particular missions. As the graphic above shows, state task forces will work along side federal task forces.
**Key Players (cont)**

**United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) . . . as a Combatant Command**

**Combatant Command** - The President and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) command federal military forces through the combatant commands. There are two geographic combatant commands with primary Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) responsibilities: USNORTHCOM and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). The other combatant commands provide capabilities to USNORTHCOM and USPACOM for DSCA as directed by the Secretary of Defense. USNORTHCOM and USPACOM control five standing joint tasks forces that have primary missions associated with DSCA. FM 3-28 This edition of *The Azimuth* highlights USNORTHCOM.

**USNORTHCOM . . . Some Takeaways:**

- US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established Oct. 1, 2002 to provide command and control of DoD homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities.
- Mission - USNORTHCOM anticipates and conducts Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests.
- USNORTHCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) includes air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately five hundred nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, portions of the Caribbean region, to include The Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands.
- Commander, USNORTHCOM has the authority to alert and prepare to deploy assigned and allocated forces in support of a primary agency such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Combatant Commander may request, deploy, and employ selected forces upon notification from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the SECDEF, in support of a validated request for assistance from a primary agency.
- As directed by the President or SECDEF, USNORTHCOM conducts operations through assigned Service components, designated functional commands, and subordinate standing joint task forces.
- USNORTHCOM consolidates existing missions that were previously executed by other DoD organizations under a single unified command. This provides unity of command, which is critical to mission accomplishment.
- USNORTHCOM plans, organizes, and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as ordered by the President or SECDEF.
- If required, USNORTHCOM may deploy its standing joint force HQ, a joint command and control element organized within HQ, USNORTHCOM. This command and control element rapidly deploys to enable the stand -up of a joint task force (JTF) HQ or to augment existing JTFs. In addition, USNORTHCOM may deploy a situation awareness team as an advance joint liaison element.
- USNORTHCOM’s civil support mission includes domestic disaster relief operations that occur during fires, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Support also includes counter-drug operations and managing the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass destruction.
- In providing civil support, USNORTHCOM generally operates through established JTFs subordinate to the command. An emergency must exceed the capabilities of local, state, and federal agencies before USNORTHCOM becomes involved. In most cases, support will be limited, localized and specific.
THE AZIMUTH
TRAINING FEEDBACK AND LESSONS LEARNED

CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS OVERVIEW

Key Players (cont)

United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) ... as a Combatant Command (cont)

PRESIDENT

SECDEF

UNITED STATES
NORTHERN COMMAND

U.S. Coast
Guard

National Guard
Bureau

AFNORTH

ARNORTH

MARFORNORTH

FLEET
FORCES
COMMAND

JOINT TASK
FORCE
ALASKA

JOINT FORCE
HEADQUARTERS
NATIONAL
CAPITAL REGION

Relationships

--- Coordinating

—— COCOM/OPCON

Supporting

Key Players (cont)

United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) ... as a Combatant Command (cont)
Key Players (cont)

United States Army North (USARNORTH)

US Army North (USARNORTH) was established to support USNORTHCOM to plan, organize, and execute homeland defense and civil support missions. USARNORTH is responsible for providing training support and conducting DSCA operations in support of the lead federal agency and deploying joint forces during emergencies.

**USARNORTH...Some Takeaways:**

- USARNORTH deploys from Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
- USARNORTH has a main CP, based at Fort Sam Houston, and two contingency CPs, each capable of operating as a JTF with augmentation. The contingency CPs organize for rapid land and air deployment anywhere within the USNORTHCOM AOR. Both CPs have joint and interagency compatible communications systems, with satellite links.
- It is a land-based response force that conducts homeland defense and civil support operations in the continental US.
- USARNORTH, as the Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) and the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) to USNORTHCOM, conducts Homeland Defense (HD), Civil Support (CS) operations and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities in order to protect the American people and their way of life.
- USNORTHCOM has standing JTFs subordinated to USARNORTH.
- The defense coordinating officers (DCO) and defense coordinating elements for all ten FEMA regions also belong to USARNORTH.
- In response to any incident requiring large numbers of federal troops, USARNORTH initially deploys a contingency CP near the joint field office.
- Although homeland security is not a specific military mission, medical commanders must plan for, and be prepared to, support a primary agency such as the FBI or FEMA in response to a CBRNE event. Various federal statutory authorities and policies provide the basis for federal actions and activities in the context of domestic incident management. The National Response Framework (NRF) uses the foundation provided by the Homeland Security Act, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) -5, and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) to provide a comprehensive, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management.
- Under its TSC mission, USARNORTH works with its partners nations in the region to enhance North American homeland defense by engaging with our neighbor's armies to build partner capacity and to enhance interoperability. The USARNORTH Theater Security Cooperation mission continues to expand.
Key Players (cont)

Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS)

Joint Task Force–Civil Support is a standing joint task force headquarters assigned to USNORTHCOM and under the operational control of USARNORTH. It plans and integrates federal military support for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives incidents (referred to as CBRNE incidents) consequence management operations, and when directed, establishes command and control of DoD forces in response to a CBRNE incident to assist local authorities in saving lives, preventing further injury and providing temporary critical support.

**JTF-CS . . . Some Takeaways:**

- JTF-CS forces consist mainly of CBRNE consequence management response force units as provided to USNORTHCOM in an annually updated CJCS CBRNE EXORD.
- When directed by the Secretary of Defense, the commander of USNORTHCOM deploys Joint JTF-CS to establish command and control of federal military forces at a CBRNE incident site.
- The CBRNE consequence management response force provides capabilities such as casualty decontamination, security, medical triage and treatment, aviation, logistics, and transportation. Domestic CBRNE consequence management (CM) support encompasses both deliberate and inadvertent CBRNE incidents, including terrorism, acts of aggression, industrial accidents, and acts of nature in the fifty States, US territories, and possessions.
- USNORTHCOM may deploy JTF-CS to the USPACOM area of responsibility to provide CBRNE incident support within US territory.
- JTF-CS’ ongoing support includes deliberate planning activities; developing CBRNE doctrine and identifying requirements; analyzing local and state emergency plans to help anticipate requirements for DoD assistance; and managing high fidelity geospatial products and geographic information system (GIS) data sets.
- JTF-CS, in accordance with the CJCS CBRNE CM EXORD, and the USNORTHCOM Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 3500, is sourced through force providers, such as US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).
- JTF-CS is not a primary agency as defined in the National Response Framework, nor does it provide a first response capability commensurate with local and state incident specific responders, to include the National Guard.

**NOTE**

Preparing for and executing a domestic consequence management mission requires JTF-CS to work closely with the many other federal, state, and local agencies that also respond to CBRNE incidents. Although the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), will most likely be the agency JTF-CS supports during an incident of national significance, liaison with other federal and state agencies, is critical. These agencies include, but are not limited to, the Department of Justice, the Department of Energy, and the Centers for Disease Control, various State Emergency Management Agencies, state and local law enforcement agencies, state National Guard HQ, and state medical and public health agencies. The Department of Defense is just one member of the federal response community. JTF-CS therefore recognizes the vital need for interagency coordination.
Key Players (cont)

Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) (cont)

**Example Organization . . .**

**TF Operations**
- Conduct consequence management operations
- Coordinate and execute operational plans
- Tactical mission planning / execution / resource allocation
- Synchronize unity of effort

**TF Aviation**
- Aerial recon
- CASEVAC
- MEDEVAC
- Spt to SAR
- Transportation spt

**TF Medical**
- Establish casualty collection points
- Coordinate patient movement
- Conduct TRIAGE and treatment operations
- LVL-I-III health service support to JTF and subordinates
- Medical augmentation to facilities
- Sanitation operations
- Medical logistics support
- Pastoral care
- Epidemiology support

**Technical Forces**
- Hazard / survey monitoring
- Technical extraction
- Decon (civilian / military)

**JTF-CS**
- Tactical planning and C2 of tactical forces
- Tactical execution

**HQ Troops**
- Provide comms architecture for JOA to the JTF and forces
**CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS OVERVIEW**

### Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

Joint Publication (JP) 3-28 defines civil support as DoD support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. DoD Directive (DODD) 5111.13 defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as:

> Support provided by US Federal military forces, National Guard forces performing duty in accordance with Reference (m) [Title 32 United States Code], DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, and DoD component assets, in response to request for assistance from civil authorities for special events, domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other domestic activities. Support provided by National Guard forces performing duty in accordance with Reference (m) [Title 32 United States Code], is considered DSCA but is conducted as a State-directed action. Also known as civil support.

It is important to note that DSCA will replace two older terms: *military support to civil authorities* (defined as a mission of civil support consisting of support for natural or man-made disasters, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive consequence management, and other support as required), and *military assistance to civil authorities* (defined as the broad mission of civil support consisting of the three mission subsets of military support to civil authorities, military support to civilian law enforcement agencies, and military assistance for civil disturbances).

### Civil Support and the US Constitution

Under the Constitution, the United States is a republic comprising of fifty states, together with various territories and possessions. This system, in which the states share powers with a central national government, is called federalism, and is the basis for division of powers between state and federal government. The Constitution carefully apportions power within the federal government between the branches of the federal government (executive, legislative, and judicial) and the individual states. This applies to the armed forces. FM 3-28

The original authorities granted to the states in the Constitution concerning their militia is the predecessor of today’s National Guard and constitutes the basis for the separation of the National Guard from the Regular Army and Air Force. It is the authority that permits state governors to retain command of their Guard forces.

Any discussion of the mission authorities for military forces participating in civil support requires knowledge of the legal considerations of The Stafford Act, The Posse Comitatus Act, The Insurrection Act, and The National Emergencies Act. Following are a series of smart cards that address each.

**Smart Card**

**THE STAFFORD ACT** - The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 100-707, known as the Stafford Act) is the primary federal statute giving the President the authority to direct federal agencies to provide assistance to state and local authorities during an incident. The purpose of this assistance is to save lives, alleviate human suffering, protect public health and safety, and lessen or avert the threat of catastrophe. The Stafford Act allows four ways for the President to provide federal – including military – support to civil authorities. Within these four categories, military support may include aviation, communications, engineering, logistical, medical, public affairs, and other capabilities.
Civil Support and the US Constitution (cont)

**Smart Card**

**THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT** - The Posse Comitatus Act (Section 1385 of Title 18 USC) punishes those who, “except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully use any part of the Army or Air Force as a Posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws…”

Questions arise most often in the context of assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies. In this context, courts have held that, absent a recognized exception, the Posse Comitatus Act is violated when:

- Civilian law enforcement officials make “directive active use” of military investigators
- The military “pervades the activities” of civilian officials
- The military is used so as to subject citizens to the exercise of military power that is “regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory in nature.”

**Smart Card**

**THE INSURRECTION ACT** - The Insurrection Act authorizes the President to use federal military forces within the United States to restore order or enforce federal law after a public emergency when requested by the state governor or when the President determines that the authorities of the state are incapable of maintaining public order.

The President normally executes this authority by first issuing a proclamation ordering the dispersal of those obstructing the enforcement of the laws. The President may act unilaterally to suppress an insurrection or domestic violation against the authority of the United States without the request or authority of the state governor.

**Smart Card**

**THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT** - The National Emergencies Act of 1976 (Section 1601-1651 of Title 50, USC) gives the President broad authorities to respond to emergencies, subject to Congressional regulation of these emergency powers.

Under the powers delegated by this statute, the President may seize property, organize and control the means of production, seize commodities, assign military forces abroad, institute martial law, seize and control all transportation and communication, regulate the operation of private enterprise, restrict travel, and, in a variety of ways, control the lives of United States citizens. Congress may modify, rescind, or render dormant such delegated emergency authority.
National Policy

National policy for domestic emergencies primarily addresses the National system for integrating all government agencies involved in responding to domestic emergencies, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Framework.

“NIMS establishes the national approach for incident management across local, state, and federal levels. (All types of emergencies and disasters generally are known as incidents.) In military terms, the NIMS contains the capstone doctrine for coordinated incident management in the United States. The incident management systems described in the NIMS is the foundation for the additional response procedures described in the NRF. The NIMS and NRF also provide the foundation for National Planning Scenarios, developed for a range of threats from a terrorist nuclear attack to the outbreak of a deadly infectious disease. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) promulgates and updates the NIMS, NRF, and supporting planning documents. The NIMS and NRF provide policy and guidance for federal agencies, including DoD. Federal agencies develop supporting plans that implement the requirements established in the NIMS and NRF. Virtually all state, county, and city emergency managers use the NIMS and NRF. The NIMS and NRF apply not only across all levels of government, but they also include military forces and nongovernmental organizations. This policy forms a comprehensive approach for responding to domestic emergencies. The NIMS and NRF provide guidance on how to achieve unity of effort across all participating organizations.” FM 3-28

National Incident Management System (NIMS)

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) Smart Card # 1

The NIMS has five components: preparedness, communications and information management, resource management, command and management, and ongoing management and maintenance. This discussion highlights the central construct of the NIMS—the command and management component. Individual responders and agencies manage and coordinate their efforts using these flexible elements of the NIMS command and management component:

- The incident command system.
- Multiagency coordination systems.
- Public information.
- NIMS planning process. Broadly similar to the military decision making process, the NIMS planning process guides responders in each tier as they respond to the situation with an incident action plan.

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) Smart Card # 2

The NIMS establishes the incident command system as the standardized organizational structure for managing all domestic incidents. The incident command system includes common terminology, modular organization, management by objectives, reliance on an incident action plan, manageable span of control, and integrated communications. Every incident command organization shares these characteristics, but each incident command structure adapts to the requirements of situation. In the immediate aftermath of any incident, local responders arrive first on the scene. First responders normally include law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services and hazardous materials teams. At the incident site, local authorities organize the various responders based on the incident command structure.
National Policy (cont)

National Incident Management System (NIMS) (cont)

Single Incident Command Structure

A single incident command structure refers to situations in which one incident commander has manageable span of control. The single incident commander is normally the senior responder of the local civilian organization with the responsibility for the incident, such as a fire chief or police chief. When there is only one incident commander, he or she establishes an incident command post at a safe distance from but not near the scene of the emergency to direct operations. FM 3-28

Unified Command Structure

A unified command structure enables agencies with different legal, geographic and functional responsibilities to plan and coordinate operations. In a unified command structure, the individuals designated by their jurisdictional authorities jointly determine objectives, plans, and priorities and work together to execute them. By working as a team, the unified command overcomes much of the inefficiency and duplication of effort that can occur when agencies from different functional and geographic jurisdictions, or agencies at different levels of government, operate without a common organizational framework. FM 3-28

Area Command

A very large or complex incident may have separate incident command organizations (any combination of single or unified commands). The primary federal agency may establish an area command to coordinate separate incident commands responding to a larger emergency. (State authorities managing a complex, multijurisdictional response without federal assistance may also use an area command.) An area command does not have operational responsibilities—it is a management organization. Its functions include setting priorities, allocating resources according to established priorities, ensuring effective communications, and ensuring that incident management objectives are met and do not conflict with each other or with policy. FM 3-28
National Policy (cont)

National Response Framework (NRF)

### The National Response Framework (NRF) Smart Card #1

The NRF replaced the earlier National Response Plan in 2004 as the all-hazards doctrine for managing domestic incidents. It elaborates the principles in the NIMS, focusing on prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. It provides the structure and mechanisms for coordinating federal support to state and local incident managers and for exercising federal authorities and responsibilities based on the NIMS.

### The National Response Framework (NRF) Smart Card #2

The NRF establishes a systematic and coordinated approach to incident response at the field, regional, and federal headquarters levels. It establishes protocols for such activities as reporting incidents, issuing alerts and notification, coordinating response actions, and mobilizing resources. Though the NRF generally seeks to preserve the primary role of state and local bodies as first responders, it recognizes catastrophic events will require a federal government response.

### The National Response Framework (NRF) Smart Card #3

The overarching objectives for incident response center on saving lives, reducing suffering, and protecting property and the environment. Five key NRF principles of operations are the basis of the overarching objectives:

- Leaders at all levels communicate and actively support *engaged partnerships* (cooperation) by developing shared goals and aligning capabilities so no one is overwhelmed in times of crisis.
- Incidents are managed at the lowest possible jurisdictional level and supported by additional capabilities when needed, through a *tiered response*.
- As incidents change in size, scope, and complexity, the response is adapted to meet requirements through scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities.
- Organizations participating in a multiagency or multijurisdictional response achieve *unity of effort* through unified command.
- Individuals, households, communities, and governments maintain *readiness to act* balanced with an understanding of risk.

### The National Response Framework (NRF) Smart Card #4

The NRF is based on the capability of civil authorities at each level to respond to extraordinary situations. Each level of government maintains enough capability to carry out its legal responsibilities specified in law. Each has some reserve capability to deal with situations out of the ordinary that occur within its jurisdiction. When a situation exceeds the capacity of that level of government, it calls upon the next higher level of government to provide support. The key players in this tiered response are local government, tribal government, state and territorial government, and the federal government. Acting at all levels, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector work closely with government agencies in response to an incident.
National Policy (cont)

National Response Framework (NRF) (cont)

Tiered Response

A tiered response structure calls for the lowest possible jurisdictional level retaining incident management responsibility. Local authorities are the “first responders” and provide the initial response to every incident, including manmade and natural disasters. When first responders cannot deal with the magnitude of the tasks at hand, they request assistance from neighboring jurisdictions. If these resources are overwhelmed, first responders request resources from the state. Continuing the tiered response effort, the state then draws on its own internal emergency response capabilities or requests assistance from neighboring states through mutual-aid agreements. Finally, if state resources are overwhelmed, the governor requests federal support. The following graphic from FM 3-28 provides an overview of tiered response under the NRF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DHS</th>
<th>Department of Homeland Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMAC</td>
<td>Emergency Management Assistance Compact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**FM 3-28**
General

The National Guard holds a unique dual status in that it performs federal missions under the command of the President and state missions under the command of the state’s Governor. The continuing high pace of overseas deployment of National Guard units, combined with the challenging nature of domestic missions for which it must be prepared to respond, dictate constant readiness and effective, efficient organizations. Currently, the majority of the National Guard’s personnel, training, and equipment is provided for its federal warfighting mission, however, response to large-scale, multistate events, homeland security-related activities, and federally-declared disasters are ever-present requirements.

In its civil support roles, the National Guard works with multiple state and federal agencies that have responsibilities for different aspects of homeland security. DoD is responsible for planning for the National Guard’s federal missions conducted under the C2 of the President. The Army and Air Force are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the ARNG and the Air National Guard (ANG), respectively, for federal missions. Within the Office of the SECDEF, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs supervises DoD’s homeland activities, including the execution of domestic military missions and military support to US civil authorities, and develops policies, conducts analysis, provides advice, and makes recommendations for these activities to the Under Secretary for Policy and the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs is also responsible for coordinating with DHS.

The National Guard’s involvement in civil support operations is chronicled throughout their long history, from the earliest English colonies in North America, post Revolutionary War, the Mexican War, the early months of the Civil War, and the Spanish American War through crises in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The frequency of call ups has grown throughout their 375 years. The accompanying graphics reflect some of the more recent, significant civil support requirements.
Organizing for Support

In the National Guard, the state Adjutant General is an Air Force or Army general officer who serves as the commander of the state’s National Guard and is the joint forces commander for all military forces under the governor’s command and control. The adjutant general recommends National Guard response options to the governor and designates the National Guard commander for any National Guard response. The Adjutant General has a joint staff that includes full-time National Guard officers and state civilian employees. During any incident, the Adjutant General coordinates with adjutant generals from other states and with the National Guard Bureau for emergency assistance. In states with constituted militia units, the Adjutant General serves as an intermediary with state National Guard forces.

National Guard forces are permanently organized under a JFHQ-State, which oversees the administrative requirements for their Guard units and coordinates with NGB.

Each state’s National Guard varies in composition and size, and there is no standard response organization. In most states, the Adjutant General establishes a JFHQ-State HQ that will have operational control (OPCON) over all Air and Army National Guard forces from participating states. State National Guard forces may be in a state active duty or Title 32 status. There are legal distinctions between the two statuses, but there is no difference in their tactical deployment. When the governor mobilizes the state National Guard, the forces are in state active duty status under the C2 of the governor. In a state active duty status, the state government pays for expenses. National Guardsmen on state active duty conduct all missions in accordance with the needs of the state and within its guidelines and statutes, e.g., pay and state military codes. National Guard forces in state active duty status may also perform civil law enforcement missions in support of the state.

In many cases the state governor may request that the federal government pay for costs associated with a state call up of National Guard forces. With SECDEF approval, state National Guard forces change from state active duty status to Title 32 status. While the funding line is different, state forces under Title 32 status remain under the C2 of the governor. The National Guard of one state can assist other states responding to a disaster through formal agreements, e.g., the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).

There may also be state defense forces that may be present during civil support operations. Twenty-four states have a state defense force of some description, organized under a separate provision of Section 109(c) of Title 32, USC. A state defense force may be a state-organized defense force or even a named militia. While they are the responsibility of the state adjutant general, they are not National Guard forces. They are under the governor’s command and funded by the state.
Domestic Disaster Response

Since the beginning of our Nation, the US military has been called upon to respond to all manner of domestic disasters and emergencies. Such disasters, natural and man-made, have included hurricanes, typhoons, fires, floods, earthquakes, tornados, massive explosions, and terrorist attacks. Other types of domestic disasters and national emergencies that may require military deployment and support include disease pandemics, major power blackouts, nuclear, biological, or chemical releases, and civil disturbances and insurrections, to name a few.

Disasters defined, some characteristics:

- Any disaster is both a personal and a community experience for the victims.
- A disaster can strike anytime and anywhere.
- “A disaster can take many forms to include: a hurricane, an earthquake, a tornado, a flood, a fire or hazardous spill, and act of nature, and an act terrorism.” FM 3-28
- It may build over a few days or weeks, or hit with no warning.
- A disaster normally produces an overwhelming demand for resources and impacts local and state official response.
- Disasters may start a chain of subsequent disasters.

“Emergencies affecting the public welfare and occurring within the fifty states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US possessions and territories, or any political subdivision thereof, as a result of enemy attack, insurrection, civil disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood, or other public disasters or equivalent emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt the usual process of government. The term domestic emergency includes any or all of the emergency conditions defined below: a. civil defense emergency--A domestic emergency disaster situation resulting from devastation created by an enemy attack and requiring emergency operations during and following that attack. It may be proclaimed by appropriate authority in anticipation of an attack. b. civil disturbances--Riots, acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, or other disorders prejudicial to public law and order. The term civil disturbance includes all domestic conditions requiring or likely to require the use of Federal Armed Forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 15 of Title 10, United States Code. c. major disaster--Any flood, fire, hurricane, tornado, earthquake, or other catastrophe which, in the determination of the President, is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant disaster assistance by the Federal Government under Public Law 606, 91st Congress (42 United States Code 58) to supplement the efforts and available resources of State and local governments in alleviating the damage, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. d. natural disaster--All domestic emergencies except those created as a result of enemy attack or civil disturbance. See also civil defense emergency; civil disturbance; major disaster; natural disaster.” Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defense 2005

When responding to disasters, federal military forces receive support through DOD channels, primarily through their parent service channels, while National Guard units in Title 32 or state active duty receive support through their state National Guard supply agencies. FM 3-28

In most civil support situations, the President will not federalize National Guard forces. National Guard units conduct advance planning with civilian responders, and together, these organizations (civilian and military) establish coordination plans and procedures based on National policy such as NIMS, NRF, and National planning scenarios. FM 3-28
Domestic Disaster Response (cont)

Response

Response to any disaster, as discussed earlier, is tiered. The primary responsibility for responding to domestic disasters and emergencies rests with the lowest level of government able to manage the response, and if a situation exceeds local capability, local authorities first seek assistance from neighboring jurisdictions (usually under a mutual aid agreement). Requests work their way up (tiered) from the lowest level to the highest level, as each lower level capability is exhausted. When neighboring capabilities are over-committed or additional requirements are anticipated, responders go to the state for help. If the state is over-committed, it requests assistance from other states (under existing agreements) before federal assistance is requested. The principal influencing factor is the level of the disaster, typical as opposed to catastrophic.

Phases

The NRF divides disaster response into three broad phases: prepare, respond, and recover. USNORTHCOM plans DCSA using six phases: anticipate, shape, respond, operate, stabilize, and transition. Commanders and staffs planning for and conducting civil support operations should be familiar with these phases and understand the relationship between the NRF and USNORTHCOM phases. The graphic that follows highlights the two operational phases and provides a brief explanation of each.
**Civil Support Operations and the National Guard**

**Domestic Disaster Response (cont)**

**Phases (cont)**

- **Prepare**
- **Respond**
- **Recover**

**The National Response Framework Phases of Disaster Response**

**The U.S. Northern Command Phases of Disaster Response**

- **Shape**
- **Anticipate**
- **Respond**
- **Operate**
- **Stabilize**
- **Transition**

- **Shape** - Refers to continuous situational awareness and preparedness. Actions include interagency coordination, planning, identifying capability gaps, conducting exercises, and public affairs activities.

- **Anticipate** - Begins with the identification of a potential DCSA mission, a no-notice incident, or when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. The phase ends when federal military forces deploy or when it is determined they are no longer needed.

- **Respond** - Begins with the deployment of initial federal military response capabilities and is completed when sufficient forces are deployed to accomplish the mission.

- **Operate** - Begins when federal military forces commence operations and ends when these forces are near the end of their mission and no further assistance is anticipated.

- **Stabilize** - Begins when military and civilian authorities decide that federal military support will scale down, and is considered successful when all operational aspects of the mission are complete and federal military support is no longer needed.

- **Transition** - Begins with the redeployment of remaining federal military forces and is complete when these forces have transitioned all operations back to National Guard forces or civil authorities.

**Operational and Tactical Considerations for Disaster Response**

Federal and state government organizations have accumulated thousands of lessons learned from domestic emergencies, incidents, and federally declared disasters. From this collection of lessons learned, numerous operational and tactical considerations have been entered into doctrine. FM 3-28 highlights these selected considerations in the format of the doctrinal concepts of battle command and some of the elements of combat power with the principal emphasis on tactical considerations that are important to planning.

Commanders and battle staffs should be familiar with each of these considerations, not only from a planning aspect, but mission execution as well. Historically, while we learn from the past, we also repeat many of our mistakes. The consideration tables included in this edition of The Azimuth, may be used as planning and execution tools. Lessons learned from past disasters have been added to highlight areas of emphasis.
Domestic Disaster Response (cont)

Operational and Tactical Considerations for Disaster Response (cont)

Commanders and unit staffs are encouraged to review the following considerations tool set with a view towards updating their planning and / or tactical standing operating procedures (SOP) (PSOP / TACSOP). The sample command and staff questions are not intended to be all inclusive of the myriad possibilities that may befit a given situation. Rather, they are provided to encourage unit commanders and staffs to systematically determine the actions and tasks that may be required. Reverse planning (from situation stabilization back to preparation to respond) is a proven technique that captures detail that might otherwise be overlooked.

A comprehensive task set, while always dependent on the situation, should start with identifying the types of disaster response missions the unit may be required to support. Once accomplished, a study of past, similar events and the lessons learned from each, will reveal areas of emphasis for task / action development. Once you have a detailed understanding of what a particular type of emergency entails, you can prepare for them by building detailed “what if” tools . . . if this event or situation occurs, react with this action set. Let the unforeseen and unknown be the only surprises. Finally, do not be satisfied that identifying tasks and actions is enough. Take the time to “tag” each with who or what must accomplish it.

* Battle Command will change to Mission Command with publication of the new FM 3-0, Operations.

### Battle Command

#### Desired End State:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considerations</th>
<th>Sample Command and Staff Questions and Actions</th>
<th>Answer / Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of the operational environment</td>
<td>Who best understands the physical environment affected? &lt;br&gt; Does anyone have first hand knowledge? Found them? Talked to them? &lt;br&gt; Commander to subordinate locations for assessment? &lt;br&gt; How does subordinate assessment compare to personal observations? &lt;br&gt; What reports and statistics are available? How accurate are they? &lt;br&gt; Commander to visit citizens in disaster area? &lt;br&gt; Commander understands his role and that of staff and subordinate units? &lt;br&gt; Staff understands their role? &lt;br&gt; Staff identified and established contact with subordinate unit and civilian counterparts? &lt;br&gt; What is the chain of command? &lt;br&gt; What is the task organization? &lt;br&gt; Are there units, headquarters, and organizations that have not previously worked together? &lt;br&gt; For whom is this the first deployment in a domestic emergency? &lt;br&gt; Commander met with other organization leaders?</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
# Civil Support Operations and the National Guard

## Domestic Disaster Response (cont)

### Operational and Tactical Considerations for Disaster Response (cont)

#### Battle Command

**Desired End State:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considerations</th>
<th>Sample Command and Staff Questions and Actions</th>
<th>Answer / Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment of the situation</strong></td>
<td>Has the assessment of the situation been stressed to staffs and subordinates? How?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What coordination with supported and supporting agencies has occurred?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What coordination with other military forces and volunteer organizations has occurred?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What about coordination and interaction with the media?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How do we distinguish misinformation and rumor from ground truth?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Are incident command centers and communications operable? Need assistance?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How accurate is the initial assessment? Do we need to adjust? How do we get it right?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What are the specific needs on the ground? How can they be verified?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What are the actual coordination requirements?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Is there an existing plan that will help in the assessment?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Civil support operations leadership</strong></td>
<td>Focus maintained on subordinates and their civilian counterparts as well?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the plan to build trust and confidence between military and civilian personnel?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How can a unified effort be achieved?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How do we demonstrate willingness to support?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What are the fine lines between willingness to support and just taking charge?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What are the interagency shortfalls in personnel, communications and awareness?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How might we help with identified shortfalls? Should we offer assistance?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### Command and Control

**Desired End State:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considerations</th>
<th>Sample Command and Staff Questions and Actions</th>
<th>Answer / Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exercising parallel command</strong></td>
<td>Will we be operating in overlapping areas of command?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is my chain of command? How does it fit with others in the overlapping area?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How do we achieve unity of effort?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What do we have to do to achieve continuous coordination in the area of operations?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>If operational decisions require a collective effort, what procedures must be taken?</td>
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<td>Have common goals in the area of operations been established? What are they?</td>
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<td>What do we have to do to get co-locate our command post with others?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What liaison efforts will facilitate close coordination?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The occurrence of multistate disasters</strong></td>
<td>How many and which states are involved?</td>
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<td>What components will be in the force structure?</td>
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<td>Other than support to my state’s first responders, what additional support must be provided?</td>
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<td>What are the existing agreements with states affected?</td>
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<td>Will existing agreements be overridden because of the extent of the catastrophe? How?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How will the national Guard Bureau be involved?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Will a FEMA field office be established? Where?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Will federal forces be committed to the response effort? Where?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Civil Support Operations and the National Guard

Domestic Disaster Response (cont)

Operational and Tactical Considerations for Disaster Response (cont)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired End State:</th>
<th>Sample Command and Staff Questions and Actions</th>
<th>Answer / Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command and Support relationships</strong></td>
<td>What are the impacts of separate chains of command in the area of operations?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are my support relationships with the area of operations?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How do our support relationships facilitate unified action?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Command post operations</strong></td>
<td>Who should I co-locate with? How? When? Where?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>If not possible to co-locate, how do I best facilitate communications and coordination?</td>
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<td>Is a smaller, mobile command post the answer? How?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What is the status of civilian communications in the area of operations?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What are the road movement restrictions? What are the CP access requirements?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Are their secure communication requirements? Visitor space requirements?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What CP operating adjustments must be made to align with the incident command system?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Communications</strong></td>
<td>What is the plan to offset saturated communications infrastructure?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What percentage of the commercial communication system has been destroyed or degraded?</td>
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<td>How operational are cell phone towers?</td>
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<td>What is the plan for alternate forms of communications and power?</td>
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<td>Have we planned for deploying with extra iridium telephones? How many? Distribution?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What are the dialing instructions for the affected area? Directory available?</td>
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<td>What is the plan to provide satellite phones to key civilian leaders?</td>
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<td>What about communications equipment compatibility? What is the plan to offset?</td>
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<td>Have we verified what communications systems will be required? How many?</td>
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<td>What frequency lists will be needed? Approved by FEMA and the FCC?</td>
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<td>What communications capability is available to liaison elements?</td>
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<td>What is the plan to integrate our communications systems with those of civilian agencies?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Can we communicate with first responders? What are the requirements?</td>
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<td>Have we planned for radio bridging equipment? How much will be needed?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Use of liaison officers</strong></td>
<td>How many liaison officers will be required to support the mission?</td>
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<td>What equipment must they deploy with and have available in the area of operations?</td>
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<td>What differences in liaison officer communications equipment must be planned for?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What liaison officer interoperability capabilities and doctrine must be planned for?</td>
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<td>What headquarters have been identified for liaison officer exchange? What is the plan?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How do you intend for liaison officers to increase situational understanding?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What steps have been taken to train and select liaison officers in diplomacy?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are selected liaison officers prepared to speak for their parent commander when required?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The area of operations</strong></td>
<td>How will the area of operations serve as a unit control measure?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are areas of operation aligned with concentrated support to civil authorities?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What civilian precincts and municipal boundaries align with our area of operations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What specific units align with civilian precincts and municipal boundaries?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Domestic Disaster Response (cont)

### Operational and Tactical Considerations for Disaster Response (cont)

### Protection

**Desired End State:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considerations</th>
<th>Sample Command and Staff Questions and Actions</th>
<th>Answer / Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>What is the safety plan? Has it been disseminated? How? To whom?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are we using the composite risk management (CRM) process? Do all understand?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are we using CRM for all possible protection considerations? How?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing rules for the use of force (SRUF)</td>
<td>Has SRUF guidance been disseminated? How? To whom?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What training should occur regarding SRUF?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How does SRUF apply to the mission at hand?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have there been any modifications to the SRUF by the joint task force commander?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When / if working with NG forces from another state, does my RUF compare to theirs?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does every Soldier have a RUF card?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arming posture</td>
<td>What is the threat to deployed Soldiers?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the requirements for law enforcement and critical infrastructure protection?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When / if working with NG forces from another state, how does my arming convention compare to theirs?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will deployed federal forces have weapons?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has the joint task force commander issued arming guidance or orders? What?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental contaminants</td>
<td>What types of health hazards can be expected in the area of operations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What guidance and training has been accomplished to prepare for these hazards?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the force health protection plan? How does it apply to the mission at hand?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the force health protection plan comply with environmental regulations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the plan to monitor health protection? Are leaders involved?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the status of supplies to support force health protection?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Movement and Maneuver

**Desired End State:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considerations</th>
<th>Sample Command and Staff Questions and Actions</th>
<th>Answer / Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restoring mobility</td>
<td>What types of terrain will be encountered in the area of operations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How does unit vehicular capability match up to perceived requirements?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assess unique requirements for type vehicles (obstacles, rough terrain, stranded personnel)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Driver status? Experienced with what type vehicles? How matched to requirements?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the maneuver plan to get to and help first responders?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrating supporting assets at the point of greatest need</td>
<td>Have asset points of concentration been identified? Where?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the movement plan for assets to selected areas?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What assets must be moved to selected concentration points??</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How soon must type assets be available in selected areas?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Domestic Disaster Response (cont)**

Operational and Tactical Considerations for Disaster Response (cont)

### Sustainment

**Desired End State:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considerations</th>
<th>Sample Command and Staff Questions and Actions</th>
<th>Answer / Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deployment</td>
<td>What is the deployment plan?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What logistics footprint will be required to support the unit?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is the staff linked with federal, state, and commercial partners?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will there be a need to deploy resources into the AO from outside the disaster area? If so, from where?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What deployment means are required? What other forces are deploying into the same AO?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What organic deployment assets are available? Can we self-deploy?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When and how will liaison elements deploy?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Where will reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) take place?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will movement by air occur? Where is the aerial port of debarkation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How will federal forces deploy? When? Debarkation points?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of state National Guard forces</td>
<td>Has coordination with government agencies and NGOs in the AO been accomplished?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish coordination through higher headquarters to the joint task force-state for resupply.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What civil authorities need assistance? What civilian organizations need assistance with planning?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinate with supporting military units and civilian organizations to pre-position supplies and construction material at or near the planned point of usage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the military and civilian regulations for the movement of hazardous cargo? Are we complying?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the centralized procedures for moving personnel to and from their home stations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are federal installations in the operational area available for use? Where? When?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of federal military forces</td>
<td>What capabilities and requirements must the home station have to support the deployed Force?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the transition criteria for support requirements from the home installation to the base support installation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the military and civilian regulations for the movement of hazardous cargo? Are we complying?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Intelligence

**Desired End State:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considerations</th>
<th>Sample Command and Staff Questions and Actions</th>
<th>Answer / Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incident awareness and assessment</td>
<td>Has the staff obtained the governing operation plan and SOP from their gaining command?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once obtained check for incident awareness and assessment information requirements permitted by law within a domestic environment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND THE NATIONAL GUARD

Domestic Disaster Response (cont)

Operational and Tactical Considerations for Disaster Response (cont)

Desired End State:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considerations</th>
<th>Sample Command and Staff Questions and Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incident awareness and assessment (cont)</td>
<td>Has the S-2 clarified all contentious intelligence areas with the higher headquarters?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the DOD directives and the specific Service regulations concerning domestic operations? Are intelligence personnel familiar with them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the priority information requirements? Do they need modification?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the essential environmental information requirements? Do they need modification?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the friendly force information requirements? Do they need modification?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct a situation assessment using METT-TC as they relate to the assigned civil support mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitive information</td>
<td>Know what determines sensitive information in a DCSA environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What types of intelligence information may be collected, processed, stored, and disseminated? What are the processes for doing so?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is the intelligence staff familiar with the sensitive information restrictions unique to the current mission and area of operations? How will these restrictions impact unit collection, storing, and dissemination in the area of operation?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The preceding tool set can be enhanced by adding other task / action requirements, e.g., who must perform the action or task; the required outcomes for each action or task; the required coordination and approval to perform each action or task; the critical time line for accomplishing the action or task; the impact each action or task has on other required actions or tasks; determining the critical path for information sharing; and much more. You get the idea. For every action and information requirement, there are numerous ancillary requirements that influence effective mission accomplishment.

State National Guard units are trained and mission focused to meet intra- and inter-state domestic emergencies. There are available off-the-shelf mission plans that facilitate deployment and redeployment, coordination with state and federal agencies, rules for the use of force (RUF), sensitive information requirements, command and control possibilities, communications capabilities and expectations, task organizations, and much more, yet each domestic emergency comes with a uniqueness that no amount of preparation and study of lessons learned will achieve 100% solutions.

Following is a description of the well-known disaster, Hurricane Katrina, and some of its prominent lessons learned. Note how the lessons learned link to the operational and tactical consideration highlighted in previous pages and how, as responders, we tend to learn the same lessons over and over again.

Hurricane Katrina

Hurricane Katrina of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season was the costliest natural disaster, as well as one of the five deadliest hurricanes, in the history of the United States. Among recorded Atlantic hurricanes, it was the sixth strongest overall. At least 1,836 lost their lives in the actual hurricane and in the subsequent floods, making it the deadliest US hurricane since the 1928 Okeechobee hurricane. Total property damage was estimated at $81 billion (2005 USD), nearly triple the damage wrought by Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Hurricane Katrina formed over the Bahamas on August 23, 2005, strengthened rapidly in the Gulf of Mexico, and made landfall as a Category 3 storm on the morning of Monday, August 29 in southeast Louisiana. It caused severe destruction along the Gulf Coast from central Florida to Texas, much of it due to the storm surge. The most severe loss of life occurred in New Orleans, Louisiana, which flooded as the levee system catastrophically failed. Eventually 80% of the city and large tracts of neighboring parishes became flooded, and the floodwaters lingered for weeks.
Domestic Disaster Response (cont)

Hurricane Katrina (Lessons Learned)

Do any of the following sound familiar . . . ?

That:

- we review emergency plans at all levels of government – including the 600-page National Response Plan that set forth the federal government’s plan to coordinate all its departments and agencies and integrate them with state, local, and private sector partners – were put to the test and came up short.
- we re-examine how the federal government is organized to address the full range of potential catastrophic events – both natural and man-made.
- we maintain the imperative of integrating and synchronizing the Nation’s homeland security policies, strategies, and plans across federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGO), faith-based groups, communities, and individual citizens.
- the existing National Preparedness System be improved to minimize the impact of disasters on lives, property, and the economy.
- a lack of familiarity with incident management, planning discipline, and field-level crisis leadership exists.
- we must create an infrastructure for ensuring unity of effort. (The federal government must manage a National Preparedness System for measuring effectiveness and assessing preparedness at all levels of government).
- we must develop a culture of preparedness and build a sense of shared responsibility among individuals, communities, the private sector, NGOs, faith-based groups, and federal, state, and local governments.
- we must ensure that relevant federal, state, and local decision-makers, including leaders of state National Guards, are working together and in close proximity to one another in the event of another disaster;
- we ensure situational awareness by establishing rapid deployable communications, as well as instituting a structure to consolidate federal operational reporting with DHS.
- we embed a single DoD point of contact at the joint field office (JFO) and FEMA regional offices to enhance coordination of military resources supporting the response.
- we designate locations throughout the country for receiving, staging, moving, and integrating military resources to ensure the most effective deployment of federal disaster relief personnel and assets
- we identify and develop rosters of federal, state, and local government personnel who are prepared to assist in disaster relief.
- we employ all available technology to update and utilize the National Emergency Alert System in order to
- we provide the public with advanced notification of and instruction for disasters and emergencies.
- we encourage states to pre-contract with service providers for key disaster relief needs, such as debris removal and the provision of critical commodities.
- we enhance the mechanism for providing federal funds to states for preparations upon warning of an imminent emergency.
- we improve the delivery of assistance to disaster victims by streamlining registration, expediting eligibility decisions, tracking movements of displaced victims, and incorporating safeguards against fraud.
- we enhance ongoing review of state evacuation plans and incorporate planning for continuity of government to ensure the continuation of essential and emergency services.

This is just a partial list of lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. While they helped shape current civil support operations doctrine, some of these lessons have been re-learned in subsequent domestic emergencies. Repetitious mistake avoidance clearly lies in careful planning and studying the mistakes of the past. The development and continuous updates of unit SOPs is a time-honored solution to repeating past mistakes.
**Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosive (CBRNE)**

**What is it?**

CBRNE is the acronym for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives threats. It is commonly used worldwide to refer to incidents or weapons in which any of these hazards have presented themselves. The term CBRNE is a replacement for the Cold War term NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical), which has replaced the term ABC (atomic, biological, and chemical) that was used in the 1950s. The addition of the R (for radiological) is a consequence of the "new" threat of a radiological weapon (also known as the "poor man's atomic bomb"). Since the start of the new millennium, a new term – CBRNE – was introduced as a replacement term for CBRN. The “E” in this term represents the enhanced (improvised) explosives threat. CBRNE weapons / agents are generally referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, this is not always the case. Terrorist use of CBRNE agents may cause a limited number of casualties, but impact the society at large in a major way. In many cases the intent of CBRNE weapons is to cause terror instead of mass casualties. A CBRNE incident differs from a hazardous material (HAZMAT) incident in both scope (e.g., CBRNE can be a mass casualty situation) and intent. CBRNE incidents are responded to under the assumption that they are deliberate, malicious acts with the intention to kill, sicken, and / or disrupt society.

**Some reasons for concern:**

**Chemical attack** - Chemical warfare agents can be obtained and utilized by terrorist organizations. These chemical warfare agents are categorized as being nerve, blood, blister, vomiting, psychochemical, and choking agents. Identifying the type of chemical agent dispersed can be attained through the use of gas chronometer / mass spectronometer and MINICAMS. The findings will assist first responders in rendering the appropriate aid to victims. Chemical agents are classified as persistent or non-persistent. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) states treatment for chemical attacks is administered by public health agencies and first responders by using treatment modalities “based on syndromic categories (e.g., burns and trauma, cardiorespiratory failure, neurologic damage, and shock).” United States vulnerability to the deliberate use of biological and chemical agents is substantial and has been highlighted by recognition of substantial biological weapons development programs and arsenals in foreign countries, attempts to acquire or possess biological agents by militants, and high-profile terrorist attacks.

**Biological attack** - The effects of biological agents present another real concern for emergency managers. Unlike chemical agents, a biological agent normally incubates for a period of time in the host’s body before displaying any symptoms. Its subtle symptoms of an ordinary sickness can temporarily hide their real effects on a given population. Hospital emergency rooms will more than likely be flooded by patients suffering from its effects until a trend is discovered. Biological agents have a variety of effects on human beings depending on the dosage received and the route of entry. The range of the effects can vary from mild to death. Biological warfare agents can be broken down into three groups: pathogens, toxins, and bio-regulators. Since bioregulators are chemical compounds, they can be used in conjunction with other CBRNE in order to mask their identification and impair proper medical treatment for its victims.

**Radiological attack** - Effects of a radiological dispersion device (RDD), also known as a “dirty bomb,” would produce injuries from heat, force of the explosion, debris, and radiological dust. A dirty bomb consists of radioactive material attached to a conventional bomb. After determining the initial fatalities from an explosion, the slow, painful process of identifying casualties from future radiation must be determined. The health risks of exposure to radioactive material are dependent upon several factors: the amount of radiation received, known as the dose, and the length of time over which the dose is received. Radiation generally penetrates the body when exposed to beta particles and gamma rays. Beta particles can be a hazard to both bare skin and eyes by causing burns. If ingested or inhaled, damage to internal organs will occur in its victims. Gamma radiation travels hundreds of meters in open air and penetrates most objects. Gamma rays penetrate tissue farther than do beta or alpha particles. Gamma rays can cause death.
Incident Response

First and foremost, there are guidelines that commanders and battle staffs must be infinitely aware of. These guidelines may be state, federal, local, civilian organization, and higher headquarters (HHQ) driven. Knowledge of all, as they may apply to a given area of operations and CBRNE type incident, must be known and understood at the unit level. The objective of response guidelines is to establish procedures for mid-level strategic / tactical planners responsible for CBRNE preparedness and response. As a rule, response guidelines provide generic advice and guidance on procedures, capabilities and equipment required to implement an effective response. They are designed to improve multi-agency interoperability in first response to a CBRNE incident and provide guidance on when regional, national, or international assistance may be required. They also serve as a checklist. Rather than aiming for standardization, incident response guidelines focus on developing a common understanding of the actions required during the initial response phase.

Following are a series of guideline smart cards designed from information provided by the Civil Emergency Planning, Operations Division—NATO International Staff to provide unit commanders and staffs with sample action / task / capabilities / tools checklists for CBRNE incident response that can contribute to SOP development. They are not meant to be all inclusive of the myriad actions that may be taken or required for a specific event, nor unique to any particular state, federal, local, civilian organization, or HHQ.

### Smart Card – Incident Response Information Gathering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task / Actions</th>
<th>Capabilities Needed</th>
<th>Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information Receiving and Mobilization Centers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Recognize that a CBRNE incident has or may occur</td>
<td>▪ CBRNE awareness training for call takers</td>
<td>▪ Questionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Gather, assess, and disseminate all available information to first responders</td>
<td>▪ Method of gathering information (public, intelligence, etc.)</td>
<td>▪ Information technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Establish an overview of the affected area</td>
<td>▪ Method of sharing information between responding agencies</td>
<td>▪ Direct telephone lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Provide and obtain regular updates to and from first responders</td>
<td>▪ Pre-determined level of response to (suspected / confirmed) CBRNE incidents</td>
<td>▪ Radios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Geographical information (maps)</td>
<td>▪ Information technology</td>
<td>▪ Geographical information (maps)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Approach and Arrival at the Scene | | |
| ▪ Approach scene with caution and upwind | ▪ CBRN awareness training for responders | ▪ Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) |
| ▪ Carry out scene assessment | ▪ Weather information | ▪ Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Detection, Identification and Monitoring Equipment (for personnel, boundary monitoring and analysis) |
| ▪ Establish incident command (each responding agency) | ▪ Knowledge and understanding of risk assessment | ▪ Pocket and/or emergency response guides |
| ▪ Recognize signs and indicators of CBRNE incidents | ▪ Knowledge and understanding of response to improvised explosive devices | ▪ Inter-operable communications equipment (e.g., handheld radios) |
| ▪ Determine whether CBRNE or hazardous material incident | ▪ Knowledge and understanding of roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of each responding agency | ▪ Main scheme radios |
| ▪ Estimate number of casualties / victims | ▪ Effective inter-agency coordination on-site | ▪ Geographical information (maps) |
| ▪ Estimate resource requirements | ▪ Common command system and structure | |
### Smart Card – Incident Response Information Gathering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task / Actions</th>
<th>Capabilities Needed</th>
<th>Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approach and Arrival at the Scene (cont)</td>
<td>Multi-agency communication channels, Knowledge of geographical area, Search capability, Analysis capability, Knowledge of facilities and critical infrastructure, Protection of unaffected critical infrastructure and key sites (local, regional, national targets)</td>
<td>Response plans for specific risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide situation report to emergency control rooms, etc. and request assistance if necessary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Carry out risk assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Undertake hazard identification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do not approach or touch suspect objects / packages—do not operate radios, mobile phones or other electronic devices within vicinity (safe distance +/-400m)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Consider secondary devices / targets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish and agree multiagency response plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identify safe areas for additional first responder vehicles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Search for secondary devices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Critical infrastructure considerations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Smart Card – Incident Response Scene Management

#### Isolate Scene to Mitigate Consequences (Initial)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task / Actions</th>
<th>Capabilities Needed</th>
<th>Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Consider wind direction</td>
<td>Common command system and structure, Knowledge and understanding of hot / warm / cold zone</td>
<td>Pocket and / or emergency response guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish multi-agency command point in safe area (cold zone)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Detection, identification, and monitoring equipment (for personnel, boundary monitoring and analysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish inner and outer cordon (hot / warm / cold zone)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal protective equipment (respiratory protection, chemical protection suits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pocket and / or emergency response guide</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cordon tape and signage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Isolate Scene to Mitigate Consequences (Containment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task / Actions</th>
<th>Capabilities Needed</th>
<th>Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Contain contaminant material / liquid</td>
<td>Knowledge and understanding of signs, symptoms and effects of substances (chemical, biological and radiological)</td>
<td>Pocket and/or emergency response guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish quarantine (holding) area for contaminated victims / casualties (where necessary)</td>
<td>Knowledge and understanding of Hazmat management, Knowledge and understanding of decontamination (emergency, mass, clinical)</td>
<td>Cordon tape, signage, barriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish decontamination and triage areas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Detection, identification and monitoring equipment (for personnel, boundary monitoring and analysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cordon off contaminated areas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal Protective Equipment (respiratory protection, chemical protection suits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decontamination equipment (emergency, mass, clinical)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Decontamination equipment (emergency, mass, clinical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shelter for victims/casualties from adverse weather</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Incident Response (cont)

### Smart Card – Incident Response Scene Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task / Actions</th>
<th>Capabilities Needed</th>
<th>Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isolate Scene to Mitigate Consequences (Additional Considerations)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Identify and establish multiagency marshalling area for additional resources</td>
<td>1. Identify sites/locations to accommodate large numbers of multi-agency vehicles and resources</td>
<td>1. Cordon tape, signage and barriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Establish traffic cordon</td>
<td>2. Use pre-determined sites/locations where possible</td>
<td>2. Recording equipment (video/still cameras)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Preserve scene and maintain evidence to the extent possible (criminal investigation)</td>
<td>3. Use available/suitable space with solid foundation</td>
<td>3. Evidence bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Carry out coordinated evidence collection</td>
<td>4. Knowledge and understanding of scene preservation for criminal investigation (evidence, forensics)</td>
<td>4. Detection, identification and monitoring equipment (for personnel, boundary monitoring and analysis)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Smart Card – Incident Response Saving and Protecting Lives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task / Actions</th>
<th>Capabilities Needed</th>
<th>Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Responders – Saving Lives; Giving Warnings; Managing Evacuation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Determine immediate actions and priorities</td>
<td>1. Weather information</td>
<td>1. Personal Protective Equipment (respiratory protection, chemical protection suits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Evacuate inner cordon (to quarantine area)</td>
<td>2. Knowledge and understanding of decontamination (emergency, mass, clinical)</td>
<td>2. Recording system for hot zone personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Restrict inner cordon access (protected first responders only)</td>
<td>3. Knowledge and understanding of medical triage</td>
<td>3. Decontamination equipment (emergency, mass, clinical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Provide safe working methods for rescuers</td>
<td>4. Sufficient numbers of trained personnel to provide rescue, decontamination, medical support and operational scene management</td>
<td>4. Personal property bags (for belongings of decontaminated victims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Carry out necessary rescues</td>
<td>5. Safe working methods for hot zone personnel (recording entry and duration of exposure)</td>
<td>5. Post decontamination clothing for victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Implement decontamination as appropriate (emergency, mass, clinical)</td>
<td>6. Transportation of contaminated victims/casualties</td>
<td>6. Detection, identification and monitoring equipment (for personnel, boundary monitoring and analysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Consider decontamination of personal property</td>
<td>7. Methods for communicating timely advice/warnings to the public</td>
<td>7. Medical treatment (trauma, prophylactics etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Implement medical triage and treatment</td>
<td>8. Emergency evacuation plans</td>
<td>8. Transport (ambulance, bus etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Provide timely warnings and advice to the public (immediate vicinity and beyond as necessary)</td>
<td>11. Provision of survivor reception center</td>
<td>11. Website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Consider evacuation (immediate vicinity and beyond as necessary)</td>
<td></td>
<td>12. Use of media (television, radio)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Consider utility shutdown</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Consider public order</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Consider hospital defense (self presenters)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Isolate scene to mitigate consequences (additional considerations)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CBRNE Response and the National Guard

**Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosive (CBRNE) (cont)**

**Incident Response (cont)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Smart Card – Incident Response Additional Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task / Actions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Notification</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Notify appropriate authorities at local, regional and national level (governmental and responder agencies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Notify specialists (chemical, biological, radiological / nuclear, medical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Consider international support and conventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide situation reports to all supporting organizations</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prepare impact assessment (en-route / on site)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish effect on population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish effect on critical infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish effect on environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Carry out incident specific and environmental sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hazard prediction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dispersion modeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Radiation monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Consider emergency provision requirements for immediate and wider area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assess resource requirements (short, medium and long term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integration of Support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Specialist advice and / or additional resources to be incorporated into incident plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Welfare and accommodation for responders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victim / Casualty Support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide information to hospitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide clinical countermeasures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide information to general practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide health surveillance (short-medium term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide emergency accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish casualty bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information to the Public</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implement communication plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide timely warnings or advice to public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide regular updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide health advice to public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CBRNE Response and the National Guard

National Guard CBRNE Incident Response Capabilities


These forces may work together, support other agencies, or remain separated across a large area. Geography, type of CBRNE hazards, number of response agencies, and size of the incident determine the employment of these forces.

The WMD-CSTs were created specifically for domestic CBRNE operations by congressional law and Presidential Decision Directive 62.

A National Guard Response Force is a rapid-response, general-purpose force available to each state. Although not a specialized CBRNE element, it can provide incident site security. A National Guard Response Force can deploy independently or as a HQ that can assume control of a WMD-CST and CERFP elements deployed to the incident.  

### National Guard CBRNE Response Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Capabilities</th>
<th>Availability</th>
<th>Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team (WMD-CST)</td>
<td>22 full-time National Guard personnel</td>
<td>Rapid identification of CBRNE agents</td>
<td>Able to deploy to a WMD, HAZMAT, or natural disaster incident within 90 minutes of notification.</td>
<td>Cannot be deployed outside the United States or its territories while in Title 32 status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57 teams, one in every state (California, New York, and Florida have two teams) and territory (District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands)</td>
<td>Assessment of current and projected consequences</td>
<td>Able to deploy across state boundaries based on a verbal agreement between affected governors. CSTs routinely respond together to support large incidents. Up to 22 teams have been deployed in support of a response.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Advice on response measures</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistance with requests for additional support</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Analytical Laboratory System Unified Command Suite – incident communications systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)</td>
<td>200 personnel</td>
<td>Casualty search and rescue</td>
<td>Within 6-48 hours</td>
<td>8-12 hour sustained capability in contaminated environments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Decontamination</td>
<td>17 CBRNE enhanced response force packages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency medical care</td>
<td>At least one CBRNE enhanced response force package in each FEMA region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard Joint Task Force</td>
<td>12,500-25,000 personnel</td>
<td>Force protection</td>
<td>First elements within 24-72 hours</td>
<td>Larger elements require significant assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aviation support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mass decontamination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medical support</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Engineer support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General support tasks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CBRNE – Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives  
FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency  
HAZMAT – Hazardous material  
WMD – Weapons of mass destruction
Considerations for CBRNE Incident Response

Like the operational and tactical considerations for domestic emergencies, FM 3-28 also highlights selected considerations for domestic CBRNE incidents. The following sample command and staff questions and actions can be placed in a checklist tool format like that beginning on page 24 of this edition of *The Azimuth* or any other format desired by the unit.

### Operational and Tactical Considerations for CBRNE Incident Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considerations</th>
<th>Sample Command and Staff Questions and Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command and Control</strong></td>
<td>What are the safety measures, technical references, reach-back, personal protective equipment, and logistics requirements that are in place / should be in place?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the CBRNE-specific mission requirements? Who is responsible for each?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do we have situational understanding at all levels? If not, where are the problems?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are liaison personnel in place and briefed as to their assignments? What are their specific assignments? Do we have lapses in coverage?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the status of our composite and operational risk management integration? Where are the gaps?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are our command and control systems compatible with existing civilian systems? Where are the gaps? How do we fix?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do we have a solid common operational picture? Are update capabilities in place and working?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the plan for sharing information? Is it working? Where are the gaps?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Affairs and Public Information</strong></td>
<td>What public affairs assets are available? Established contact? Who is our POC?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the plan for providing information? Who verifies accuracy level? Synchronized with the incident command joint information center?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do Soldiers on the ground understand the command’s public affair’s guidance?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count on rumor control being a critical requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has civilian broadcast capability been impaired / disrupted? Do we need to assist with providing factual information to the civilian populace?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure daily awareness of public affairs guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protection</strong></td>
<td>Do we have an accurate assessment of our personnel and equipment? Are there issues? What?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What level of protective garment is required? What is the level of hazard?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the status of our decontamination equipment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have we confirmed the proposed location and protection measures for the decontamination site? Where…what?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do we have a CBRNE incident model that fits the situation at hand? Have we referred to it?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have we planned for flexibility in the employment of protective equipment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have we planned for heat injury prevention for personnel wearing protective equipment?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Considerations for CBRNE Incident Response (cont)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational and Tactical Considerations for CBRNE Incident Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Considerations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement and Maneuver</td>
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<td>Sustainment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction—Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST)

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD–CST) of the National Guard are key to the CBRNE mission in that they provide a specialized capability to respond to a CBRNE incident within their state. In response to a WMD situation, Civil Support Teams (CST) provide a well-trained assessment team to support the State response as a lead element for the National Guard. Their knowledge of the emergency management system, expertise in emergency response operations, and technical capabilities may provide tremendous assistance to the local Incident Commander. WMD terrorism requires rapid response to a suspected or actual terrorist attack. The WMD-CSTs provide assessment of the damage, consultation on logistics, medical, chemical, and biological defense, and transmission of the situation to HHQ to facilitate follow-on military forces. The WMD-CSTs are available for rapid deployment for WMD response operations.
National Guard WMD-CST (cont)

General

CSTs were established by Section 12310, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 12310) to be National Guard units that would provide specialized CBRNE incident response primarily in a Title 32 operational status within the United States and its territories. Congress, the President, and the DoD recognized that the CSTs, responding under the authority of the Governor, provide significant capabilities to assist local and state agencies that may be overwhelmed by a large-scale terrorist attack or where specific technical capabilities are required. In October 1998, Congress authorized and funded the fielding of the first ten WMD-CSTs. With this fielding began the development and evolution of new capabilities and concepts to ensure that DoD could support evolving interagency response plans. Since 1998, Congress has authorized and funded the fielding of CSTs in the remaining states, territories, and possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia.

Mission

The mission of the WMD-CST is to support civil authorities at domestic CBRNE incident sites by identifying CBRNE agents and substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional support. This includes incidents involving the intentional or unintentional release of CBRNE, to include toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) and materials (TIM), and other disasters that result or could result in the catastrophic loss of life or property in the United States.

Organization

“to provide military unique capabilities, expertise, and technologies to assist state governors (to) prepare for and respond to CBRNE incidents. Team must complement and enhance (not duplicate) state CBRNE response capabilities.”

DoD Program Review, September 2001

“The WMD-CST includes twenty-two, full-time National Guard, Active Guard Reserve (AGR) ARNG and ANG personnel (Title 32) and is comprised of six sections: command, operations, communications, medical / analytical, administrative/logistical, and survey. WMD-CST members receive specialized training and state-of-the-art equipment (both commercial and military) to provide the teams the capability to rapidly and accurately identify and model the extent of chemical, biological, or radiological contamination in a given area and provide a technical reach back capability to other experts. The level of specialization within the team results in a structure that contains a greater number of senior personnel than normally found in a similar-sized military unit.”

FM 3-28

The team is formed specifically to provide advice to the Incident Commander to help make assessments of the requirements for follow-on forces. The unit is commanded by a lieutenant colonel, jointly staffed with ARNG and ANG personnel, and encompasses fourteen military occupational skills. The unit is Federally-resourced, trained, equipped, and sustained, with the State National Guard providing the personnel, stationing, and common support. The Adjutant General either employs the WMD-CST to support the State response under the direction of the Governor or to support another State’s response under a supported Governor.
National Guard WMD-CST (cont)

Employment and Capabilities

In the event of an emergency resulting from actual or suspected use of a WMD, the NGB facilitates WMD-CST employment through the Response Management Plan (RMP). The RMP prescribes NGB-assigned national response categories for each WMD-CST and consists of three mission categories: Priority (gold), Ready (silver), or Standby (bronze). The assigned response category directs how rapidly a WMD-CST must be prepared to deploy to an incident scene after official notification. Non-mission-capable teams receive a ‘black’ status, which alerts the National Guard, requires units to focus on areas such as training requirements, and leaves. WMD-CSTs in this category, once directed, must prepare for and deploy no later than N + 72 hours. The WMD-CST is equipped with high-end detection, analytical, and protective equipment. The unit possesses satellite, secure, and cellular telephone communications to provide connectivity with both civil and military forces within the operational conditions. Its principal capabilities are the Analytical Laboratory System (ALS), the Unified Command System (UCS), and the advanced echelon (ADVON).

Analytical Laboratory System (ALS)

The ALS is a self-contained, C-130 transportable, mobile, analytical platform. The ALS provides advanced technologies with enhanced sensitivity and selectivity for identification and characterization of CBRNE agents. Within the compartments of the ALS, operators have the ability to prepare, extract, analyze, and store environmental samples and to document the contaminated environmental conditions. They may also prepare samples for possible law enforcement evidence in the event of a criminal or terrorist incident, and send them to other national laboratory networks. The members of the ALS team provide the incident commander with the best available on-site analysis of hazards. This allows the state and federal agencies to determine appropriate follow-on response to a CBRNE incident. When linked to the Unified Command Suite (UCS), the ALS provides on-site data and analysis to national laboratories and subject matter experts.

Unified Command Suite (UCS)

The UCS is a self-contained, stand-alone, C-130 air-mobile, fielded communications system that operates in urban and undeveloped areas using portable and fixed equipment. It normally deploys throughout the United States and its overseas territories or possessions in urban, rural, and remote locations on improved, hard surface roads and provides real-time voice, data, and video communications reach back (unclassified and classified) among WMD-CST members, local, and state emergency response agencies, lead federal agents, and supporting military activities. It allows technicians with the WMD-CST to share on-scene data and analysis with any responding or supporting agency. UCS supports the WMD-CST Commander’s ability to exercise tactical C2 of the WMD-CST and serves as the single conduit and communications link between the WMD-CST Survey Teams in the field and higher authority.
National Guard WMD-CST (cont)

Employment and Capabilities (cont)

Advanced Echelon (ADVON)

The advanced echelon (ADVON) of the team deploys using a specially-equipped sport utility vehicle with capabilities similar to the UCS, but with limited encryption. It is interoperable with the UCS and first responders. En-route, ADVON capabilities allow mobile voice and data international maritime satellite (INMARSAT), satellite telephone communications, a media center with onboard navigational information, and intra-team communications.

CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)

General

The CJCS validated the CERFP as a Joint capability on August 17, 2007. The CERFPs are a key element of the overall DoD program to provide support to civil authorities in the event of an incident involving weapons of mass destruction in the United States. CERFP elements support mass casualty decontamination operations at or near CBRNE incident sites; provide casualty search and extraction; and emergency medical treatment, triage, and patient stabilization. A request for a CERFP can originate from a variety of state sources but will be channeled through the JFHQ-State and coordinated with the state emergency management agency. The CERFPs and Civil Support Teams (CST) provide a phased capability. The CSTs detect and identify CBRNE agents / substances, assess their effects, advise the local authorities on managing response to attacks, and assist with requests for other forces. The CERFPs locate and extract victims from a contaminated environment, perform mass patient / casualty decontamination, and provide treatment as necessary to stabilize patients for evacuation.

Organization

Command and Control - The C2 element must be prepared to execute recall of a CBRNE enhanced response force package and coordinate adequate transportation for CBRNE enhanced response force package personnel and equipment to the incident site. At the incident site, the C2 element coordinates with the incident or task force commander.

The Mission—On order: Responds to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident and assists local, state, and federal agencies in conducting consequence management by providing capabilities to conduct patient decontamination, emergency medical services, and casualty search and extraction.
**CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)**

**Organization (cont)**

**Medical Element** - The medical element provides short duration, pre-hospital emergency medical treatment during a CBRNE response mission and at rescue sites. Specifically, the team works with decontamination and/or casualty extraction teams to provide emergency medical treatment and triage in a contaminated environment, and stabilization and treatment in the cold zone prior to evacuation.

**Decontamination Element** - The decontamination element conducts ambulatory and non-ambulatory patient decontamination under the supervision of medical personnel and assists the security element with local zone monitoring for force protection. The CST will conduct a sweep of the incident area to determine the type and level of contamination present. The contaminated area is then cordoned off if possible, and entry control points are established. Based on the input from the CST, the decontamination element develops a decontamination action plan and determines the correct procedures and materials for the decontamination process. The decontamination lines are set up at the entry control points, leading from the contaminated area, or "hot zone" to the redress area in the clean area, or "cold zone," insuring that no contamination is spread outside the existing "hot zone." Patients are processed through the decontamination line and into the redress area. Injured patients are processed under the supervision of medical personnel to insure that they are adequately decontaminated without sustaining further injury. The decontamination element commander directs the operations of the team, verifying the decontamination solutions and procedures, and communicates their activities to the CERFP commander.

**Casualty Extraction (Search and Rescue) Element** - The Casualty Extraction Element conducts casualty search and extraction at an incident site. Extraction levels of rescue are defined as basic operations, light operations, medium operations, and heavy operations. Basic operations includes surface rescue at structural collapse incidents including the removal of debris to extricate easily accessible victims in stable environments. Light operations are a minimum capacity to conduct a safe and effective search and rescue where the collapse is of a light frame ordinary construction building. Medium operations covers a response to a building or structural collapse involving the failure of cinder block or non-reinforced masonry construction. Heavy operations involve the collapse of a concrete tilt or reinforced concrete and steel structure. If a CST determines radiation is present in an affected area, maximum stay times are calculated and teams are sent into the area to conduct searches. The search and rescue element commander directs the operations of the team, insuring that exposure levels are monitored, adequate work / rest cycles are observed, and team activities are communicated to the CERFP Commander.
CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) (cont)

Response Overview

N=0 N+1.5 N+3< N+6 N+8 < N+12

Incident Site

Local & State First Responders

Assembly Area

NG CERFP

NGB Joint Staff Briefing

Example CERFP Incident Response Time Line

- **Full Spectrum Vulnerability Assessment Teams**
  - Teams in each state analyze and assess Critical Infrastructure (Planning and Preparedness)

- **National Guard Response Forces**
  - Site Security
  - Presence Patrols/ Show of Force
  - Establishment of road block and/or check points
  - Control of Civil Disturbance
  - WMD-CST Force Protection / Security (Operate in CBRNE environment)
  - Respond/assist in protection of selected DoD assets
  - Initial response within 4 hours with follow-on in 4-24 hours (Critical Infrastructure Protection)

- **WMD Civil Support Teams**
  - 22 Person teams
  - 32 teams today
  - End State: 55 Teams
  - Mission: CBRN Assessment, Technical Advice, and Facilitation of follow on support.

- **Joint Force Headquarters (State)**
  - Reorganization of existing administrative headquarters
  - Able to provide Command and Control of military response forces on behalf of the Governor or a Combatant Commander.

- **National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package**
  - One task organized force per FEMA region
  - Leverages existing warfighting capabilities
  - Specialized training to respond to CBRNE events at home.

- **DoD (Title 10)**

- **Federal Civilian**
  - Interstate Compacts
  - Specialized Federal Assets (LD/HD)

- **Specialized Regional Response Assets**

- **NG CERFP**

- **Pre-Event**
  - First 12 Hours
  - 12-48 Hours
  - 48-96 Hours
  - 30 Days

- **NGRF**

- **NGB**

- **Fжа**

- **WMD CST**

- **Federal Civilian**

- **Interstate Compacts**

- **Specialized Federal Assets (LD/HD)**

- **Specialized Regional Response Assets**

- **NG CERFP**

- **Pre-Event**
  - First 12 Hours
  - 12-48 Hours
  - 48-96 Hours
  - 30 Days

- **NGRF**

- **Fжа**

- **WMD CST**

- **DoD (Title 10)**

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- **DoD (Title 10)**

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- **Fжа**

- **WMD CST**

- **DoD (Title 10)**

- **Federal Civilian**

- **Interstate Compacts**

- **Specialized Federal Assets (LD/HD)**

- **Specialized Regional Response Assets**

- **NG CERFP**

- **Pre-Event**
  - First 12 Hours
  - 12-48 Hours
  - 48-96 Hours
  - 30 Days
Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF)

The CCMRF is the largest of the military forces trained for CBRNE consequence management. Should a significant CBRNE incident occur within the United States, USNORTHCOM would alert and prepare to deploy the CBRNE consequence management response force to augment federal consequence management efforts. For planning purposes, the force includes about five thousand personnel task organized into three subordinate task forces. Units may vary depending upon forces provided by USJFCOM to USNORTHCOM, but the capabilities remain constant. Joint Task Force, Civil Support (JTF-CS), a standing USNORTHCOM joint task force, normally commands the initial CCMRF committed. Additional CCMRFs will be employed under the command of other JTFs (JTF-51 or JTF-52 in the continental United States) as the forces become available to the supported combatant command. FM 3-28 (The following graphic illustrates the state response CBRNE elements and the CCMRF.)

A CCMRF is a joint force usually organized under a two-star headquarters. It is composed of three subordinate colonel-level task forces.

State and Federal CBRNE Response Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Response</th>
<th>Federal Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (Joint)</td>
<td>Conventional Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Support Services</td>
<td>- Joint Task Force – Civil Support (headquarters and command control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chemical-biological incident response force</td>
<td>- Task Force – Operations (decontamination and security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chemical company (decontamination)</td>
<td>- Task Force – Medical (triage and treatment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chemical company (reconnaissance)</td>
<td>- Task Force - Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chemical platoon (Biological Integrated Detection System)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Nuclear, biological, and chemical biological detection team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CBRNE coordination element</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Air Force radiation assessment team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Defense Threat Reduction Agency consequence management advisory team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (Joint)
- 190 personnel
- Casualty search and rescue
- Decontamination
- Emergency medical care
- Force protection
  (Quick reaction force and rapid response force)

CBRNE – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and High-yield Explosive (CBRNE)

State National Guard
(In-state activated or Title 32 status)

Federal Military Forces
(Title 10)

Weapons of Mass Destruction—Civil Support team
- 22-person teams
- Detection and identification
- First responders

Figure E-1, FM 3-28
Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) (cont)

The CCMRF is a tailored force based on the specialized requirements for CBRNE incident response. It becomes the base organization to which additional federal military forces may be attached or under operational control, based upon the requirements at the incident site. The CCMRF normally consists of three subordinate, multi-Service task forces: task force—operations, task force—medical, and task force—aviation. Each task force has a colonel or equivalent (O-6) in command and is organized around a brigade or equivalent HQ. The composition of each task force varies according to the availability and organization of forces selected for the CCMRF. Subsequent paragraphs describe the CCMRF using example forces. It is important to note that the logistic support to this force is limited and dependent on the theater logistic support established by USARNORTH.

How the CCMRF is organized

Joint Task Force – Civil Support *
- Conducting consequence management operations
- Coordinating and executing operational plans
- Conducting tactical mission planning, execution, and resource allocation
- Synchronizing unity of effort
- Providing military communications in the joint operations area

Task Force – Operations
- Ground mobility operations (transportation)
- Logistics operations
- Isolation-related missions directed by the Joint Task Force-Civil Support
- Isolation force
- Department of Defense site security
- Support for decontamination operations (personnel)
- Engineer operations
- Mortuary affairs

Task Force – Medical
- Casualty collection points
- Patient movement
- Triage and treatment
- Health service support to the joint task force
- Medical augmentation to civilian facilities
- Sanitation operations
- Medical logistics support
- Veterinary care
- Epidemiology support

Task Force – Aviation
- Aerial reconnaissance
- Medical evacuation
- Support to search and rescue
- Transportation support

Specialized Units
- Monitoring for hazards
- Technical extraction
- Decontamination (civilian and military)

* May also be United States Army North contingency command post
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVE (CBRNE) CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT RESPONSE FORCE (CCMRF)

Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) (cont)

CCMRF Operations

Generally, the CCMRF conducts operations in accordance with the six USNORTHCOM phases of Shape, Anticipate, Respond, Operate, Stabilize, and Transition. The phases are not rigid since CCMRF units will perform support actions as needed. The following graphic depicts the general actions that occur in each phase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 0 Shape</th>
<th>Phase I Anticipate</th>
<th>Phase II Respond</th>
<th>Phase III Operate</th>
<th>Phase IV Stabilize</th>
<th>Phase V Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintain situational awareness</td>
<td>Identify mission</td>
<td>Expand C2</td>
<td>Conduct operations</td>
<td>Reduce levels of:</td>
<td>Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify gaps</td>
<td>Assess and coordinate</td>
<td>Deploy forces</td>
<td>Improve IAA</td>
<td>• Operations</td>
<td>Redeploy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase readiness</td>
<td>Deploy incident awareness and assessment (IAA) teams</td>
<td>Conduct JRSOI</td>
<td>Maintain common operational picture (COP)</td>
<td>• Forces</td>
<td>Release operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct training</td>
<td>Identify needed capabilities and shortfalls</td>
<td>Establish joint operational area (JOA)</td>
<td>Report commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR)</td>
<td>• C2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve incident awareness through exercises</td>
<td>Set enablers</td>
<td>Employ forces</td>
<td>Report costs</td>
<td>• Logistics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct public affairs (PA)</td>
<td>Alert units for deployment</td>
<td>Establish rules for the use of force (RUF)</td>
<td>Continue IAA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Phase out C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Report costs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Continue incident awareness liaison</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct post-operational information review</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct after action review (AAR)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Gather and publish lessons learned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Phases may overlap; situational awareness is ongoing
Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) (cont)

CCMRF Operational Considerations

Just as there are tactical and operational considerations for response to domestic disasters and CBRNE incidents, there are overarching operational considerations for CCMRF operations that must be considered for both planning and execution.

- The initial task organization for the task force should stress unit integrity above capability management.
- Exercise C2 through a familiar chain of command if possible. Use mission orders.
- Specify a tactical control (TACON) or support relationship between units from different components and Services.
- Request and integrate experts in CBRNE training and operations.
- Strike a balance between mission accomplishment and risks.
- Stay flexible and be prepared to adapt to unforeseen circumstances.
- Be prepared to deal with panic-stricken citizens. Expect them to be difficult to control.

Pulling it all together . . .

The following slide, often referred to as the “ice cream cone,” provides a unique, holistic view of consequence management response. Note the force package flow from federal to state and local emergency services.

Consequence Management Response Time Line
Homeland Response Force (HRF)

The Homeland Response Force (HRF) requirement stems from the Pentagon's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that explains new constructs under which defense officials will make force structure decisions. Among these constructs is the development of a HRF as a way to field faster, more flexible, consequence management response forces. The DoD plans to restructure its CCMRF by building ten HRF teams based around the United States. The HRF is designed to work in collaboration with FEMA, at the behest of an affected state's governor, to provide rapid response to CBRNE incidents that occur in their states.

There are ten planned National Guard-sourced HRFs to be comprised of National Guard Soldiers and Airmen. Regionally oriented, each of the ten HRFs will be hosted by one state in each of the FEMA regions.

- HRFs will increase the focus of DoD CCMRFs on lifesaving objectives and increase operational flexibility while recognizing the primary role that the governors play in controlling the response to CBRNE incidents that occur in their states.
- The first two HRFs (Ohio and Washington) are expected to be in place no later than the end of FY11, with the remaining eight HRFs expected to be in place no later than FY12.
- Eight HRFs (FEMA Regions Three - Ten) (Massachusetts [supported by Connecticut and Vermont], New York [supported by New Jersey], Pennsylvania, Georgia, Texas, Missouri, Utah and California) will be sourced from single states. Note: the other two HRFs located in FEMA Regions One and Two will be sourced from multiple states within those regions. The state contributing the HRF C2 element will be considered the “host” state.
- As a key element of the new DoD CBRNE Consequence Management enterprise, HRFs will complement existing forces of about 18,000 personnel:
  - One Defense CBRNE Response Force (DCRF), formerly CCMRF 1;
  - Two Consequence Management Command and Control Elements (C2CRE);
  - Fifty-seven Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST); and

The HRFs will operate alongside other National Guard-sourced CCMRFs, like WMD-CSTs and CERFPs, as well as federal-controlled elements of the enterprise, including DCRF, C2CREs, and follow-on forces, when necessary.

- When not deployed for CBRNE consequence management operations, HRF personnel will focus on planning, training, and exercising at the regional level.

HRF Capabilities

- Six-to-twelve hour response posture, similar to that of the existing CERFPs.
- Equipped to deploy via ground transport to CBRNE incident cites, but can be moved by air if necessary.
- The core contains CBRNE capability similar to that found in the existing seventeen CERFPs.
- C2 and security capability.
- Unit size (570 personnel):
  - Medical Team — 45
  - Search & Extraction Team — 50
  - Decontamination Team — 75
  - Security Team — 200
  - C2 — 200
DOMESTIC ALL-HAZARDS RESPONSE TEAM (DART)

Domestic All-Hazards Response Team (DART)

From the 2010 Army Posture Statement . . .

What is it?
The Domestic All-Hazards Response Team (DART) provides Defense Support of Civil Authorities capabilities in response to a catastrophic event. The DART establishes scalable, capability-based force packages that mobilize and deploy to an affected area in order to meet identified capability gaps when coordinated by the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) with consent of the state Adjutants General (TAG). Prior to any incident, the DART conducts contingency planning and coordinates with participating states on existing Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) and Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). Upon request from a supported state, the DART mobilizes, deploys to an affected area, and provides additional C2 in support of a Joint Force HQ. The DART conducts Joint Reception, Staging, Onward-movement and Integration (JRSOI) of inbound operational control forces and establishes Base Support Installations (BSI) / Forward Operating Bases (FOB) for sustaining operations.

The DART concept utilizes the unique capabilities of a division HQ for planning and coordinating the employment of units. Each DART identifies force packages based on the NGB’s ten essential capabilities. These capabilities include C2 (JFHQs for Joint integration with air assets), logistics (property, finance, and maintenance), aviation, military police, engineer, transportation, medical, chemical (with access to one or more CSTs), maintenance capabilities, and signal assets. The DART is divided along FEMA regional boundaries and is well positioned for interagency response.

What has the Army done?
The DART construct was successfully employed during the 2009 Presidential Inauguration by JTF-29 and has also been exercised in Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drills and various other table top and field exercises.

What continued efforts does the Army have planned for the future?
The DART construct is a “pull” rather than “push” concept, which provides a Joint reinforcing response, contingent upon TAG request, reporting to TAG(s) through JFHQ-State. The DART is additive to existing support agreements including Hurricane Matrices and EMAC agreements.

Why is this important to the Army?
The DART construct integrates essential capabilities and assets of the ARNG. In addition to the essential ten capabilities, the DART adds mobility, agility, and efficiency to a domestic response. The DART maximizes the modular structure of the 21st Century Army, and positions the Nation well to respond to any manmade or natural disaster.

From the 2010 Army Posture Statement . . .
The DART mission designates two Guard divisions, every two years, as planners and command and control in the event of an emergency in the United States. DART planning helps Guard leaders know what military resources are available in one state to assist with emergency relief in another. Most importantly, National Guard resources are provided only at the request of, in support of, and under the command of the governor of the state where the emergency exists.

As one of the first divisions to take on the DART mission, the 28th and 35th divisions has the task of building standard operating procedures and force packages that succeeding DART mission holders will use. New York State's 42nd Infantry Division is slated to take over the DART mission in October 2010 in the East and California's 40th Infantry Division in the West. The East mission encompasses 26 states and two U.S. territories and the West, 24 states and one territory. The Guard Bureau has already stood up the East and West, 22-man DART planning teams, comprised of Army and Air Guard personnel.
**PLANNING CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

Staff planning has one principal objective — collectively integrating information with sound doctrine and technical competence to assist the commander in decision making and arriving at effective plans for mission execution. Use of the military decision making process (MDMP) will result in a detailed plan with optimal integration, coordination, and synchronization and minimal risk of overlooking critical planning aspects of an operation. Anticipation, prior preparation, coordination, and staff training are essential components of effective mission planning using the MDMP. From receipt of mission, through mission analysis, to producing an order, there are numerous actions that must be accomplished and considered during planning. For your reference, the July 2010 edition of *The Azimuth* addresses the MDMP in detail, but there are always mission-specific planning considerations that must be taken into account. The following list of example planning action considerations is not meant to be all inclusive of the myriad required during civil support-type operations. Readers are encouraged to review the task possibilities highlighted by the operational and tactical considerations tools for domestic disaster response (pages 24-29) and CBRNE response (pages 32-35) of this edition of *The Azimuth* as a source for many more.

### Example Planning Action Considerations:

- Determine chain of command.
- Determine who will perform personnel tracking—e.g., Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ), Joint Field Office (JFO), or Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) / Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). Is there a civilian counterpart that should be informed?
- Determine if a Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB) should be established.
- Establish C2 with access to phones and computers.
- Track significant events and post them.
- All staff elements should evaluate the area of operation (AO). Have a television, radio, or Internet link to the news and begin collecting information to assist in mission planning and mission analysis.
- Evaluate the AO to determine what impact the lack of civilian infrastructure will have on the unit’s operations.
- Locate a source of maps for the area. Have a hardcopy backup in case of inadequate power.
- Collect contact information within the local area.
- Evaluate and select buildings and areas within the AO that could be used for brigade or battalion level HQ or operations centers.
- Determine how security of the force will be handled. (In most cases, you will provide your own.)
- Determine how military personnel will be billeted. Will they be sleeping outdoors? If so, for how long?
- Consider the need for environmental equipment. Will you need to bring your own?
- Determine where maintenance operations will be set up.
- Bring a basic supply of food and water (3-5 days, etc.)
- Plan for maintenance operations within the AO. How will repair parts be brought in? How will refueling operations occur? What are sources for the various classes of supply?
- Integrate into the Incident Command System (ICS) to facilitate mission tasking.
- Be familiar with the FEMA resource-type categories in order to properly support the request for assistance (RFA). Resource typing is discussed in Section 2.9.
- Plan for handling the media. Does the unit have public affairs support or can it be requested?
- Establish rules for the use of force (RUF). Will unit personnel deploy with weapons and/or civil disturbance gear? Where is that gear located if not on-hand?
- Determine method of communication with the civilian infrastructure.
- There will likely be little planning guidance.
- Plan for communications. Does the existing communications infrastructure exist? Is there landline service? Is there cellular service? How will you operate without phone and Internet connectivity?
- Be aware that military line-of-sight (LOS) radios do not work well in urban areas.
- Risk assessments should include the lack of civilian infrastructure usually relied upon.
Example Planning Action Considerations (cont):

- Determine increased risk to military personnel if subsistence and petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) supplies are not available.
- Determine the condition of the road infrastructure. Are there additional hazards that must be taken into account (driving across swollen rivers, partially blocked roads, etc.)?
- Consider weather effects. What equipment can be brought by personnel to mitigate the environmental hazards?
- Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) should take into account interoperability equipment and expendable items that may not be resupplied in a timely manner (food / water, medical, repair parts, etc.).
- Priority Information Requirements (PIR) may include status of civilian infrastructure and how it may be used by military forces (e.g., Can contracts be established for food / water?)
- Determine staff and troop familiarity with the operational environment.
- Conduct an analysis of accidental and mission risk with special emphasis on the environment and what has changed due to the incident (e.g., fire damage, road impediments, flooding hazards, etc.)
- Ensure all mission changes are briefed and approved by the appropriate authority. Stress the importance of not deviating from the mission or conducting unauthorized tasks.
- Be aware that other assets may already be assigned to the same task, and your unit’s presence may have unintended consequences.
- Expect the unexpected.
- The mission and the commander’s intent must be understood two echelons down.
- Ensure the commander’s intent supports the Principal Federal Officer (PFO), State Coordinating Officer (SCO), unified commander and/ or the Incident Commander.
- Similar to outside the Continental US (OCONUS) missions, team work and communication are critical to success.
- Communicate the commander’s intent throughout the command to promote unity of effort.
- COA development must be coordinated with the NIMS / ICS structure in mind.
- Legal briefings are critical. Military personnel must understand what they can and cannot do in a DSCA environment.
- Mobility guidance will be critical in a disaster area.
- Security measures must be stressed. Always remember that the environment can change and that weather effects are critical in DSCA planning.
- Ensure that all facts and assumptions concerning available infrastructure are reviewed. Assume that nothing will be available and work up from there.

Appendix A of FM 3-28, Planning Checklists, provides a variety of checklists designed to help unit commanders and staffs with the MDMP. These include:

- Initial situational awareness and assessment checklist
- Joint task force checklist
- Organizational and unit checklists
- Planning checklist for the S-1
- Planning checklist for the S-2
- Planning checklist for the S-3
- Planning checklist for the S-4
- Planning checklist for the S-6

Planners should also refer to the DCSA Commander’s Handbook and the Liaison officer’s (LNO) Toolkit as other excellent sources for planning considerations. These may be downloaded from the CAC Combined Arms Doctrine Division (CADD) website at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/.
THE AZIMUTH
TRAINING FEEDBACK AND LESSONS LEARNED

BATTLE STAFF TRAINING TEAM (BSTT)

The Battle Staff Training Team (BSTT) provides outstanding training support to ARNG commanders and their battle staffs as they prepare for mobilization and major training events including Battle Command Training Programs (BCTP), Brigade Combat Team Full-Spectrum Exercises (BCT FSX). The team also provides defense support to civil authorities training for CCMRF, Homeland Response Force, and other State-sponsored training requirements. The BSTT supports the eXportable Combat Training Capability Training (XCTC) via execution of the Leader Training Program (LTP). Most importantly, the BSTT provides critical battle staff training in preparation for deployment to overseas contingencies, in accordance with the priorities established in the ARNG memorandum, NGB-ARZ-R, 5 May 2010, subject: Battle Command Training Capability Program (BCTCP) Training Support Priorities.

BSST - Training The Force

The BSTT conducts home-based training over two MUTA-5 / -6 periods using the staff planning exercise (STAFFEX) and CPX methodology. The program’s design is flexible to meet commander’s training objectives and address unit scheduling and resource constraints.

The BSTT schedule is synchronized with the ARNG’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model. Scheduling is accomplished via ARNG scheduling conferences, unit Commander’s Operations Training Assistants, or through unit direct contact with BCTC-Lvn.

BSTT is a sign-up program, not mandatory; provided at no cost to the unit.

The Training Concept

In FY 11, the BSTT will begin its eighth year providing critical battle staff training support to Army National Guard commanders and their battle staffs as they prepare for deployment into overseas contingency areas, in accordance with the priorities established in the ARNG memorandum, NGB-ARZ-R, 5 May 2010, subject: Battle Command Training Capability Program (BCTCP) Training Support Priorities. The BSTT supports Exportable Combat Training Capability training via execution of the Leader Training Program and also defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) training for Homeland Response Force, CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force, and other State sponsored training requirements.

We continue to focus on assisting brigade and battalion commanders in their challenging task of conducting realistic, stressful, battle command training for their units, and under new contract requirements, will also deliver MDMP training via distributed learning (DL) and Train-the-Trainer (T3) methodologies. The DL and T3 individual training components will come on line during FY 11 and BSTT will provide additional information via this and other communications vehicles once requirements and procedures are set for these new components.

Our efforts include adapting products based on emerging doctrine particularly as it relates to FM 5-0, The Operations Process to continue to impart doctrinally correct tactics, techniques, and procedures for planning and controlling operations in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments.

BSTT focus is on completion of three FY 10 units and preparing for the 117 training events already scheduled for FY 11. As always, training support is on a first come first served basis, in accordance with the priorities established in the aforementioned ARNG-G3, BCTCP Training Support Priorities memo highlighted above. If your battalion / brigade wants first-rate training, please provide, your unit requested training dates; focus for the training; what ARFORGEN year your unit is in, and if the unit is identified for deployment in TY 11 or TY 12. If interested in this great training opportunity please contact any of the POCs listed in this bulletin – we still have available support for FY 11, but it is closing faster than expected.

To schedule, contact:

Battle Command Training Center-Leavenworth
8 Sherman Avenue, Bldg #1952
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Mr. Fred Ortiz
913-758-5086
DSN 585-5086
FAX 913-758-5084
Website: www.bctc.army.mil

Feedback from the BSTT


22.5 Combat and Operational Stress Control Manual for Leaders and Soldiers. 18 March 2009.


02.17. Preventive Medicine Services. 28 August 2000.


02.51. Combat and Operational Stress Control. 6 July 2006.

References (As Stated in FM 3-28)


FM 3-0. Operations. 27 February 2008


FM 3-19.15. Civil Disturbance Operations. 18 April 2005


FM 4-02.17. Preventive Medicine Services. 28 August 2000.

FM 4-02.51. Combat and Operational Stress Control. 6 July 2006.


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PUBLICATIONS


JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

CJCSI 3710.01B. DOD Counterdrug Support. 26 January 2007.


DOD 3025.15. Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. 18 February 1997.


DOD 5209.27. Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense. 7 January 1980.

DOD 5240.01. DOD Intelligence Activities. 27 August 2007.

DOD 5525.5. DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials. 15 January 1996.

DOD 6490.03. Deployment Health. 11 August 2006.


AKO Website Path

Step (1) Sign into AKO and go to the AKO Home Page.
Step (2) Select “Files” in the upper menu block.
Step (3) Select the following, in order, from the left column menu:

“DOD Organizations” / “National Guard” / “National Guard Bureau” / “BCTC” / “BCTC TAFT Library”

NOTE: If not subscribed to the BCTC Knowledge Center, check the small link box to the left and then click the “Subscribe” button in the menu for approval. Approval is automatic. Then continue on:

“BCTC TAFT Library” / “The Azimuth”

The Azimuth Website Path

Follow this link into your Internet browser:


Scroll down to “BCTC TAFT Library” and select, in order --

“The Azimuth” / “FY 2010” / “The Azimuth” of your choice

Or . . .

Step (1) Log onto GKO. Select “ARNG” from the menu on the Home screen.
Step (2) Select the following, in order, from the left column menu:


GKO Website Path

Follow us on facebook (BCTC Ft. Leavenworth) and twitter (BCTC Leavenworth):

www.facebook.com/pages/Fort-Leavenworth-KS/BCTC-Ft-Leavenworth/139377762592

http://twitter.com/BCTCLeavenworth

Note: The BCTC-Lyv URL has been changed from www-bctc.army.mil to www.bctc.army.mil

ARNG BCTC-Lyv

www.bctc.army.mil

53

VOL. 7 ◆ NO. 4 ◆ OCTOBER 2010
ARTICLE SUBMISSION

Since this is your magazine, we need your support in writing and submitting articles for publication.

When writing for The Azimuth ...

- Feature articles can range from 1,500 to 3,000 words, double-spaced pages with normal margins, not counting graphics.
- Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.
- We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles.
- Be aware that submissions become property of the BCTC-Lvn and may be released to other Government agencies or non-profit organizations for re-publication upon request.

What we need from you:

- Contact information (email address, telephone number), a brief statement expressing your desire to have an article published, and a copy of your proposed article in Microsoft Word format.
- A Public Affairs release if your installation or agency requires it. Please include that release with your submission.
- Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic and enliven the article. We need complete captions (the who, what, where, why and how), the photographer’s credits, and the author’s name on the photos. Please do not embed graphics or images within the text, attach them separately. Images should be sent to us in tif. or jpg. formats. Please note where they should appear in the text.
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The BSTT, TAFT, and ABCS-ST teams supporting have hundreds of years of active Army experience, command at all levels through Brigade, staff experience in all warfighting functional areas from Battalion through Corps, and Army Combat Training Center (CTC) experience as Observer/Controllers, operations managers, and system and feedback analysts.

The Azimuth is not a doctrinal product. It is designed to share training knowledge throughout the ARNG. The tips and techniques offered within are written to help Soldiers and trainers execute efficient and effective training at the Battalion and Brigade echelons. If there are questions regarding the tips and techniques presented, or there are tips and techniques that you may want included in future editions of The Azimuth, refer to the following contact list.

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