Abstract

Moral Injury and the Problem of Facing Religious Authority

Why would a soldier suffer moral injury after killing an enemy combatant even when the legal and moral expectations of warfare have been met? Combatants often acknowledge that killing another human being causes them to begin a process of reconciling actions with personal convictions. Importantly, the trigger for this process is not always the knowledge of killing “someone,” but a view of the face and the impact of killing “someone” in particular. Dave Grossman describes this as trauma from a psychological perspective and Jonathan Shay explores the issue as one of morality. This paper explores the impact of killing through the religious lens of Jewish and Christian thought. In light of this, the thesis developed here is that the process of looking into the “face” of one’s enemy, fundamentally brings one into a position of responsibility for the enemy and to deny this responsibility is an ethical and religious action which is a root cause of moral injury.
Moral Injury and the Problem of Facing Religious Authority

Why would a soldier suffer moral injury after killing an enemy combatant even when the legal and moral expectations of warfare have been met? Combatants often acknowledge that killing another human being causes them to begin a process of reconciling actions with personal convictions. The trigger for this process is not always the knowledge of killing “someone,” but a view of the face and the impact of killing “someone” in particular.¹ Dave Grossman describes this as trauma from a psychological perspective² while Jonathan Shay describes it from a moral perspective.³ This paper will explore the impact of killing through the religious lens of Jewish and Christian thought. In light of this, the thesis developed here is that the process of recognizing the face of another person, including an enemy, brings one into a position of responsibility for the person and that denying this responsibility by killing creates an ethical and religious conflict leading to moral injury.

Attempts to define religion are notoriously problematic, not to mention that of religious authority.⁴ Nevertheless, as a boat is tethered to, and circles around its anchor, those who accept religious authority are tethered to certain precepts, around which they continually circle. For example, those in the Jewish and Christian traditions revolve around certain commands that are timeless truths for which they are responsible such as “Thou shalt not murder.”⁵ This is the concept of religious authority used here. Therefore, the problem of religious authority in the Judeo-Christian tradition is not a fallible “robed authority,” but the failure to face and obey the commands of God. The Pentateuch teaches that we must love our neighbor and the New
Testament teaches that we are to love and pray for our enemies. Passages such as these are not recommendations, but commands to which the faithful are “anchored” and for which they are responsible. It is this point of responsibility which will be explored and expanded here in order to appreciate the origins of moral injury. Specifically, the responsibility one person has for another is an innate and aspirational duty that is protected and blessed by God’s commands. It is my hope that understanding the nature of mutual responsibility may assist combatants in the preparing for the possibility of moral injury in a way that is consistent with the nature of humanity and religious authority.

A helpful framework for understanding responsibility in relationship to moral injury is Jonathan Shay’s description of moral injury as a “betrayal of what is right.” Because war complicates the reciprocal nature of responsibility by thrusting one man into mortal combat with another, I suggest that the cycles of regret and guilt are indicative of one circling around a deeper sense of fractured responsibility. This may not be immediately evident to a veteran in the same way that more deliberate ethical conflicts, such as the giving or withholding respect, can be remembered and understood. The idea is that fighters tend to respect fighters whether they are in the ring or on the battlefield. If one’s opponent is denied respect, a key step in preserving the innate sense of responsibility is lost setting the conditions for inhumane treatment adding an additional layer of “betraying of what is right.” For this reason and other variables in war, moral injury may not be experienced by all to the same degree, but can be experienced by any combatant especially in the face of irrepressible memories of killing a specific person.

Preparing civilians for duty as combatants has historically been limited to basic tactical training with little thought to mental or spiritual preparation beyond unit cohesion and the inclusion of chaplains to provide for specific religious services and counseling. By World War
I, there was an expectation that the burden of national defense was a “sacred duty” to be shared by citizens willing to make the supreme sacrifice while those who opposed war on moral grounds were demonized as unpatriotic. Thinkers from Europe speculated on what virtues war would bring to humanity. A young Ludwig Wittenstein thought that being close to death might bring him the “light of life” and wrote, “Now I might have the possibility to be a decent person, because I find myself face-to-face with death.” Sigmund Freud saw war as the destruction of artifice and the return to the authentic: “It eliminates the layers of sediment deposited in us by civilization and it allows the primitive man to reappear.”

However, World War I produced a different and devastating reality. Wittenstein was left “speechless,” and widespread doubt was cast on the notion that facing death for one’s country was a means of virtue. General Patton later provided a pithy new perspective and famously stated that the point of war is not to die for your country but to give the enemy a chance to die for his country. Interestingly, by the end of World War II, General S.L.A Marshall concluded nearly 75% of men facing the enemy resisted the act of killing another human being in combat to the point of conscientious objection despite training, orders, or even the instinct of self-preservation. As a result, training changed to incorporate human shaped targets and reflexive fire drills to condition trainees to fire with greater frequency and accuracy boosting the numbers of combatants firing with the intent to kill to 55% in Korea and 95% in Vietnam.

Some speculate this training has raised the numbers and severity of combatants who suffer psychological damage. If this is the case, what is the essence of what Marshall described as “the point of being a conscientious objector?” Grossman argues that across cultures and time, it is fundamentally the recognition of the enemy’s humanity, particularly by a view of
the face, or efforts to avoid recognition of the face during combat and the act of killing. What happens when the point of conscientious objection is crossed? The combatant’s action crosses a moral line of right or wrong that cannot be forgotten. Shay notes that this loss of innocence in our culture was referred to as *themis* in ancient Greece, a “betrayal of what is right,” referring to the loss of an adult’s cloak of moral safety.

Both Grossman and Shay describe the psychological process used to de-humanize the enemy in order to make killing more tolerable. For example, avoiding visual contact, using profane and de-humanizing terms, failing to respect enemy or civilian dead, intentional or unintentional misuse of lethal force can all lead some combatants to later reflect upon their actions with remorse or bitterness, even if the actions were “justified” by the state. As the memories of these circumstances become fixed over time by recurring images in memories and dreams, regret may take on greater significance in the minds of veterans causing some to wonder how they might be accountable for their actions in combat.

Many veterans look beyond human responsibility to divine accountability and how they may answer for past actions raising an important point for clarification. While verbalizing one’s fear of accountability may be an indicator of moral injury, so might a public display of confidence before God. For example, one World War II veteran reflected upon his past stating, “The point of his bayonet was no further than you are from me when I shot him . . . I’m not a young man anymore, and soon I’ll have to answer to my Maker for what I have done.” Conversely, there are some such as Chris Kyle who claimed he could answer to God for every shot he took even while he suffered inner turmoil. In both cases, a traumatic killing happened that prompted inner turmoil and concerns over accountability. In contexts such as these religious authority is often used as means to ease turmoil or resolve questions of accountability.
However tempting it is to assume this to be the primary purpose of religious authority, care must be taken not to confuse the original purpose of religious authority to bless and protect others with the necessary (and gracious) power of religious authority to forgive the sins committed against others. Many are familiar with the refrain, “There is power in the blood,” but the sacrificial systems of the Old Testament came only after Adam chose to disobey God’s command and after Cain chose to ignore God’s word of warning. The original purpose of God’s word in addition to fostering a relationship with God was to provide both blessing and protection for Eve and for Able. However, Adam and Cain both resisted God’s word for selfish reasons which resulted in bringing shame and violence to those for whom they were responsible.27

In order to further explore the nature of responsibility, I will first summarize some of the thoughts of Emmanuel Levinas and Paul Ricouer as two voices from the Jewish and Christian traditions. These men are serious thinkers who speak from the experience of war as combatants and POWs. I cannot write as one who has mastered their methods, but only as one who views some of their conclusions as useful in understanding ethics within combat. They are concerned with exploring the conditions for human recognition, although not for the purpose of describing the effects of combat per se. However, what they present demonstrates why the research of Grossman and Shay on human recognition and the face is well grounded.

Both men make similar points, but from different perspectives. They demonstrate that the wellbeing of the “self” is found by recognizing the face (humanity) of the “other” and in being responsible for that person, not from a position of power or paternalism, but in the greater sense of service and sacrifice. As individuals who personally suffered and witnessed war they are able to provide the “mechanics” of why feelings of regret, responsibility and accountability become acute in ways that few philosophers can. Their ideas are not unique to themselves, but
come forward with a vocabulary and clarity as ones who plumbed the depths of hardship found in war.

Emmanuel Levinas was a Pole born to a Jewish family, who made his way to France via Russia and Germany. He entered the French Army early in WWII, was captured, and spent the remainder of the war as a POW. Just as Grossman and Shay observe that the face of the enemy creates a sense of understanding of what is right and what has gone wrong, Levinas argues that ethics and personal awareness begins with a view of another’s face. He writes that the view of the face reveals a fundamental expression saying, “Do not kill me,” and beyond that, a primordial expression from “Infinity” saying, "Thou Shalt not kill." This visual encounter is the genesis of ethics calling the goodness of the self into action by extending dignity and accepting responsibility for one’s neighbor. But what if the self decides to “totalize” and kill the other as Levinas observes in the “sober coldness” of Cain who defiantly questioned God asking, “Am I my brother’s keeper?” Rejecting responsibility for Able and killing him had a lasting effect. Though God was merciful in how he called Cain to account, he still lived under the bondage of a curse. By referring to Cain, Levinas is not attempting to equivocate wanton murder with necessary killing in combat, but is simply arguing that in the ultimate sense, face to face killing results in bondage because of the futility in attempting to deny human fraternity and mutual responsibility. In much the same way, Shay observed that killing in combat resulted in a type of “enslavement” among combatants suffering moral injury and the Greeks believed that Mars, the god of war, deceives its participants of its true nature.

Paul Ricouer was born into a Protestant Christian family in Valance, France. His father was killed in WWI and as an adult Ricouer was drafted into the French Army during WWII, was soon captured and remained a POW for the duration of the war. Although Ricouer does not use
the term “moral injury,” he is concerned with listening to the stories of those who have been victimized and experienced violence and what this type of interaction implies in the ethics of the human to human encounter. He argues that listening to victims is a responsibility for the self and that the sum of responsibility is a “counting on” and “being accountable for” another, i.e., the victim. Refusing to listen, or even denying these stories is a defense mechanism that shields the listener from any sense of responsibility for the victim, but it also “kills the victim a second time” by explaining away and emptying the “murderous events” of meaning.

Therefore, the responsibility to listen to a victim is a process that engenders mutual recognition and responsibility because of the way the self should allow the other to be the primary concern of the ethical relationship, an idea from which Ricoeur draws inspiration and sees a parallel by what is taught in Gospels, “Whoever would save his life must lose it.”

The thrust of Levinas’ and Ricoeur’s thought is that the self is one who primarily encounters the other and is therefore responsible for that person by either receiving the view of the face or verbal testimony. Ethics then is not something that starts or is determined in isolation, but comes to the self by being responsible for those who are encountered. Bondage or moral injury is a result of breaking or denying this innate and ethical bond of responsibility. As an aside, Ricoeur’s work helps explain why those who suffer moral injury find good counsel so cathartic and why those who resist speaking of their experiences struggle so mightily.

Additionally, Levinas provides insight into the issue of survivor’s guilt. In these cases the self has accepted responsibility for the safety of his or her friend. But when death comes by the hand of the enemy, the self, now a survivor, is haunted by feelings of responsibility such as, “I should have done more” or hold him or herself accountable by thinking, “It should have been
me.” Sadly, substance abuse, depression, and suicide sometimes become the means of being accountable for the “sin” of survival after combat.

During combat any number of tragedies may happen that illustrate how the violation of responsibility was not the intent of combatants especially when civilians or even children are killed. For example, a civilian driving a car with faulty brakes is unable to stop at a traffic control point (TCP) with tragic results, or civilians become lost and confused in combat and literally end up in the wrong place at the wrong time. Young combatants may try to shake off these events at the moment and say, “It’s tough to be them,” but the regret and growing need to be accountable to someone for their actions often becomes undeniable. Furthermore, in all of these circumstances the combatants may be well within the rules of engagement and engage the right people, but as accounts from men such as CPT Kudo illustrate, death and killing in combat cannot be reduced to a legal matter when in fact it is a moral matter. Making it a legal matter is appealing, for then the responsibility and accountability might rest on the desks of lawyers.

The circumstances just mentioned are as understandable as they are tragic, but the arrival of a genuinely violent person(s) on the battlefield is a different matter and unfortunately, no war seems to be complete without them. Theoretically, the legal and personal justifications for killing these people in combat come together in such a way that one’s conscious should be free from guilt by killing the worst of the worst, if it is even possible to identify who they are. Such is a line of inquiry that leads to “Just War Theory” which Robert Meagher believes tends to confuse and emphasize the legal over the moral, pushing the humanity out of the enemy and oneself. The humanity of the enemy must be kept in view, for if the treatment of the enemy could be different based on various moral opinions, Levinas and Ricouer would have little to offer in their theories other than interesting and humane thoughts. However, because the truly
violent are human, they challenge the temptation that responsibility to violent actors can be suspended because any encounter, with any human being, is inherently one of responsibility. Granted, one may or may not find the arguments of these men compelling, but of more importance is their consistency with the religious authority of the Jewish and Christian traditions.

These religions continually call those of faith to “Love thy neighbor” without apology for circumstance because they originate from God’s will for one human to protect and be a blessing to another. Yet, facing this religious authority is challenging, for if it is hard to face and love a contentious neighbor, how much more an enemy?

Jewish tradition summarizes the extent of these commands by stating, “Love thy neighbor is one of the great principles in the Torah.”45 The great Rabbi Hillel adds, “If I am not for myself, who is for me? And if I am only for myself, what am I? And if not now, when?”46 In positive terms, the command to “love your neighbor” or “love your enemy” can also become a means to recognizing God47 in the Jewish faith as Levinas implies by referring to the “Infinite” and the “Glory of the Infinity.”48 For those of the Christian faith the scope of the Old and New Testaments are summarized by Jesus as the first and second greatest commandments, “Love the Lord your God with all your heart, and the second is like unto it, love your neighbor as yourself.”49 This religious authority is not perceived to be a problem when the “other” is God, a friend, or even a stranger. But when one’s neighbor becomes an enemy, the gravity of religious authority becomes apparent once it is grasped that loving one’s neighbor as oneself “is like unto” loving God with all your heart. This is profound and speaking as a Christian, the failure to consider the whole of this command is the first step in compartmentalizing religious authority, consigning God or certain neighbors (especially the bad ones) to abstract terms, obscuring the humanity of the neighbor and reducing religious authority to an absolution for
When this happens religion can be weaponized and the original purpose of religious authority to protect and bless one’s neighbor is undermined. The problem among Christians has always been a selective application of this command which in essence is a resistance in facing any whom we find to be distasteful in much the same way that Isaiah conveyed his prophecy, “We hid as it were, our faces from him; he was despised, and we esteemed him not.”

The problem of religious authority for those who profess faith is that the enemy must literally be faced and recognized as being squarely within the boundaries of the religious action of receiving prayer and love. To remove the enemy outside of these boundaries is not just a matter of denying God’s commands, but a resistance in recognizing one’s responsibility for the enemy. How is this to be understood by those of faith who find themselves in combat? Commanders are sent to command in the worst places in the world, and the individual infantryman may be asked to maneuver under the worst circumstances possible. Each individual has a unique and complex set of challenges that rarely allow for one to sit down with the enemy, negotiate, and express genuine concerns over a cup of chai. Unfortunately, “There is a time for war.” Because war is never ideal, the tough love and discipline from a battalion of infantrymen may be used as a “hard stop” against a violent enemy in order to bring peace. Whatever the larger political circumstances may be, the individual responsibility to the enemy requires wisdom and discernment and admittedly invites the tension of doing the moral right or wrong at any given time. But perfect decision making is not the point of religious authority and neither the prophets nor Jesus give any indication that these commands to love and pray for the enemy are easy and free of tension.

The point of the tension is two-fold. First, it refuses to give one autonomy over the decision to kill, even if society, to include the church, grants legal and moral authority to kill out
of necessity in order to prevent the creation of additional widows and orphans. As result, individuals who bear the burden of killing are often left with feelings of uncertainty for specific decisions in combat. This is precisely the point that Ricoeur and Levinas make by presenting ethics as a challenge to personal autonomy or sovereignty in favor of responsibility to the other.

The second reason for the tension is found in the idea that the commands are duties that engender a relational responsibility for the enemy and accountability to God that leads to a communal action. This is why it is problematic for those of the Jewish or Christian faiths to argue that killing is a matter of the heart or intent as if the self is a solitary moral agent in these moments. Although neither the actions of Moses nor the words of Jesus in relationship to the enemy neglect intent, the sum of their teaching revolves around communal action not individual intent.53

At a minimum one is called to the activity of prayer, which for Christians is an active dependence and fellowship with the Holy Spirit which should bring the self into a struggle with God over one’s response to enemy action and how to meet that enemy responsibly. It may start with a prayer for safety and lead to prayer for members of the unit and then prayer for the enemy. Whatever the content may be, it is a community action rooted in humility before God and responsibility to one’s enemy.

My purpose is not to disparage the Augustinian teaching of intent (of which I am largely ignorant) but to state that a communal action is in view and is qualitatively different than the secular view of the individual as being solely responsible for one’s thoughts (intent) and different from Buddhism which teaches that individual intent facilitates the production of unwholesome thought and action.54 For those of faith, failing to wrestle with and face the tension of religious authority prior to combat, if not during combat, leads to dangerous moral terrain, for as Jürgen Moltmann writes, “It is not the evil he does, but the good he does not do, not his misdeeds
but his omissions, that accuse him.” So writes Moltmann, who speaks as a German combatant and POW from WWII who later became a Christian philosopher and theologian.

Even if all this becomes lost during the heat and confusion of combat, at a minimum this moral tension keeps the enemy’s humanity in view. Shay and Grossman believe this step alone might mitigate a dangerous aspect of moral injury if for no other reason than because it places meaning upon the events surrounding death in combat rather than making allowances for dehumanizing an enemy who may simply have been fulfilling a duty to his community. It should also be understood that even if one does approach combat with humility and wrestles with the tension inherent in religious authority it does not mean that one will avoid moral injury. Rather, one should expect the possibility of moral injury as part of the service and sacrifice of protecting those who need protection.

**Conclusion:** Because war breaks the natural process of mutual responsibility, combatants tend to soften the anxiety of killing by temporarily denying the humanity of the enemy or presuming the grace of God’s forgiveness as a way to protect one’s conscious for killing. However, to violate the natural order of the human-to-human encounter in war with or without a belief in God creates regret and anxiety, and it inhibits one’s ability to “reconnect” with loved ones, the very ones to whom combatants feel the most responsible. Furthermore, the trauma of war often leads to an overt anger toward the ones who combatants believe were most responsible for their personal wellbeing, typically God or political leaders. In the midst of these issues, healing becomes the concern for those suffering from moral injury. To wit: Robert Meagher points out that the emotions of regret and the desire to “make up” for things done in combat leads back to the Greek term *metagnosis* or repentance. Interestingly, Meagher notes that this term in classical Greek refers more to “make over.”

Although the purpose of this paper is to
identify a root cause of moral injury, Meagher hits on a concept that is consistent with the need addressed in the Jewish and Christian traditions to restore broken relationships. Perhaps it could be said that what is needed for healing is an ability to “re-make responsibility over again” with others. However, this discussion and the resources of religious authority regarding forgiveness and repentance as it relates to human recognition and responsibility are reserved for the appendix for the sake of maintaining focus on this paper’s thesis.

**Recommendations:** The thesis suggests that the process of recognizing the face and humanity of the enemy brings one into a position of responsibility to the enemy and is consistent with religious authority. Where this principle is acknowledged, life has the possibility to flourish, but where this principle is set aside, the potential for moral bondage abounds regardless of whether one believes in God and scriptural authority or not. Nevertheless, if the military community is to be a profession in its conduct of war and serious about addressing moral injury, is there not a moral imperative to be professionally responsible to the enemy beyond documents such as the Rules of Engagement and Laws of War which tend to emphasize legal compliance? Pete Kilner believes we should teach ethical decision making prior to combat and LTCs Fromm, Pryor, and Cutright write that Army values sometimes only extend as far as other U.S. personnel and not to the enemy. Additionally, they have suggested that humility be added as a value for the Army. Their thinking is good, for if the only consideration in our values is of “me and mine,” we fail to address a core issue of the human to human encounter in combat. The purpose of presenting Ricoeur and Levinas is to briefly demonstrate that recognition of the other entails an innate ethic of responsibility. One way to prepare combatants for war is to teach respect for the enemy as a means of responsibility that holds the enemy within the boundaries of humanity. Teaching this holds us accountable to the relationship which exists
with the enemy however abstract it may seem until it suddenly becomes visible and violent. Violence will spark a range of emotions, but again fighters tend to respect fighters whether they are in the ring or on the battlefield and when respect is withdrawn the actions that follow can sow the seeds of regret rather than honor long after the fight is finished and passions have subsided. Therefore, respect needs to be trained for precisely because of the unpredictable nature of violent encounters. An anecdotal story from Madeleine L'Engle brings forward this truism along with the theory presented in this paper.

“Father's war was not like our wars today. In his war the enemy still had a face. Once, a good many years after the war, my parents were eating dinner in a Spanish inn, and suddenly Father got up from the table in great excitement and rushed across the dining room to a man who, in his turn, was hurrying to greet Father. The two men embraced warmly, and Father brought his friend over to the table to meet Mother: the man was a German; he had been an officer in the Kaiser's army; he and Father had fought against each other at the front. It is difficult to understand such an incident today. These two ‘enemies’ were genuinely happy to see each other; they had shared an extraordinary experience; they respected and honored each other. I wonder if that can happen today.”

My point is not to throw a romantic light upon the nature of combat or minimize the perniciousness of certain members of the enemy, but to illustrate respect as an aspect of the warrior ethos that maintains a perspective of responsibility to those we fight even if we never meet them in person. Young men enter combat far more interested in protecting one another and meeting the test of combat than in dehumanizing the enemy. Some may engage in face-to-face combat as stated in ADP 1 and hearing a leader state, “There is your enemy. Respect him or die.” communicates a tone and resolve necessary to keep a young combatant responsibly alert on physical, emotional, and spiritual levels. I recognize that ADP 1 (Appendix 2) mentions that respect should be given to all, but I recommend that the core Army Value of respect be re-considered to explicitly include respect for the enemy since these values are memorized and referred to on a regular basis by Soldiers of all ranks. For example, the
definition could be changed to read, “Treat people as they should be treated. In the Soldier’s Code, we pledge to treat others with dignity and respect to include those whom we engage in combat. Respect is what allows us to appreciate the best in other people…”

Such wording would be consistent with all military branches who already call its members to a higher level of conduct and moral leadership than is expected of civilians. Furthermore, an approach such as this could easily be implemented as an institutional value, a MOS specific value, and as an individual value that is also consistent with the personal beliefs many have regarding religious authority and humanity in general.

Humans are not designed to easily accept the physical, emotional and moral destruction found in war and will suffer moral injury when sent to war and as a result, military sacrifice carries scars prompting at least one individual to recommend that civilians thank Soldiers for their sacrifice rather than their service.65 This is why we must seek to understand the effects of war and look beyond a purpose that revolves around winning to an ethic that defends the defenseless, the human dignity of U.S. service members, and the dignity of those we engage in combat.66 This will not mean soldiers will never fire weapons in anger or lose their sense of humanity in combat, but perhaps they may train for war in such a way that they enter combat having been encouraged to consider a responsibility beyond themselves. Perhaps they may also deploy with an understanding that casually or deliberately denying the enemy humanity and respect during combat leads to a slow death even if the physical fight is won.67

Therefore, we should not “weary in doing good” or hesitate to translate the countless personal efforts of respecting the enemy during the last thirteen years of combat into an Army Value that prepares the next generation of combatants for the reality of war and moral injury.

*In Omnia Paratus*
Appendix 1

In a study on Vietnam veterans those who had a positive view of God and sought forgiveness fared better than those who felt alienated by God for various reasons. This seems to coincide with religious “common sense.” However, it is important and necessary to understand how the resources and doctrines of the Jewish and Christian faiths have influenced Emmanuel Levinas as a philosopher and Jürgen Moltmann as a theologian as they describe how recognition and responsibility lead to “freedom” and “life.”

Levinas believes that freedom was possible through a comprehensive view of forgiveness. He does not speak to the issue of killing in particular on but as one who has suffered in a way that reflects upon his time as a POW. Drawing inspiration from Lamentations 3:3 he writes, “To tend the cheek to the smitter and to be filled with shame,” is a trauma of persecution in which the self is to pass from the outrage to the responsibility for the persecutor. In this case, responsibility means that he not only forgives the persecutor of sins, but he becomes the expiation and substitution for the persecutor’s sins and in this sense maintains responsibility and accountability for the other. This is necessary for Levinas’ thinking because he states that freedom cannot ever be gained by mastery over the other and indeed, bondage is the result of one’s attempt for mastery over the other because in reality such a move is a retreat into the safety of one’s own mind for “self-affirmation” and “self-discovery.”

Whereas Levinas drew from his Jewish background which teaches forgiveness for sin by substitution, Jürgen Moltmann contributes as a Christian and uses the concepts of substitution and forgiveness in Trinitarian terms. Moltmann believed he and his fellow countrymen in post-war Germany had been “imprisoned” by the guilt of initiating violence against so many and
wondered if they might be forgiven and have life. He understood that “life” depended upon recognition of the victim because it was only in the recognition of the victim that the perpetrator could truly know oneself just as the Apostle Peter did not truly understand his offense until he looked Jesus in the eye after denying him and hearing the cock crow. But, Moltmann believed there were three problems. First, most perpetrators resist facing their victims. Moltmann writes, “Victims have long memories, but those who caused suffering have short memories. They don’t know what they have done and don’t want to know. So the perpetrators are dependent on the victims if they want to turn away from death.” Second, the victims who needed to be recognized had been killed and so visual recognition was impossible. Third, even if the surviving victims could be found for whom the perpetrator had been responsible the victims “have no right either to condemn them or forgive them.” This does not mean the victim has no desire to forgive the perpetrator, but the authority of a victim is limited only to helping the perpetrator see himself or herself for who he or she and therefore cannot become an expiation for their the sins.

Moltmann thought of Christianity in terms of hope and that Christianity is inspired by an object that is hoped for, the object being Jesus Christ. Moltmann then presents Christ to his countrymen as the one who was tortured. While Levinas leads one to consider that the hostage (victim) be the substitute for the violent neighbor, Moltmann argues that it is the recognition of the tortured Jesus who is the substitute for the face of the victims. This recognition becomes the moment of truth - “The mask falls. The torturer recognizes himself for what he is.” Yet, hope is gained and not lost because the authority of that “judge” is based in the one “who bears the sins of the world.” It is in this moment that “justice creates new life.” By placing the offending humans in a position to view himself, Christ carries the religious authority of Colossians 1:27
which states “He is our hope” by effectively being responsible and accountable for the sins of the perpetrators and therefore brings life to those trapped by guilt.\textsuperscript{75}

In these two ways, Levinas and Moltmann draw from their respective faiths to provide a basis for how one suffering from either the trauma of violence or the trauma of initiating violence might re-make responsibility and understand accountability through prayer and the action of Christ. It is true that there are those such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, also a WWII combatant and philosopher, who do not draw upon religious authority but sincerely accept the regret that he could not act upon his intrinsic responsibility to love those whom he presumably killed by calling in artillery strikes.\textsuperscript{76} As a result he wishes to re-establish renewed efforts of love.\textsuperscript{77} Merleau-Ponty does not link this responsibility to an accountability to God or look to God’s commands or actions as a resource to re-establishing accountability but seeks to do so by generosity with the next human encounter.\textsuperscript{78} However, the value of religious authority as found in the Old and New Testaments, in addition to teaching responsibility for the other, is an acceptance of accountability that lies beyond the self for every action taken. For where there is accountability, there is the possibility of reconciliation, and where one finds reconciliation there lies the essence of religious authority, not as a tool to be mastered, but as source of love that dismantles the grip of fear.
WHY AND HOW THE ARMY FIGHTS

2-19. The Army defends the security and integrity of the United States as a sovereign nation. It protects the rights and interests of the American people, by conducting military operations as directed by civilian leaders in a manner that also respects the basic rights of all others, as prescribed in the law of armed conflict.

2-22. It is critical for Army professionals to understand that they are the institution behind which the Constitution extends and protects the rights of every American. If we are to maintain our legitimacy as a profession and safeguard the United States, we cannot afford to misuse the lethal power given to us by the Nation. Every failure of Army professionals to honor basic rights and adhere to the law of armed conflict diminishes the trust of the American people and the respect of the international community. These failures are incidents where a few members of the Army Profession cause great harm to the legitimacy of our profession and our Nation.

THE ARMY ETHIC AND THE APPLICATION OF FORCE

2-29. A fourth principle of the law of armed conflict is unnecessary suffering. This is a more complicated requirement than the other three principles, since it has implications for force design, weapons development, and tactical employment of certain systems. Sometimes referred to as the principle of superfluous injury or humanity, this principle requires military forces to avoid inflicting gratuitous violence on the enemy. This principle has significant impact on the development and fielding of certain weapons systems. For example, in the late 1980s the Army developed and tested a laser weapon that could automatically detect and disable enemy optics, such as an antitank gun sight. However, the laser used to destroy the optics also had the potential to permanently blind the enemy gunner. The Army never fielded the system. Both military and civilian professionals will encounter this principle in the course of their careers, directly or indirectly. Tactically, this principle imposes restraints on the individual Soldiers involved in close combat. For example, a sniper team may not deliberately maim an enemy combatant to inflict crippling injury and tempt others to come to the target’s rescue.

HOW WE LIVE – WITH VALUES AND BY ETHICAL PRINCIPLES

2-34. Army professionals treat each other and all humans with dignity and respect—treating others as they should be treated. They build trust within the profession and with the Nation through honorable service. Trustworthiness comes from the positive belief and faith in the competence, moral character, and resolute commitment of comrades and fellow professionals.
and power out of which the modern world has been constructed.”

Talal Asad. “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological category,” in Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 54. Electronic Copy (accessed April 2015). Asad discusses the process of transposing religion from a supernatural to a natural history, from a theological to an anthropological category and then discusses various methods of how religion can be understood. William T. Cavanaugh. The Myth of Religious Violence. New York: Oxford University Press. 2009. Cavanaugh develops his discussion in chapter two by discussing how religion is often defined in either substantivist or functionalist terms, and that religion as a term is a concept that constructs and is constructed by different kinds of political configurations therefore giving it multiple expressions.

Tomoko Masuzawa. The Invention of World Religions; or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) 319. “This concept of religion as a general, transcultural phenomenon, yet also as a distinct sphere in its own right . . . is patently groundless.” Masuzawa notes the tendency in the west to create history and the “science of religion” and as such the discourse about religions was also a discourse about secularization as a result of categorizing topics of study such as economics, political science, and sociology. This has resulted in dozens and dozens of different definitions for religions.

Talal Asad. “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological category,” in Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 54. Electronic Copy (accessed April 2015). Asad discusses the difficulties of authority and power associated with religion by writing, “My aim has been to problematize the idea of an anthropological definition of religion by assigning that endeavor to a particular history of knowledge and power out of which the modern world has been constructed.”

1 William L. Eerdmans Publishing Company. A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans’s Publishing Company. 1988. 346. Exodus 20:13. The sixth commandment is commonly remembered as “Thou shalt not kill!” but is more properly translated, “Thou shalt not murder” from Biblical Hebrew as done in the NIV and NET. Killing is translated as (harag) and murder the same word (rasah), which means murder and also encompasses the meaning of careless or neglectful killing. While many civilians assume the sixth commandment is the one they have kept, combatants assume this is the one they have broken. Two things need to be said here. First, because of the use of words for killing and murder in the Old Testament, combatants must keep the moral issues of both in view and refrain from reducing the vocabulary of harag as permissible in terms of being “legal” as a way of artificially “keeping” the commandment for personal or societal accountability. Secondly, killing in combat happens, but it does not lead to good because it is a process that indicates that not all is well in the world during war. One’s innate hope for what is right or good as described by C.S. Lewis can quickly be lost and violated in what is a “fallen” sinful world.

2 Matthew 5:43-48

7 I have intentionally left out any idea of proper preparation as a means to prevent moral injury. Prevention may be a result of proper preparation but at best, prevention can only be hoped for on a case by case basis depending on who the individual is. Nevertheless, my line of thought is that just as Alcoholics Anonymous maintains that the first step toward recovery is acknowledging the problem, understanding the issues of accountability may be a step forward in recovery for those struggling with moral injury.

8 Grossman. On Killing. 117. An example of regret as a starting point for moral injury is the following: “This was the first time I had killed anybody and when things quieted down I went and looked at a German I knew I had shot. I remember thinking that he looked old enough to have a family and I felt sorry. On page 39 Glenn Gray describes his own personal guilt and anguish resulting from his WWII experiences, and cries out with the pain of every self-aware soldier who has thought this matter through: “I, too, belong to this species. I am ashamed not only of my own deeds, not only of my nation’s deeds, but of human deeds as well. I am ashamed to be a man.” This, says Gray, “is the culmination of a passionate logic which begins in warfare with the questioning of some act the soldier has been ordered to perform contrary to his conscience.”

9 Grossman. On Killing. 39. In discussing the nature and source of the resistance to kill, Grossman touches on this aspect of mutual responsibility, “In killing the grunts of North Vietnam, the grunts of America had killed a part of themselves.”

10 Grossman, On Killing. 74. “We thought we had managed all right,” he told Holmes, “we kept the awful things out of our minds, but now I’m an old man and they come out from where I hid them. Every night.”


And thus again we have developed organs to see German idealism.” Scheler theorized that, “War reestablishes in our consciousness the true, realistic relationship between life and death.” Thomas Mann argued, “In this sense, the result of war can well be a ‘superior humanity’ an elevation, a maturity, a nobilization of the human.” Despite its horrors, war can produce “freedom, and religious serenity, a detached attitude toward life, and the ability to hover above fear and hope, which is undoubtedly the opposite of moral degradation, and thus, the overcoming of death.”

14 Losurdo. Heidegger and the Ideology of War. 22.
15 Losurdo. Heidegger and the Ideology of War. 18.
18 Grossman. On Killing. 30. S.L.A. Marshall studied why most soldiers failed to fire their weapons and concluded that “the average and healthy individual . . . has such an inner and usually unrealized resistance towards killing a fellow man that he will not of his own volition take life if it is possible to turn away from that responsibility . . . At the vital point,” says Marshall, the soldier “becomes a conscientious objector.”

20 Rita Nakashima Brock and Gabrella Lettini. Soul Repair: Recovering from Moral Injury after War. Boston: Beacon Press. 2012. Xvii. The testimony that some “veterans have made about shooting unarmed civilians in a split second, without making a conscious decision to take a life” has been attributed to the conditioning of reflexive fire drills.
21 Grossman. On Killing. 28 & 29. This lack of enthusiasm for killing the enemy causes many soldiers to posture, submit, or flee, rather than fight; it represents a powerful psychological force on the battlefield; and it is a force that is discernible throughout the history of man. The application and understanding of this force can lend new insight to military history, the nature of war, and the nature of man. 128. “The eyes are the window of the soul, and if one does not have to look into the eyes when killing, it is much easier to deny the humanity of the victim. The eyes bulging out ‘like prawns’ and blood shooting out of the mouth are not seen. The victim remains faceless, and one never needs to know one’s victim as a person.

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23. Grossman. On Killing. . . . In each of these instances the presence of the hood or blindfold ensures that the execution is completed and serves to protect the mental health of the executioners. Not having to look at the face of the victim provides a form of psychological distance that enables the execution party and assists in their subsequent denial and the rationalization and acceptance of having killed a fellow human being.”

Shay. Achillies in Vietnam 4 & 5. Such as giving bronze stars and CIBs even after it was recognized that those killed were civilians. 9. And the discussion of the failure of state authority and the betrayal of what is right.
27 Shay. Achillies in Vietnam 115 & 148. This issue cuts right to the heart of the critics (and encouragements) that Jonathan Shay offers to church leaders as a result of working with veterans who have been confused and disenchanted after being taught the power of religious authority rather than the original purpose of religious authority as a means of understanding war and killing. Dr. Robert Meagher also has some notable thoughts on this in Killing from the Inside Out. For the purposes of this paper, responsibility rather than accountability will be the main emphasis of religious authority.
28 In the words of Levinas, “Ethics precedes ontology.”
30 Levinas. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. 199. Levinas capitalizes “Other” in this case to indicate humanity at large.
31 Paul Ricoeur makes a similar argument that the nonviolent testimony of a victim creates an ethic that leads the reader of a text or verbal testimony to lift up the priority of the other and to be accountable for their care.
32 Levinas. Otherwise Than Being 10.
moral injury because of a shifting moral terrain that desensitizes combatants to “push the humanity out of themselves and the enemy.”

The other way is, possibly more than any other factor, responsible for the perpetuation of atrocity and horror in our world today. . . . And this simple, naïve tendency to disbelieve or look for meaning.

Just as one hesitates to kill in the face of extreme pressure and despite the threat of violence, one has difficulty imagining—and believing—the existence of atrocity despite the existence of facts. . . . And this simple, naïve tendency to disbelieve or look for meaning.

This effectively results in the “ethical primacy of the other than the self over the self.”

Ricoeur argues that denying stories from those who suffered evil is a selfish choice to passively ignore the victim by a process of what he calls “forgetfulness” that kills the victim a second time by using “explanations” or excuses for ignoring the story that effectively level off and empty the murderous events of meaning.

Grossman. 214. Grossman echos Ricoeur’s point, “Perhaps denial of mass atrocity is tied to our innate resistance to killing. Just as one hesitates to kill in the face of extreme pressure and despite the threat of violence, one has difficulty imagining—and believing—the existence of atrocity despite the existence of facts. . . . And this simple, naïve tendency to disbelieve or look for meaning.


Paul Ricoeur. Ones Self as Another. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1992. 165-168. He discusses the distinction between self-consistency and self-constancy, the latter being a responsibility which is the sum of “counting on” and “being accountable for.”

Ricoeur. “Figuring the Sacred: “The Memory of Suffering.” 290. Ricoeur argues that denying stories from those who suffered evil is a selfish choice to passively ignore the victim by a process of what he calls “forgetfulness” that kills the victim a second time by using “explanations” or excuses for ignoring the story that effectively level off and empty the murderous events of meaning.

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Daniel Shay. Odysseus in America. New York: Scribner. 2003. 93. “But Doc, the only one not hit, felt then and until he killed himself, that he should have kept his two dead buddies alive.”

41 Dexter Filkins. “Atonement: A troubled Iraq veteran seeks out the family he harmed.” The New Yorker. October 29, 2012. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/10/29/atonement (accessed March 21, 2015). This is a very insightful article of a story that developed over the course of ten years as Lu Lobello sought to reconcile with the survivors of an Iraqi family who lost three members to his squad in 2003.


44 Robert Meagher. Killing from the Inside Out: Moral Injury and Just War. Oregon: Cascade Books. 142. 2014. Print. See Dr. Meagher’s preface. Also, Dr. Meagher argues “Just War Theory” cannot be relied upon to spare particular individuals from moral injury because of a shifting moral terrain that desensitizes combatants to “push the humanity out of themselves and the enemy.”


47 Rabbi Elliott Dorff. “God in Modern Jewish Thought.” The Ziegler School of Rabbinic Studies. Bel Air, California: American Jewish University & the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism and the Rabbinical Assembly. 98. 2007. Electronic Copy. (accessed March 2015). For example, Martin Buber speaks of the practical and pragmatic “I-It” relationship that people have with one another, “However, if that is the only kind of relationship that we have with other human beings, we have lost what is distinctly human in us—namely, the ability to relate to others for the sake of the relationship itself. He calls this “I-Thou” relationships. The only absolutely pure I-Thou relationship that humans can have is with God. . . . We learn to have such relationships through the I-Thou encounters we have with other human beings (“Every particular Thou is a glimpse through to the eternal Thou”) and through reading the ways in which other people had true encounters with God . . .”

48 Levinas. Otherwise than Being. 144,145.

49 Matthew 22:36-40

50 The imperative to love God and one’s neighbor casts a moral characteristic upon all actions in the Jewish and Christian traditions placing each individual before God in a state of guilt or innocence, shame or honor. This requires a substitution such as the proverbial scapegoat or a sacrificial lamb to expiate sin in order to bring one into right standing with God. Those of the Jewish faith typically recognize the forms of various prayer to be symbolic of this process and Christians recognize Jesus to be the historical substitute and means of forgiveness. But religious authority cannot be defined solely by the call to seek forgiveness of sins.

51 Isaiah 53:3. The King James Version.

52 Ecclesiastes 3:8

53 Exodus 17:11
This an interesting difference between the intent (cetana) of Buddhism and Christianity at this point. According to the Pali canon, the Buddha tells a warrior that he cannot be born in heaven if he dies in battle, not because the Buddha had anything against warriors, but because killing comes only from anger due to how the mind works. Therefore the intent of killing always produces unwholesome and bad karma. The difference also grows due to the difference between the existence of the Soul in the Judeo-Christian tradition and the non-self of the Buddhist tradition as taught by understanding the self as a collection of five aggregates. For further information on this topic one may reference the following: M.K. Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer. *Buddhist Warfare;* Onward Buddhist Soldiers: Preaching to the Sri Lankan Army by Daniel W. Kent. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. 156. Pali canon, Samyutta Nikaya XLII. Rupert Gethin. “Can Killing a Living Being Ever Be an Act of Compassion? The analysis of the act of killing in the Abhidhamma and Pali Commentaries.” *Journal of Buddhist Ethics.* Vol. 11. 2004. Centre for Buddhist Studies, Department of Theology and Religious Studies. University of Bristol. 190. Electronic Copy. (accessed February 2015).


Shay. *Achilles in Vietnam.* 110, 118 & 119. On these pages Shay describes the damage done by a failure to honor the enemy, how dehumanizing the enemy endangers the lives of soldiers while they fight, and that the impulse to dehumanize and disrespect the enemy must be resisted, whether its basis is religious, nationalistic, or racist. The soldier’s physical and psychological survival is at stake. Grossman. *On Killing.* 214. “And this simple, naïve tendency to disbelieve or look the other way is, possibly more than any other factor, responsible for the perpetuation of atrocities and horror in our world today. 117. Here Shay describes how a soldier found comfort in his care of the enemy dead. “The “honored guest” was an enemy Soldier that visited the U.S. Soldier in his dreams. He had taken the time to put that VC Soldier in a body bag and send him back with the U.S. Soldier who had been killed.”

This is why a staple training for hostage situations teaches that if at all possible, the hostage should make an attempt to establish his or her humanity with the captors so that the process of recognition, responsibility, and accountability might have a chance to develop.


Pete Kilner. “A Moral Justification for Killing in War.” *Army* 60.2 (Feb 2010): 55-58,60. Perhaps no argument will assuage their regret, but looking into their eyes and telling them, “You made the right moral decision with the information you had at hand” can only help. The vocabulary of rights and bubbles can help our soldiers make and justify their judgment calls, not only to 15-6 investigators but, more importantly, to their own consciences. Killing someone, even justifiably, is upsetting at some level. That is normal and healthy. If the killing is morally unjustified, the psychological impact will likely be much greater.

Peter Fromm, Douglas Pryer, Kevin Cutright. “The Myths We Soldiers Tell Ourselves (and the harm These Myths Do).” *Military Review.* September-October 2013. 64


*The Army Values.* http://www.army.mil/values/ (March 7, 2015). Respect: Treat people as they should be treated. In the Soldier’s Code, we pledge to “treat others with dignity and respect while expecting others to do the same.” Respect is what allows us to appreciate the best in other people. Respect is trusting that all people have done their jobs and fulfilled their duty. And self-respect is a vital ingredient with the Army value of respect, which results from knowing you have put forth your best effort. The Army is one team and each of us has something to contribute.


“‘Atonement: A troubled Iraq veteran seeks out the family he harmed.’ Lu Lobello speaks to the difficulty of seeing a fellow Marine get shot, be engaged in a fire fight, and then witness the approach of cars which were engaged only to find it was a family of civilians, other Marines yelled “Cease Fire!” but not before three of the men in the family were killed. What happened in a matter of minutes turned into years of anguish for Lobello and his squad members.

Donna Carla Bailey. *Religious coping, trait forgiveness, and meaning as protective barriers for soldiers.* Iowa State University. Graduate College. 2009. 34-53. Electronic Copy. (accessed March 26, 2015) Although this study is mainly concerned with religion and forgiveness after a traumatic event, it made a research distinction between those who had “a positive religious coping” which included a forgiveness trait and those who had “a negative religious coping.” Those who had a positive religious coping were marked by turning to God, helping others, and religious forgiveness were less likely to suffer from psychological stress than those with negative coping who felt alienated from God and viewed God as punishing and uncaring and therefore had difficulty reconciling faith with their Vietnam experiences.


Levinas. *Otherwise than Being.* 127. “It is from the first a substitution by a hostage expiating for the violence of the persecution itself.” 144. “Substituting itself for the other, a responsibility ordered to the first one on the scene, a responsibility
for the neighbor, inspired by the other, I, the same, am torn up from my beginning in myself, my equality with myself. The glory of the Infinite is glorified in this responsibility.”

71 Paul Ricoeur. “The Memory of Suffering” Figuring the Sacred, Fortress Press: Minneapolis. 1995. 120. Print. Levinas puts forward the idea of substitution as a way of undercutting any return to the “self-affirmation of some clandestine and concealed freedom.” Ricoeur notes on page 120 that Levinas is concerned with the reality that a pursuit of self-discovery leads to and engenders a forgetfulness of the other.

Levinas. Otherwise than Being. 118. To put it in Levinas’ words, “the offender who, as offender, requires no less of me [the persecuted] than the gesture of pardon, of expiation.”


73 Moltmann. Jesus Christ for today’s World. 69.

74 Moltmann. Jesus Christ for Today’s World. 69. The previous sentence comes from this page as well.

75. Moltmann. Jesus Christ for Today’s World. 68.


77 Merleau-Ponty. The Primacy of Perception. 454.

78 Kascha Semonovitch, & Neal DeRoo, editors. Merleau-Ponty at the Limits of Art, Religion, and Perception. New York, NY. Continuum International Publishing Group. 2010. 179. Merleau-Ponty is suspicious of the theory of Judeo-Christian ontology represented in Exodus 31:5 by “I am the one who is” as translated by the Alexandrian Bible ego eimi ho on, and only holds to the possibility of the “fragile perfume of transcendence” as a new dawn of the divine.
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CH (MAJ) Seth George

BIO

CH (MAJ) Seth George is the World Religions Instructor for the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. He is an ordained minister the Presbyterian Church in America and currently serves as a chaplain for the Traditional Protestant Congregation on Ft. Leavenworth, KS. CH George is from Murphysboro, Illinois. He has a B.A. in History from Covenant College on Lookout Mountain, GA; a M.Div. from Sangre de Cristo Seminary in Westcliffe, CO.; a M.A. in Religious Studies from the University of Kansas. CH George came on Active Duty in 2003 and served with the 1-18 Infantry during two deployments to Iraq, followed by multiple deployments to Afghanistan with the 4-160th SOAR. He has a range of personal interests that are mechanical, musical and historical in addition to his academic interests which center on Christian and Islamic thought.