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Abstract

Genocide and mass atrocity constitute the worst of humanity's failures. The constituent crimes beyond mass murder, include enslavement, persecution, sexual violence, emotional and physical torture and other inhumane acts. Under NATO, U.S. and other international military law these are usually classified as war crimes because the preponderance of genocidal crime occurs during periods of armed conflict.¹ In spite of these legal strictures, soldiers, militias, government functionaries and ordinary people become swept up in genocidal crimes and become involved as perpetrators. The commission of these horrific acts violate not only the Law of Land War but in most cases, the acts are also an assault of long-held moral-ethical values. The acts committed during a genocide constitute a betrayal of those values which produces an attendant emotional and psychological harm to the perpetrator that can have effects of long duration and of considerable consequence. Perpetrators of genocide experience significant moral damage as a result of the perceived betrayal of their moral code.

Whatever the motivation at the time of the crime, many *genocidaires* and war criminals suffer severe emotional strain as a result of the shame, guilt and anger that follow a moral-ethical betrayal. An illuminating example is that of Private Steven Green, a member of the first battalion of the 502nd Infantry Regiment assigned to Yusifiyah, Iraq, the so-called Sunni Triangle. PVT Green was the ringleader and main participant in a murder-rape in Iraq in 2005. Wracked by guilt and remorse, he took his own life while imprisoned.² In PVT Green's case, his remorse became malignant and tortured. As indicated by evidence he left behind, his extreme reaction a clear result of his unrequited guilt. Perpetrators must come to terms with their crimes and they do so in many different ways and for many different reasons. The only bridge to psychological well-being is a genuine examination of one's actions through the lens of self image.

¹ Martin White, 'Charging War Crimes: A Primer for the Practitioner,' *The Army Lawyer*" (Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-393, February, 2006.

² Jim Frederick. *Black Hearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death.* (Random House, New York, 2010). Introduction.

Moral Injury Among Perpetrators of Genocide

For a people to kill another large group of people, the ethical and emotional constraints that normally inhibit them from adopting such a radical measure must be lifted.¹

One of the very few constants in our widely diverse world is an operating system of social, moral and ethical values. Every society has a set of norms that guide and enforce the behavior of its members and those norms tend to be unique in detail within each society. However, principal and nearly universal among those is the value accorded to human of life. In some societies life is sacred, in others less so but still of considerable worth. Beyond individual societies, the international community, such as it is, has categorized killing in general and murder in particular as criminal.² In the context of national level violence, usually as either civil or international war, value systems can be offset by the extreme exigencies of the moment. In no case is that more apparent than in instances of genocide and in the attendant genocidal crimes. No other circumstance can compromise so utterly civilizing values.

Genocide is, in and of itself, an international crime. Moreover, the constituent crimes beyond murder, including enslavement, persecution, sexual violence and inhumane acts, have all become war crimes under NATO, U.S. and other international military law mainly because so much genocide occurs during periods of armed conflict.³ In spite of these legal strictures, soldiers, militias, government functionaries and ordinary people become swept up in genocidal

¹ Daniel Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, (New York, Random House, 1996), p 414.

² Article 7 (1) (a), International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U. N. Document # PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000), Human Rights library, University of Minnesota.

³ Martin White, 'Charging War Crimes: A Primer for the Practitioner,' *The Army Lawyer*" (Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-393, February, 2006.

crimes and become involved as perpetrators. The commission of these horrific acts violate not only the Law of Land War but in most cases, the acts are also an assault of long-held moral-ethical values. The acts committed during a genocide constitute a betrayal of those values which produces an attendant emotional and psychological harm to the perpetrator that can have effects of long duration and of considerable consequence. Perpetrators of genocide experience significant moral damage as a result of the perceived betrayal of their moral code. This phenomenon can be described as: ⁴

. . .moral injury is a construct that describes extreme and unprecedented life experience including the harmful aftermath of exposure to such events. Events are considered morally injurious if they transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations. Thus, the key precondition for moral injury is an act of transgression, which shatters moral and ethical expectations that are rooted in religious or spiritual beliefs, or culture-based, organizational, and group-based rules about fairness, the value of life, and so forth.⁵

Moral injury and emotional damage are not the exclusive domains of the perpetrator. Victims, too, can suffer serious and sometimes incurable damage to their psychological health. Consider the case of the *Judenrat* in Vilna in 1943. A fledgling resistance had emerged in the ghetto and it had become increasingly more effective. The Nazi response was to threaten, through the *Judenrat*, that all in the ghetto would be murdered if the leader of the resistance fighters, Yitzhak Witneberg, and his followers were not handed over. Witenberg and the

⁴ Brent Litz, et al., "Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans: A preliminary model and intervention strategy," *Clinical Psychology Review*, Volume 29, Issue 8, December 2009, Pages 695–706.

⁵ Brett Litz and Shira Maguen, *Moral Injury in the Context of War*, Department of Veterans Affairs PTSD website, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/co-occurring/moral_injury_at_war.asp

resistance fighters were compromised to the Nazis after much debate and they were summarily shot.⁶ Several members of the *Judenrat* were wracked with terrible guilt.⁷ Certainly they felt remorse, but took comfort in the fact that some number had hope of survival. Efforts at survival notwithstanding, the *Judenrat* suffered moral injury as a result of their betrayal of the resistance fighters.

A different type of emotional stress attended the men of several ghettos in Poland that utilized the ability of young women to blend into the Polish community and thus serve as messengers and couriers between the ghettos. These young women, the *Kashariyot*, performed their duties at terrible risk of discovery for they surely would have been a target of special treatment by the *Gestapo* if caught. Their heroism must have fed a level of impotence among the men of the ghetto because the lethal risk was carried solely by the women of the community.⁸ Finally, and most tellingly, in the case of genocidal sexual violence, victims suffer indelible emotional scars and so, too, do some bystanders. This is made more complex because in some cases people can have two or even three roles in a genocide being, at various times, victim, bystander or perpetrator. Rwanda provides an example of this in which, immediately following the slaughter of Tutsis by the Hutu, Tutsi vengeance was visited upon the Hutu turning former victims into perpetrators or bystanders or, in some cases, both.⁹ Thus, despite the limits imposed on the definition above, victims can suffer terrible moral injury with

⁶ Michael Marrus, *The Holocaust in History*, (New York, Penguin, 1987. Pp145-6.

⁷ Dan Diner, 'Why the Jewish Council Cooperated', in *The Holocaust: Problems in European Civilization*, Donald Niewyk, ed., (Boston, MA, Wadsworth, 2011). 171-4.

⁸ Lenore Weitzman, "Women of Courage: The *Kashariyot* (Couriers) in the Jewish Resistance During the Holocaust', in *Lessons and Legacies VI: New Currents in Holocaust Research*, Jeffrey Diefendorf, ed., (Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press, 2004). 144-6.

⁹ Footnote needed.

emotional and psychological effects as a direct consequence of genocidal crime. But moral injury in the context presented here is more about the injury inflicted on the self by the person who acts purely as a perpetrator without crossing or confusing roles. These perpetrators visit moral injury upon themselves when they willfully betray their moral foundations and this is an entirely different type of psychological damage.

In a discussion of moral injury in perpetrators, however, the definition assumes even further nuance because just as there are sins of omission and sins of commission, so, too, can moral injury vary depending upon motivation and intent. In the case of perpetrators, the injury is not the same as that of the victim or bystander. Neither is it the same injury to the psyche suffered by the commission of an unintentional error. In the case of the single role perpetrator of genocide, the injury is a result of a conscious and premeditated violation of the law and of their moral code. It is a double betrayal.

Perpetrators must come to terms with their crimes and they do so in many different ways and for many different reasons. The only bridge to psychological well-being is a genuine examination of one's actions through the lens of remorse. The therapeutic properties of remorse enable the slow process of reinterpretation that will, in turn, lead to repair of the moral damage caused by the acts.¹⁰ But not every perpetrator feels remorse for their actions and of those that do, some express remorse only dubiously.

Whatever the motivation at the time of the crime, many *genocidaires* and war criminals suffer severe emotional strain as a result of the shame, guilt and anger that follow a moral-

¹⁰ Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1998), 120 ff.

ethical betrayal. An illuminating example is that of Private Steven Green, a member of the first battalion of the 502nd Infantry Regiment assigned to Yusifiyah, Iraq, the so-called Sunni Triangle. PVT Green was the ringleader and main participant in a murder-rape in Iraq in 2005. Wracked by guilt and remorse, he took his own life while imprisoned.¹¹ In PVT Green's case, his remorse became malignant and tortured. As indicated by evidence he left behind, his extreme reaction a clear result of his unrequited guilt.

The key to repair of moral injury is genuine remorse. Remorse inflicts upon us a conundrum because the biggest hurdle in a consideration of perpetrator remorse is establishing the credibility and veracity of the expressed sentiment. PVT Green's remorse is patent; he was clearly unable to reconcile his actions with his soul but how do we see into the hearts of other perpetrators? In the case of SS Standartenfuhrer Jochen Peiper, the Nazi SS Panzer Commander who commanded the troops that committed several massacres of combatants and non-combatants across eastern Europe, Italy and Belgium. Peiper was an enthusiastic and Teutonically efficient executor of Nazi will in conquered lands. During the Battle of the Bulge in December, 1944, every man, woman and child, both combatant and non-combatant, in the path of his armored juggernaut was slaughtered.¹² The infamous Malmedy Massacre occurred under his command. His ruthlessness never wavered because his state of mind was clear. He harbored not one iota of remorse because he believed he did no wrong. His moral-ethical system had been thoroughly corrupted by the Nazi mind management machine. He made his

¹¹ Jim Frederick. Black Hearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death. (Random House, New York, 2010). Introduction.

¹² Rick Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light, (New York, Picador, 2013) p. 423-5.

case clear long after the fact when, in 1958 he stated emphatically that, “I was a Nazi and I remain one today. . .”¹³

Confessional remorse:

Other perpetrators have expressed remorse in ways that seem more like mechanisms for mercy or escape rather than as an effort to achieve emotional or psychological healing. Psychologists have referred to this reaction as an “exonerating strategy.”¹⁴ Exemplary of this group is Rudolph Hoess, the commandant of Auschwitz from 1940-1943. Hoess provides us with an excellent example of the evil of genocide, as a cruel and sadistic mass murderer, personally responsible for as many as 2,000,000 genocide deaths, although that estimate varies wildly between a low (?) of 1,000,000 to as many as 3,500,000.¹⁵ Hoess’s confessional autobiography, “My Soul,” doesn’t quite ring as genuine. He spends a good bit of the work attempting to transfer the blame for his actions to others almost as if he saw himself as a victim. Hoess described his actions as commandant as a period of ethical turmoil: “For a long time I wrestled with this dilemma, the choice between my inner convictions on the one hand and my oath of loyalty to the SS and my vow of fidelity to the Führer on the other.”¹⁶ Unfortunately for 2,000,000+ people, the ethical dilemma did nothing to slow or halt the mass murders. Hoess’s response is a dodge or, what Leigh Payne calls, a vital lie.¹⁷ “Justifications, excuses, euphemisms, vital lies and victimhood permeate most remorseful confessions and

¹³ Michael Reynolds, *The Devil’s Adjutant: Jochen Peiper, Panzer Leader*. (London, Spellmount Ltd., 1995). 260.

¹⁴ Johanna Ray Vollhardt and Michael Bilewicz, “After the Genocide: Psychological Perspectives on Victim, Bystander and Perpetrator Groups” in *The Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 69, No. 1, 2013. Pp 4-5.

¹⁵ Rudolf Höss (1960). *Commandant of Auschwitz: autobiography*. World Pub. Co. p. 193.

¹⁶ Alan Rosen, “Autobiography from the Other Side: The Reading of Nazi Memoirs and Confessional Ambiguity,” *Biography*, Vol 24, No. 3 (Summer, 2001) 560.

¹⁷ Leigh Payne, “In Search of Remorse: Confessions by Perpetrators of Past State Violence” in *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol XI, No. 1, pp 117-8.

erode their sincerity. . .”¹⁸ That is certainly the case with Rudolph Hoess We are left with no tangible evidence that he was truly remorseful and must either conclude that he was impervious to moral injury or was able to withstand the stresses in a vain effort to gain exoneration.

The case of Oswald Pohl provides us with a more intriguing result, leaving us less sure of whether or not he experienced moral injury. Pohl had been a very senior Nazi official, equivalent to a senior general, charged with oversight of many concentration camps. The ‘Extermination through labor’ policy and the authorization to perform hideous medical experiments are attributed to Pohl.¹⁹ Pohl’s case gained some renown because of his very public repentance with a concomitant conversion to Catholicism. In his record of that journey, *Credo: Mein Weg zu Gott* (Credo: My Path to God), Pohl commits to God but never admits to any specific wrong. He offers nebulous confessions but as with so many in post-war Germany, avoids any explicit admission of crime. As Jaspers points out, this is common in the period in which Germans avoided any personal responsibility, but accept partial national guilt for which they cannot be held personally accountable.²⁰ In the final analysis, Pohl’s *Credo* lacks credibility because he avoids a direct confrontation with the evil he authored; he is too circumspect as he tries to distance himself from the actions of his past. He does not undergo any semblance of purgative crucible. His search for absolution may have found an audience in

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Bjorn Krondorfer, ‘A Perpetrator’s Confession: Gender and religion on Oswald Pohl’s Conversion Narrative,’ *Journal of Men, Masculinities and Spirituality*, Vol 2, No. 2. June, 2008.

²⁰ K. Jaspers, *The Question of German Guilt* (E. B. Ashton, trans.). (New York, Dial Press. First published as *Die Schuldfrage*, Heidelberg, 1946).

heaven, but those of us who are earth-bound remain unconvinced that he suffered any moral injury.

Genuine remorse:

There are, to be sure, remorseful perpetrators who seek to do more than escape. There are many who work to help victims recover and, in so doing, repair their own damaged ethical base. Their credibility is clear as they enable us to see their moral injury and to see their attempts at repair. One of the most credible statements of guilt and remorse was rendered to the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in the wake of events in and around Srebrenica in which as many as eight thousand civilians were slaughtered. As a brigade commander involved in operations in the vicinity of Srebrenica, Dragan Obrenović ordered the execution of over a thousand civilians, including wounded Bosnian soldiers taken from a hospital. Following a plea of guilty, Obrenović did not ask for clemency but rather, spoke from the dock of his remorse:

I am here before Your Honours because I wish to express my remorse. I have thought for a long time, and I'm always followed by the same thought – guilt. I find it very hard to say this truth. I am to blame for everything I did at that time. . . I am also to blame for what I did not do, for not trying to protect those prisoners. . . I ask myself again and again, what could I have done that I didn't do? Thousands of innocent victims perished. Graves remain behind, refugees, destruction and misfortune and misery. . . There is misfortune on all sides that stays behind as a warning that this should never happen again. My testimony and admission of guilt will also remove blame from my nation because it is individual guilt, the guilt of a man named Dragan Obrenović. I stand by this. I am responsible for this. The guilt for which I feel remorse and for which I apologise to the victims and to their shadows. I will be happy if this contributed to reconciliation in Bosnia, if neighbours can again shake hands, if our children can again play games together, and if they have the right to a chance. I will be happy if my testimony helps the families of victims, if I can spare them having to testify again and thus relieve the horrors and the pain during their testimony. It is my wish that my testimony should help prevent this ever happening again, not just in Bosnia, but

anywhere in the world. It is too late for me now, but for the children living in Bosnia now, it's not too late and I hope that this will be a good warning to them.²¹

Obrenović's guilt is clear but so is his remorse. This type of credible heart-felt remorse transcends Oscar-worthy drama of Hoess and Pohl because unlike those two, his case was already decided. His effort was not an attempt to avoid punishment because he had already been sentenced and was going to prison for a long time.

Another example of a perpetrator overcoming a credibility problem is that of Kimani Peter Mogoai, a foot soldier in the ANC army during the mass atrocities associated with apartheid in South Africa. Kimani begins by talking about his moral injury: "I have taken this opportunity to speak the truth and to express my torturing regrets about the wasted years and my shame about a mean and petty past. . . I regard myself today as a disgrace." He continues, moving from a focus on self to a focus on those he harmed: "It is with my deepest remorse that I ask for forgiveness."²² Beyond his words, Kimani did not mask his responsibility with an inability to remember or any other avoidance mechanism.

Between the extremes of Jochen Peiper and Kimani Mogoai is the case of Kurt Gerstein, the so-called conscience stricken SS Officer. Gerstein's circumstances are painfully ambiguous and contradictory, conditions that bred doubt in spite of his demonstrated genuine remorse. Gerstein served in the Hygiene Institute of the SS. In that capacity he was witness to and, in some cases, party to genocidal crimes especially involving medical experiments. He was

²¹ Statement of Dragan Obrenović, Guilty Plea Statement to the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal-Yugoslavia (ICTY) at <http://www.icty.org/sid/219>.

²² SABC Radio broadcast, "Tell Us About It," Windows of History, <<http://sabctruth.co.za/windows.htm>

later a key cog in the killing machine by being a trusted courier for Zyklon-B, the chemical agent used to poison many of the inmates in the extermination camps.

Gerstein joined the SS even though he had a long pre-war history of anti-Nazi sentiment. He maintained that his sentiment never changed and he kept detailed records of his deeds and passed them to numerous sympathetic parties during the war including the Papal Nuncio in Berlin, Father Cesare Orengigo and a Swedish diplomat, Baron Von Otter. In spite of his claims, the post-war courts saw his membership in the SS and his participation in concentration camp activities as too incriminating to ignore and he was imprisoned where he wrote “The Gerstein report” as a final testimony. He then hanged himself. Gerstein’s remorse was ultimately recognized as genuine and he was pardoned, in 1965 through the combined efforts of his wife and Baron von Otter.²³

Reconciliation:

Reconciliation is the final and most important step in the moral injury repair process. It is also the most difficult to achieve. Dragan Obrenović states clearly his desire for reconciliation: “I will be happy if this contributed to reconciliation in Bosnia, if neighbours can again shake hands, if our children can again play games together, and if they have the right to a chance.”²⁴ Repair of moral injury demands reconciliation with self and if at all possible with victims. Frequently, however, the motivations for reconciliation can seem self-serving as in the case of

²³ Biographical summary of Kurt Gerstein, conscience-stricken SS officer, on the Holocaust Memorial Museum site at <http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005840>

²⁴ ICTY

John from the “As We Forgive” series.²⁵ John was a perpetrator in the early part of the Rwandan genocide and was a willing party to much atrocity. Later he was consumed by one particular murder in which he had beaten a man to death. Wracked with guilt, he sought reconciliation as a means to heal his damaged Psyche. Urged by counselors in prison to reach out to the daughter of the man he had murdered John was, at first, reticent, but so strong was his desire for moral comfort that he finally relented and engaged Chantal, the victim’s daughter. He met with Chantal and the meeting was amicable but inconclusive because Chantal could not forgive John. John’s clear aim, throughout is to become unburdened but he never seemed to care about Chantal or her feelings or her emotional injury that resulted from his action. John’s desire for forgiveness is selfish, yet it did work to repair his moral injury.²⁶

Severi was from a like pool of perpetrators in the Rwandan genocide. He was plagued by guilt for the murder of a village neighbor, a woman, and her four children during the genocide. Wallowing helplessly in his guilt and desperately seeking what he termed ‘deliverance,’ Severi returned to his village after release from prison and reached out to Rosaria, the sister of the woman he had murdered. He visited Rosaria often, begging her repeatedly for forgiveness. Rosaria was slow to warm to Severi but over time the roots of reconciliation took hold and Rosaria actually offered Severi a job, working her land. Over time, Severi convinced a local construction effort to build for Rosaria a new home to replace the one that was burned down during the genocide.²⁷ In Severi’s case what may have been a self-centered search for release

²⁵ “As We Forgive,” a documentary based on the testimonies gleaned from the Gacaca trials in post-genocide Rwanda. The testimonies are at <http://www.genocidearchiverwanda.org>. and the documentary reference is at <http://www.asweforgivemovie.com>.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

from guilt evolved into true reconciliation and, by extension, a more thorough repair of his moral injury.

Reconciliation as prophylaxis for mass atrocity:

One of the operating themes in current genocide research is that ordinary people can do extraordinarily evil things in the grasp of a genocidal frenzy. Christopher Browning's Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland and Daniel Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing Executioners are the hallmarks of this genre. Both try to understand why people from a Western, Christian, Enlightenment tradition in Germany and elsewhere in Europe abandoned their moral-ethical foundations and became complicit in the nightmare that Adolph Hitler unleashed on the world. It is clear from this study that all but the most hardened perpetrators suffer moral injury. Interestingly, the perpetrators that are offered counseling in prison seem to be the most amenable to confronting their crimes honestly and begin the journey from admission to remorse to reconciliation, thus repairing moral injuries they have suffered. It is further curious that only in the case of the more recent mass atrocity events, specifically Bosnia and Rwanda, that post-sentencing counseling was provided in an effort to urge the accused to confront their crimes. The first benefit of this is that the victims receive some recognition of guilt and accountability which is key to their emotional health journey of emotional healing. The secondary effect has been the emotional healing that has ensued among the perpetrators. In the Bosnian and Rwandan cases we can see real progress toward reconciliation. Dragan Obrenović indicates an ardent desire to accept responsibility for

his crimes, suffer the sentence of the court and to begin the process of reconciliation.²⁸

Similarly John and Severi from Rwanda met with counselors in prison who urged them both to engage with their victims and other survivors.²⁹ In both of their cases, credible statements of remorse were followed by outreach to victims in an effort to reconcile. Severi's actions seem more authentic, but as described in the "As We Forgive" documentary, both he and John have become contributing members of their societies again and, crucially, advocates against genocide. The Bosnian and Rwandan cases are indicative of a therapeutic pattern and it behooves us to pursue this line of thought if prevention is our goal.

The comparison to Europe is sobering. Cast in a cloud of shame and guilt, the many bystanders in post-World War II Europe, particularly in occupied France, Poland and especially Germany have engaged in a multi-generational denial of responsibility. Whether the recent increase in anti-Semitism in Europe is related to this is beyond the scope of this discussion, but it seems fair to at least consider that the failure to complete a full accounting of Holocaust responsibility, to include opportunities to repair the moral injury of much of the population, may be a contributing factor.

Moral injury can be terminal as evidenced by the case of Private Green. But it does not have to be. If all perpetrators were considered victims of moral injury and treated accordingly in their adjudication and confinement, we could sow the seeds for a lasting anti-genocidal ethos that can be leveraged for preventative purposes in the future. It is too attractive a possibility to ignore.

Afterword:

In 1922, the German Foreign Minister, Walter Rathenau was assassinated by Ernst Werner Techow, an anti-Semitic extremist. Rathenau was almost certainly killed because he was a Jew. Before

²⁸ Guilty Plea Statement of Dragan Obrenović.

²⁹ "As We Forgive"

his trial Techow's mother received a note from the murdered Rathenau's mother: "In grief unspeakable, I give you my hand. . . say to your son that, in the name of the spirit of the one he has murdered, I forgive, even as God may forgive, if before an earthly judge your son makes a full and frank confession of his guilt. . . and before a heavenly judge repents."³⁰ Techow did confess and in so doing, he reconciled. He did go to prison only to be released five years later for good behavior. Techow's case is interesting not for the admission, remorse and reconciliation. It is interesting because in 1940, when France surrendered to the Nazi war machine and the round up of French Jews began, Techow went to Marseilles and engineered the escape to Spain of over 700 Jews. Shortly before he went to Marseilles, he wrote: "Just as Frau Rathenau conquered herself when she wrote that letter of pardon, I have tried to master myself. I only wished I could get an opportunity to right the wrong I have done." Remorse and reconciliation are powerful forces, not just in the repair of moral injury, but in forging new consciences in the repaired people.

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The moral domain of war concerns the human dimension of conflict. People compose military forces so all military operations include human considerations. Leaders must use and protect their soldiers who are their most precious resource. Leaders must understand how military operations stress soldiers to ensure this stress does not prevent success. Psychological studies have identified many characteristics of military operations that affect soldiers. This monograph uses the following list of factors to describe the impact of military operations on soldiers: fear of death and injury; fatigue; physical discomfort; isolation; uncertainty; value conflicts; boredom; separation from family; climate, terrain, and culture; training and tactics; and lack of privacy. The spectrum of conflict may be divided many ways. Army doctrine generally discusses three types of conflict: low, mid, and high-intensity. This monograph divides conflict into low

and mid/high-intensity categories for discussion of the differences in stress soldiers experience. The missions and threats in low-intensity conflict result in soldiers experiencing different kinds of stress in low-intensity conflict than in mid/high-intensity conflict. This monograph discusses these differences and the implications for doctrine, training, and organization

Volbach, David L. "Killing in Combat: Utilizing a Christian Perspective, when is a Soldier justified in taking life?"

Justified killing by Soldiers on the battlefield will be explored from a Christian perspective. Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, U.S. Army (Retired), author of *On Killing*, explains, "only 15 to 20 percent of the American riflemen in combat during World War II would fire at the enemy. Those who would not fire did not run or hide... even when faced with repeated waves of banzai charges." Grossman posited the reason these men did not fire was because "there is within most men an intense resistance to killing their fellow man. A resistance so strong that, in many circumstances, soldiers on the battlefield will die before they can overcome it." The nature of the problem investigated is drawn from this study and others like it. Did at least some of these Soldiers fail to fire their weapon because innately they feared the threat of eternal judgment for disobeying God's command to not murder (Deut. 5:17) more than the threat of their own death or even the deaths of the friends and comrades who stood by their side? e?

Wead, Sean. *Ethics in combat: preparing soldiers for moral decisions in combat*, a project study. Fort Leavenworth, KS, Command and General Staff College, 2013.

This study is about soldiers of the United States Army. Their dedication and selfless service not only puts them at physical risk but challenges their morality. Their willingness to participate and eagerness to learn gave energy to the class and the study. The many efforts of leaders within the Army, from the formation of military codes of ethics to the defining of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and everything in between, laid the foundation of this study. The testimony of veteran soldiers from World War I to the present gave crucial insight into this training. Many soldiers willingly shared moral challenges from combat with the knowledge that their experiences would be published. Contents include: the state, ethics, and war; ethics, the individual, and the battlefield; impact character; teaching ethics to soldiers; and results of training and reflection

Oral Histories:

http://books.google.com/books?id=YNAhQ3tV8TIC&pg=PA289&lpg=PA289&dq=moral+injury+genocide&source=bl&ots=nDbWCb1J7_&sig=x7EcigfWUsVrS80HUbnG-mpfBsM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=KexPVPm5GIKZNqa5g-gC&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=moral%20injury%20genocide&f=false