

Intelligence Ethics: A Key to Much Bigger Issues

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For delivery at a conference of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, USA.

Abstract

To many people ethics for spies is the ultimate oxymoron. Wiser eyes see that the Revolution in Intelligence Affairs (RIA) highlights dilemmas common to the profession of arms in general. Without some self-restraint (a.k.a. discipline) the most powerful militaries on earth have been able to destroy civilization for about 50 years. Recent developments in information technologies may also destroy liberty, because they empower police-states in particular to detect and repress dissent. So restraint of power in electronic intelligence is also prudent, but rare. To guard against police-states armed with WMDs, and the amorphous threats of non-state terrorists, military and internal security services naturally wish to know everything possible about everyone who might become a spy or a terrorist. That would be every person on earth. Thus overzealous security services risk destroying the very freedoms they were empowered to protect, even in democracies.

This dilemma has challenged traditions like just war theory that strive to restrain some decisions to start wars and some conduct during wars. What happens to discrimination and proportionality when it becomes more efficient (and far more powerful) to collect data on everyone continuously rather than waiting for “probable cause” to suspect criminal behavior by particular individuals? What happens to liberty? How should commanders react if political leaders prove indifferent to

restraints like rule of law in their zest to detect every ‘criminal’ which so often includes rival politicians or mere critics of the state? How should officers act when oaths to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution” conflict with non-disclosure agreements with specific agencies?

Edward Snowden became well known when he revealed how the RIA was transforming signals intelligence. Critics call him a traitor for violating non-disclosure contracts, while supporters call him a patriot for defending the U.S. Constitution from damage by overzealous bureaucracies with no effective oversight. Whatever one thinks about Mr. Snowden, he was preceded by a long line of similar, if less successful “whistleblowers.” Such people develop slowly over time, so there must be other whistleblowers (and/or traitors) incubating. So now there is an extensive “Insider Threat” program that erodes the few freedoms left to those who volunteer to work hard for and sometimes to risk their lives for American intelligence services and national security.

This is more significant at the level of strategic versus tactical intelligence, where the logic of operational security is obvious to all. Keeping secrets saves friendly lives in operations. But strategic intelligence covers many issues that are not so black and white. We should not forget that Snowden was preceded by, and will be followed by, others who take their oaths to the U.S. Constitution very seriously. These themes will be expanded on with reference to the historic development of professional ethics in law and medicine.¹ Intelligence professionals are trying to develop an ethos up to the challenges of their roles in world affairs. The fate of nations and of core American values like freedom, democracy and rule of law hangs on whether or not they succeed in time, while guarding the perimeter against dangers known to all.

Introduction

¹ Author essay on this in the American Intelligence Journal, Vol. 28 No. 1, 2010, pgs. 82-92, published by the NMIA

The strategic challenge of our time is between civilization and barbarism, not any particular conflict between nations, alliances or entities. This critical truth is often obscured by focus on tactical details and the drive to win every battle. It calls us to remember why laws of war were conceived, deliberated, and ultimately ratified by all the nations on earth that we call “civilized.”

Barbarians will do anything to win. “Restraint” is a sign, a footprint, the mark of civilization. Law intends to restrain barbarism. So rule of law has many enemies. We have been able to destroy “civilization as we know it” for at least 50 years. So our strategic forces, and others on earth, better stay restrained lest we be doomed. For over 100 years humans have been able to lay waste entire populations, and we have killed millions with chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, many now banned. So some restraints on the barbarism of total war were called for by the suffering of the earth, not least troops maimed in the two World Wars of the 20th century.

The strategic challenge of our time is between civilization and barbarism, and ways of war are a key distinction between barbarians and those who would call themselves civilized. Challenges like torture or prudent use of force are not new. They have been with us for millennia, since any of us can become a barbarian in the blink of an eye (or at least behave like one) if our families are in peril. That is not unique; indeed it is very human, and tragically common. Applying restraint to such harsh situations is a primary challenge for civilization. This does not mean surrender. It means discipline and resilience. It benefits from recognizing long-term effects. Every advanced nation on earth concluded that human survival is in peril if we do not grow up enough to avoid killing ourselves, or destroying core values with our deadliest weapons.

At the same time we worry about spreading WMDs, those who spend full-time protecting the free world must also watch the proliferation of failed and failing states that provide such fertile ground for terrorists and terrorism. A “developing global crisis” of expanding populations and declining natural resources is creating more unemployed, very poorly educated teenaged males than could be killed with every bomb on earth. Such hopeless teens are fodder for demagogues.

“Intelligence ethics” struggles with the distinction between civilization and barbarism when it dissects torture, kidnapping and assassination (noting euphemisms like “enhanced interrogation,” “extraordinary renditions” and “targeted killing”). We struggle with this distinction when we discuss intelligence collection on domestic populations, so much easier today with modern technology. At what point is turning a weapon of war against your own population immoral? Some people forget that national security intelligence is a weapon of war, and are quite care-free when they urge us to turn such powers against our own people, searching for bad guys among us.

It would therefore be nice if “intelligence ethics” were a mature field. But in truth it is barely a baby when compared to fields like medicine and law. They took a century each to develop their own professional codes of ethics, under less pressure. There are a few books of variable quality on intelligence ethics today ⁱ, one small international society with a journal of about 6 years duration (IIEA) ⁱⁱ, a flurry of executive orders and decision directives from Presidents or DNIs, and libraries of commentary from lawyers (mostly) on current cases. But systematic efforts to cultivate a real ethos for intelligence professionals are truly at the baby stage today.

On the plus side, page 3 of the “National Intelligence Strategy of the USA” is entirely devoted to “Principles of Professional Ethics for the Intelligence Community” and the seven items there are universal virtues. ⁱⁱⁱ This is a big improvement over past documents. None of them explains how

we came to rationalize torture as standard practice, surveillance of all US citizens as routine, or how we became known worldwide as the most warmongering country on earth and indifferent to international laws of war that we expect others to obey. But it is a big step up from predecessors.

The works cited at the end list only English language entries, so who knows how much “ethics” activity may be bubbling up in other intelligence services? Not me, even though I get around. But I would bet hard money there is not much outside the Anglo world because of a systematic fear of “ethics” among intelligence bureaucracies first mentioned in print by Jan Goldman from our National Intelligence University in his 2007 chapter on “Ethics Phobia.”^{iv} To the best I can estimate, foreign intelligence services like Arab mukhabarat, Israel’s MOSSAD, and quite a few Asian entities wonder if America has gone completely bonkers discussing intelligence affairs so openly as the USA today. They know why spy groups fear “ethics” – spies are in the business of breaking other people’s laws every day. Sometimes bones; sometimes hopes and dreams. There is no money in “ethics” for spies, but there are many incentives for providing good intelligence, especially if that is available fast. People who ask questions about ethics, often ask many other questions. Since protecting sources and methods is a mantra to all intelligence professionals, we should not be surprised that ethics is omitted from many texts and is challenging to discuss at all.

So we will close this introduction with a focus on the need for speed, and the overwhelming priority that national security issues often bring to big problems. Would you rather be morally pure and dead, or alive and soiled by horrible things you did to survive attack by barbarians? It does not take a Ph.D. in philosophy to see some logic in this question. Survivors of the Shoah (Jewish Holocaust in WWII) ask this often. And if you have been hired, trained and equipped specifically to protect a population against such maniacs, why should ethics be a big concern

compared with winning the battle against forces of evil before you? The answer to that question is **to avoid becoming the evil you oppose**. Philosophers have spoken to that problem also. ^v

Why Intelligence Ethics is a Key to MUCH Bigger Issues

Human survival is a goal that transcends victory for one country or another. It is at risk to the warring states we see today, so many oblivious to international law, and so many with WMDs in their arsenals. Intelligence ethics tries to explain why some things are even more important than winning as fast as one can. It also attempts to show by examples how evil methods create evil outcomes far more often than not, no matter how sincere or pious the actors. There are endless examples of “unanticipated consequences” from bending or breaking core rules for expediency.

Consider the second US war in Iraq (2003-2011). Speaking truth to power is a core principle for intelligence analysts. Brutally summarizing a complex genesis, this second invasion of Iraq by US and allied forces was sold to the US public, Congress and allies on grounds that Saddam Hussein was concealing WMDs of great significance, and was a secret ally of Osama bin Laden. All false. The administration tried to sell this idea to the United Nations also, in a speech by Secretary of State, Gen. Colin Powell at the UN on Feb. 5, 2003. He said there: “These are not assertions. What we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.” But the UN did not agree that the evidence was solid, because it was not. After invasion on March 20, and a very intensive search for ground evidence to corroborate these fears, both turned out to be false. But a nation had been destroyed that may never be restored, tens of thousands of American

troops were killed and wounded (> 500,000 Iraqis) and the financial cost to the USA will almost certainly exceed \$2 trillion when all the health care bills and death benefits are paid.^{vi}

Those are very large adverse consequences to very many people from a lack of ETHICS among intelligence professionals, not merely a lack of good technique. There were certainly good people inside the US IC^{vii} who tried to point out that some of these allegations were flat-out false. Some had even been fabricated, like a letter alleging that Iraq had purchased uranium yellowcake from Niger. The UN detected this forgery, and other flaws, but the US administration did not and even destroyed the career of a CIA nuclear proliferation officer in the National Clandestine Service because her husband and former Ambassador to Niger, Joe Wilson, dared to write an op-ed in the New York Times months later pointing out the letter's dubious origins and questionable accuracy.

Some call this a failure of intelligence (usually policy people); others call it a failure of policy that was driving intelligence assessments. Sir Richard Dearlove (the head of Britain's MI6) reported to his Prime Minister on July 23, 2002 that "the intelligence was being fixed around the policy."^{viii} That is a concise definition of "politicization" of intelligence, a cardinal sin among ethical analysts, but regrettably common. CIA analysts, at least, are always supposed to tell truth to power "without fear or favor." But then they may risk their careers. The power of politicians, and mere superiors, to end analytic careers if they do not confirm the fond beliefs of superiors is legendary.^{ix} Far more thorough reviews of the Iraq case can be found in "A Pretext for War" by James Bamford (2005) and "The Greatest Story ever Sold" by Frank Rich (2006).^x

There are grave costs of other kinds from this type of misbehavior, to both the American public and to honest practitioners within an intelligence system that is essential for the protection of the

public that authorizes, funds, trains and empowers our spies. Space is too short here to itemize those grave costs, but they include high rates of divorce, alcoholism and even suicide among those who discover that their oaths to the US Constitution are often superseded, in practice, by nondisclosure agreements to specific agencies. Let us turn to signals intelligence for a moment.

Freedom, and some degree of privacy, are other goods that could be destroyed quite thoroughly by the RIA (Revolution in Intelligence Affairs) as it rolls on. This is most obvious in surveillance of electronic communications today. In war this is not a big problem since you certainly want to know everything you can about enemy communications, and there are many historic cases showing how powerful that can be (like “Enigma” in WW II Europe, and breaking the military codes of Japan).^{xi} Domestically there are many reasons why it would be useful if police could track everyone, everywhere, for example, in addition to recording all their cell phone and computer communications. There is no doubt that very crazy people leave warning indicators prior to their explosions, so you can be certain that someone is getting their Ph.D. now on how to detect them. It is a small step from “Joe might be angry someday in the future” to “why not pick up Joe now and find out what he’s doing today?” New York City tried “stop and frisk” for scary minorities, and harvested deep hatred, so even the NYPD rejected this as a policy for everyone. One of the best references on how “Big Brother” might become a problem is the classic 1984 by George Orwell.^{xii} It is not a nice police-state, yet countries like Russia, North Korea and China work hard today to achieve such capability. But does this mean the fortress of freedom should?

Why Intelligence Ethics is Intrinsicly Rooted in the Ethics of War and Peace

Spies have been with us at least as long as recorded history. They are mentioned in the Jewish Bible (Old Testament, long predating the New) among other ancient sources. And the value of tactical, military intelligence proved itself so thoroughly that the incomparable Chinese General Sun Tzu devoted an entire chapter of his Art of War to “The Employment of Spies.”^{xiii} As with so many technologies, the crucible of war forged development of ever more elaborate systems of decision support for Generals and Emperors.

Thus since ancient times national security intelligence has been mainly an instrument of war, although there are certainly times when good intelligence has also prevented wars from starting. But instruments, like a club, sword, gun or nuclear weapon, have no morality *per se*. They are merely tools used for good or evil by people who theoretically do have consciences and some kind of moral framework within which they make decisions. The phenomenon of psychopathy suggests that some few people may completely fail to develop “conscience” or empathy for others.^{xiv} When those rare individuals take over governments, police-states can arise that murder millions in their insatiable quest for ever more power.^{xv} Military forces have had to contend with both psychopaths and enemy armies organized by psychopaths for millennia.

Of course, almost any human being can behave like a psychopath in the most severe situations. And real spies, to the extent I know them, are always people with some sense of right and wrong, and some loyalty to this tribe or that. Still it has been said that psychopaths make better spies. And a veteran of a very well known agency told me they were encouraged there for that reason. Control is a countervailing issue, since psychopaths are notoriously hard to control.

So spies with consciences pondered moral dilemmas before the word “ethics” was even invented by the Greeks and Hebrews. So did some Generals and Emperors, like Ashoka the Great of India

(who renounced war and adopted Buddhism after slaughtering hundreds of thousands of people consolidating his empire)^{xvi} and Constantine of the Eastern Roman Empire, who enabled St. Augustine of Hippo to formulate the beginnings of Just War Theory.^{xvii}

Generals with consciences and Emperors with their more diverse sources of political intelligence felt the daily weight of responsibility for the survival of some group of people surrounded by an often hostile world. So do spies to some degree. As the scale of both weapons and conflicts increased, the costs of waging wars with no rules at all has become increasingly clear to all.

It bears recollection that humankind reached 1 billion alive at the same time just 200 years ago. We are almost 7.5 billion people now, headed toward 12 according to UN demographers.^{xviii}

The scale of weapons available to the most powerful potential adversaries today is quite enough to end “civilization as we know it” and perhaps humankind itself if the worst kinds of biological weapons theoretically possible have been created.

The pressure on Earth is intense, so we do not have forever to figure out why some ethics even for spies is essential. Spies (and intelligence professionals^{xix}) who break the laws of other nations routinely are supposed to provide early warning of serious dangers to their employers.

Note to spies everywhere: The planet is in big trouble, and failed states are a danger to everyone in a great many ways that cannot be contained by walls no matter how strong. Therefore security “solutions” that leave billions dispossessed, ignorant, and with no hope for a viable economic future are not good solutions. They are memories of ancient times when genocides could be accomplished and survived. WMDs and the internet have changed all that.

The nature of their work presents spies with unusual moral dilemmas. Like soldiers in the field, issues of life and death are all around them. Pressure is intense. Imagine the mind of an agent trying to penetrate a terrorist organization, or the high command of police-states like North Korea. Paranoia just begins their stress. But unlike soldiers, spies deliberately wear false colors and work mainly in isolation or very small groups when they are in the field. They enter communities specifically to betray them in some way, or to find someone within who will.

Spies using the old paradigm where they pretend to be of one tribe or group while they are really working for another violate the most ancient of all ethics: “Our tribes are the good (human, or “god’s favorite”) people, to be defended against all others.” Traitors are universally despised. This is why many “intelligence professionals” strongly prefer to be distinguished from “spies” even though they are in nearly identical businesses. Keeping a white team distinct from the black team is essential to esprit de corps in this domain.

Then there is the toolkit! Assassination, bribery, blackmail, extortion, torture, theft and threats of all those things are the dark part of the toolkit or “tradecraft” of spies on the operational side. Neither as attractive nor as visible as bullets, bombs and precision delivery systems, some of these tools are still very effective in their own ways with the notable exception of torture.

Torture always has adverse unintended consequences and seldom produces useful, actionable intelligence in time despite the “ticking time bomb” scenarios so often advanced to justify such extreme measures.

Finally, almost all of the current legal rationales for intelligence systems rely on the same foundation as ordinary military forces: Protection of the people and the state from all enemies,

foreign and domestic. Therefore intelligence ethics must be and is intrinsically rooted in military ethics. Intelligence historically has been an instrument of war and addresses the same life-and-death issues that war confronts the ordinary soldier and General Officers with.

But ethics for spies is in an infantile stage compared to other professional ethics, including military ethics, while global problems grow. And spies are, well, different from ordinary troops. So somehow we must transcend limitations of the past before our time for 'growing up' runs out.

Conclusions

The most significant negative military consequence of lack of ethics among intelligence services is destruction of liaison relationships with allies. Liaisons became ever more important to us as the simple, bi-polar world with one obvious enemy alliance was replaced by a "hydra-headed" complex of ever shifting threats with variable military dimensions. Examples include terrorism and transnational organized crime of course, but strategic thinkers are increasingly recognizing that global warming, desertification, rising economic inequalities and inequities, proliferation of failed and failing states as well as WMDs, and a long list of other messy problems like cyber issues are resulting in actual people attacking US forces abroad and sometimes even at home.

There are over 200 countries and about 6,000 languages and distinct dialects on earth. Some are splintering as I write. Even the Goliaths of Intelligence cannot cover all those comprehensively. And all the bombs on earth are not enough to target the millions of dispossessed teenaged males coming of age today. So liaison relationships with other intelligence entities with their distinct

language and HUMINT capabilities are ever more important today. “Coalition operations” are also more important in the strictly military world that must guard against growing asymmetric threats while not forgetting dangers like general thermonuclear war that never went away.

The second most obvious danger of low ethics among our intelligence professionals is quality of workforce. Best and brightest people seldom volunteer to work for psychopaths. So if your intel system is grossly immoral, you eventually end up with 2nd and 3rd rate commanders who hire 4th and 5th rate employees. That is not a good result for any group whose main product is supposed to be superior “intelligence” to support decisions by military and political leaders. I consult often with recovering police-states like Romania who have endured many tragic consequences of that.

Retired Air Force Lt. General David Deptula, then Dean of the Air Force Association’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies told a conference co-sponsored by RAND in Nov. 2014 that: “The battlespace for the 21st century is the human mind, not some particular chunk of territory or seas” and that “... concepts of the last century will simply be eclipsed in the information age.”^{xx} At the same time that propaganda becomes ever more sophisticated, psychological operations can be contemplated by ever smaller entities. Laptops can produce TV shows, and teens in tents can do the editing, then distribute worldwide. Almost everyone in strategic intelligence also recognizes that the complex, interdisciplinary and dynamic challenges of our future put an ever greater premium on critical thinking skills and ability to work across national and disciplinary boundaries. This is similar in some ways to the challenges of joint operations which America overcame a generation ago (well, mostly overcame). And for all the wild successes of signals intelligence recently, it turns out that most people still don’t have a clue what is actually going on unless you have a well-placed agent near the centers of adversary decision making.

Perhaps the wisest General of all time, the incomparable Sun Tzu of ancient China wrote:^{xxi}

“Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy’s army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company or a five-man squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” 3:1-3.

“If not in the interests of the state, do not act. If you cannot succeed, do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight. A sovereign cannot raise an army because he is enraged, nor can a general fight because he is resentful. For while an angered man may again be happy, and a resentful man again be pleased, a state that has perished cannot be restored, nor can the dead be brought back to life. Therefore the enlightened ruler is prudent and the good general is warned against rash action. Thus the state is kept secure and the army preserved.” 12:17-19.

Sun Tzu’s words have been republished for 2500 years, long after the emperors he worked for have been forgotten, because unlike most of his peers, Sun Tzu was wise as well as skilled. There is a very thin constituency for wisdom among active intelligence professionals. The problem here is not fear, but the reluctance of many policy leaders to be led. Many politicians think that they are in the wisdom business, and resent advice in favor of “objective facts” and options instead, so that they alone can judge what to do. Therefore analysts are often taught to mind their place, as objective advisors only, not as policy makers *per se*.

But like the best intelligence analysts, it is the sacred duty of Generals to tell the bosses what they need to know without fear or favor. I encourage all uniformed military to do so whenever necessary, whether in the intelligence fields or any other. This can be dangerous for careers, but it is our duty. So I hope you will remember why when you reach the apex of your careers.

Works Cited and other Notes

ⁱ Jan Goldman, Ethics of Spying in two editions, 2006 and 2009; Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying by James Olson, 2006; Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action and Interrogation by David Perry, 2006; and Intelligence Ethics: The Definitive Work of 2007* edited by M. Andregg. There are many memoirs of former intelligence officers that touch lightly or heavily on ethical dilemmas they experienced in service, like Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11, by career veteran Melissa Boyle Mahle. But these are seldom suitable for textbooks for many reasons. There are also chapters on intelligence ethics in some actual textbooks, like Oxford's Handbook of National Security Intelligence 2010, and the Routledge Handbook of Intelligence Studies of 2007, both edited by Loch Johnson, Senior Editor of "Intelligence and National Security."

ⁱⁱ International Intelligence Ethics Association, home site: <http://intelligence-ethics.blogspot.com/p/international-intelligence-ethics.html>

ⁱⁱⁱ The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, page 3, National Intelligence Press, 2014.

^{iv} Goldman, Jan. "Ethics Phobia and the US Intelligence Community: Just Say 'No'" in Intelligence Ethics: the Definitive Work of 2007*, edited by M. Andregg.

^v Most memorably Friedrich Nietzsche when he wrote: "**Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you.**" in Beyond Good and Evil, 1886. This quote is especially relevant to warriors, police and intelligence officers.

^{vi} Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard economics professor Linda Bilmes estimated in 2008 that the war in Iraq would cost about \$3 trillion when all bills are paid (in "The Three Trillion Dollar War"). That cost is comparable to other studies by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress (\$3.5 trillion) and the generally non-partisan Congressional Budget Office projected that the total cost will reach between \$1.4 and \$2.2 trillion. Of course, even though we formally "left" in December 2011, we are actually still there to the tune of ~ 3,000 troops and no one yet knows when the chaos of Iraq will really end. Something called ISIS or ISIL or "the Islamic State," notably neither Islamic nor a state, intends to keep things violent for quite some time unless they are defeated.

^{vii} IC = Intelligence Community, a term used so much in the US military and intelligence agencies that we did not spell that out in text.

^{viii} The "Downing Street Memo" was first revealed in The Sunday Times (of London, UK) on May 1, 2005, but it refers to text delivered by the head of Britain's foreign intelligence service, MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove to a meeting of the Prime Minister's Cabinet on July 23, 2002, eight months before the formal invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. Much more information has come out since to validate its main conclusion, which was that the George W. Bush administration in America was determined to attack Iraq regardless, and was "fixing the intelligence" to justify this invasion long prior to it. One gateway to that story is at: <http://downingstreetmemo.com/>

^{ix} Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence, 2011, Cornell University Press, by Joshua Rovner, then a Professor at the Naval War College. He is now Tower Distinguished Chair in International Politics and National Security Policy at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas.

^x Bamford, James, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies, Anchor Books, Random House, 2005, and Rich, Frank, The Greatest Story Ever Sold: The Decline and Fall of Truth in Bush's America, Penguin Press, 2006.

^{xi} In a total war for national survival against powerful nations that actually attacked us, like World War II, a strong case can be made for no holds barred defense and unfettered intelligence. But such extreme scenarios have been used repeatedly in the modern era to 'justify' continuous war without definable end against amorphous enemies who even by the most generous estimates kill less Americans at home each year than candy bars, bee stings, lightning strikes, falling furniture, avalanches, etc. In intelligence, an industry has risen that uses such apocalyptic worst case scenarios to justify continuous surveillance of US citizens at home by bulk collection of communications metadata and "big data" mining of thousands of databases in ways George Orwell could only dream of. The best open source review of the scale of that today is Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State, by Washington Post writers Dana Priest and William Arkin, Little Brown and Company, 2011.

^{xii} E.g. George Orwell's 1984 and other dystopias like Animal Farm where Big Brother rules everyone in misery. These were seen at the time as warnings about Soviet Communism, which they were to Orwell, so it is tragically ironic that they have come to be used to illustrate thought control techniques in the land of freedom of speech. Another classic of that genre was Brave New World by Aldous Huxley, published in 1932.

^{xiii} The Art of War, written by Chinese General Sun Tzu sometime in the 4th or 5th century BCE, as translated by Samuel Griffith, for the Oxford University Press in 1963.

^{xiv} Political Ponerology: A Science on the Nature of Evil Adjusted for Political Purposes, by Andrew M. Lobaszewski, Red Pill Press, Canada, 2006. The original was written in Polish in 1984 and reflected the work of psychiatrists and social scientists who had survived Nazi occupation only to be occupied by Soviet forces for many more decades. They were thus very highly motivated to investigate the causes of both organized evil, and psychopathy.

^{xv} We list references on Evil in a chapter on "Evil in Civilizations and Solutions" for a book edited by Marek Celinski, Crises and Renewal of Civilizations: The 21st Century Crisis of Ideas and Character to be published by Nova Science Publishers of New York in 2015. Rather than repeat all here, highlights and classics include: Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963), The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence by Erwin Staub, (1989) People of the Lie: the Hope for Healing Human Evil, by M. Scott Peck (1983), The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat (1991) by Robert J. Lifton and Eric Markusen, and Bob Altemeyer's 1988 AAAS best social science award winning book, Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Altemeyer, a Canadian, classified both Stalinist Communism and Nazi Fascism as "right-wing" with his technical definition of authoritarian personalities, maintaining they are more like "red" and "blue" teams fighting only over who would rule the resulting police-states and in their dreams, the world.

^{xvi} Old World Encounters: Cross Cultural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Times, by Jerry Bentley, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. There is always some uncertainty of course about the conquests of Generals and Emperors who ruled in the third century before the birth of Christ (BCE, or Before the Common Era).

^{xvii} St. Augustine of Hippo lived much later, from 354-430 AD, but is generally credited for starting a line of thought about just versus unjust wars that would be elaborated by St. Thomas Aquinas centuries later in the Summa Theologiae (written 1265-1274 AD) to develop what is generally called Just War Theory today.

^{xviii} This is a current upgrade of UN demographers' estimates for when the world's population will plateau around the year 2100. The UN Demographic Yearbook is updated every few years, and prior estimates of about 9.5 billion are now being raised to 12 billion due to advances in global health, with little decrease in birthrates in Africa.

^{xix} I will spare the reader a long history of discussion of which term to use when (spy or "intelligence professional") by summarizing it. There is a narrow definition of "spy" that includes only those people who betray their own countries or groups to provide secret information to others, and a broad definition of "spy" that includes anyone employed by national intelligence entities and the agents handlers run who are foreign nationals. I use the broad

definition here and abroad because the narrow one results in moral confusion. The internal language of many agencies is rife with moral escapism and euphemisms whose prime purpose is pointing blame at anyone but actual perpetrators. All of these professionals start out as perfectly lovely human babies and I've been one, but they are spies in the end, and almost every one of them chose that occupation. Before you rush to judgment, remember that a good spy with the right information at the right time can change the outcome of battles, wars and history.

^{xx} General Deptula's comments can be found in "Innovating for Airpower" by Autumn A. Arnette, pages 18-19 in the Air Force Magazine, January, 2015.

^{xxi} Sun Tzu, The Art of War, as translated by Samuel B. Griffith in the Oxford University Press edition of 1963. These quotes come from Chapters 3 and 12.

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^{xxi} Sun Tzu, The Art of War, as translated by Samuel B. Griffith in the Oxford University Press edition of 1963. These quotes come from Chapters 3 and 12.

Biography for Michael M. Andregg, 2015

Dr. Michael Andregg has a Ph.D. in genetics from the University of California, Davis, 1977. After studying monkeys in Morocco and doing research on genetic diseases at the University of Minnesota he concluded that war was a larger public health hazard than the rare diseases he worked on. He has taught adjunct in the graduate school at the U of MN for 34 years to date, but his main academic home is now the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul where he has taught in the Justice and Peace Studies department, and Aquinas Scholars Honors program for 24 years. His book "On the Causes of War" won a National Peace Writing Award in 1999. Andregg has published about 100 articles in scholarly venues, and a book on population demographics for young readers in 2014. He serves on a number of boards like the CFR-MN, and is Vice President for Young Scholar Development for an International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. He ran an education non-profit called Ground Zero Minnesota from 1982-2011 which produced 57 educational videos and sponsored about 5,000 education programs in the upper Midwest during that time, many on nuclear weapons and global sustainability issues. He has been invited 4 times to lecture in S. Korea and Japan on such topics, and 6 times to European venues. He has worked on intelligence community reform for about 25 years, and has lectured at many relevant schools like the Joint Military Intelligence College, US National Intelligence University, and Romania's National Intelligence Academy. He consults for recovering police-states, is co-author of a book on intelligence democratization, wrote chapters on intelligence ethics for Oxford UP and Routledge, and is currently senior editor for a major re-writing of Romania's basic textbook on intelligence tradecraft.