

Ours is to Reason Why: The Ethics of Tactical Risk Assessment in Large Scale Combat

Trent J. Lythgoe

I believe that military commanders in high places have a responsibility to the relatives and friends of the men who are serving under them, as well as to the men themselves, and I feel that they should be capable of using good tactical judgment in order that they may reduce losses and at the same time accomplish the results desired.

But what was to be done if these goals were incompatible? What if the desired results could not be accomplished with few losses? No one asked, and [General] Walker did not say.

—Excerpt from *Bloody River: The Real Tragedy on the Rapido*¹

The publication of FM 3-0 *Operations* marks a shift in the Army's warfighting focus from limited contingency and counterinsurgency to large-scale combat operations. These operations differ from recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in scale, intensity, and lethality.² Another critical difference is the level of *tactical risk* associated with tactical operations in large-scale combat. Tactical commanders will have to put large formations at risk which may result in scores or even hundreds of U.S. casualties.

Army leaders are not prepared for this shift in how they think about risk for three reasons. First, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have not put formations at high risk. Few commanders have had to consider high-risk tactical decisions. Second, the Army's doctrine—the risk assessment process—enables commanders to estimate tactical risks but give no guidance on how to weight potential gains against those risks. Third, there are clear ethical implications for undertaking a tactical action which knowingly puts Soldiers at high risk, however, Army doctrine does not address them.

This essay proposes an ethical framework to guide commanders applying tactical risk management in large-scale combat. It argues that when examined through the lenses of the ethical triangle, tactical risk assessment must meet three standards to be considered ethical. First, the expected tactical gains are commensurate with the expected costs. Second, there is no other course of action which would deliver the same tactical gains with less risk. Third, the commander executes the operation skillfully and boldly while accepting no unnecessary risk. Taken together, these standards form a three-pronged test that can guide commanders in high-risk combat operations.

The Charge of the 9th Armoured Brigade

*Theirs is not to reason why
Theirs is but to do and die.
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.*

—Alfred Lord Tennyson, "The Charge of the Light Brigade"³

In the early morning hours of November 2nd, 1942, British Brigadier John Currie grimly considered the line of Italian and German anti-tank guns his 9th Armoured Brigade was about to attack. Across the North

African desert, elements of the Panzer Army Africa, commanded by “The Desert Fox” Erwin Rommel, lay in wait. Currie’s objective was to break through Rommel’s defensive line which the British 1st Armoured Division would then exploit. But Currie had a problem—there was no infantry to support his tanks.

Currie voiced his concerns to his division commander, Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Freyberg, who shared his misgivings. The prospect of tanks charging anti-tank guns without infantry support reminded Freyberg of the ill-fated Light Brigade. Ninety-two years earlier, a British light cavalry brigade suffered severe casualties at the Battle of Balaclava. The brigade mistakenly charged Russian field guns based on a misunderstood order. The action was later immortalized in *The Charge of the Light Brigade* by Alfred Lord Tennyson.

But unlike Balaclava, Currie’s orders were no misunderstanding. The British Eighth Army Commander, Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery, had deliberately ordered the assault. Montgomery was determined to break through Rommel’s line. A break and exploitation would threaten Rommel’s fragile lines of communication, and potentially allow Montgomery to destroy Rommel’s entire Army, thereby winning North Africa for the Allies. The success or failure of 9th Armoured Brigade’s attack had operational and potentially strategic consequences.

The possibility of an operational or even a strategic breakthrough was little comfort to Brigadier Currie who estimated that without infantry support, his Brigade would suffer at least 50% casualties.⁴ Currie expressed this concern to Freyberg, who relayed it to Montgomery. Montgomery’s reply was sobering. Freyberg told Currie that Montgomery “was aware of the risk and *has accepted the possibility of losing 100% casualties* in 9 ARMD Bde to make this break, but in view of the promise of immediate following through of 1 ARMD DIV, the risk was not considered as great as all that.”⁵ (Emphasis added.)

If the prelude to the 9th Armoured Brigade’s attack had echoes of Balaclava, the results undoubtedly did as well. Like the Light Brigade 92 years earlier, Currie and his soldiers bravely executed their orders and paid dearly in blood. A total of 230 officers and soldiers were killed, wounded, or missing. The Brigade began the day with 94 tanks. By the end, only 14 were not disabled or destroyed.⁶ And like the Charge of the Light Brigade, 9th Armoured Brigade’s attack ultimately failed.

Risk in Large-Scale Combat

We are taking three trees a day, yet they cost about 100 men apiece.

—U.S. Army Captain at the Battle of Hürtgen Forest⁷

The experience of the 9th Armoured Brigade at El Alamein highlights the unique character of risk in large-scale combat. Risk is inherent in all combat, but risk in large-scale combat will be different from the Army’s recent experiences—Iraq and Afghanistan—in fundamental ways. In these recent conflicts, commanders have not, for the most part, had to consider the ethical aspects of tactical risk assessment in terms of Soldiers’ lives.

In the vast majority of battles fought, our adversaries have not been able to mass enough combat power to put large units at risk of destruction. Moreover, the vast majority of tactical actions have not had the potential to deliver significant tactical, operational, or strategic gains in the event of success. Nor have these actions had the potential to subject the force to a crippling blow in the event of failure. This is not to say Soldiers have not undertaken risky missions, nor is it to say that those missions have not been worthwhile. However, neither side of the risk equation has been substantial enough for commanders to consider the kind of order Brigadier John Currie and the 9th Armoured Brigade executed at El Alamein.

The character of large-scale combat is fundamentally different. Unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, our enemies will be able to mass large formations of combat power and put large Army formations at risk.⁸ This change

means commanders may have to make choices which risk scores or hundreds of lives to achieve tactical objectives. In other words, commanders may have to weigh knowingly and deliberately ordering Soldiers to their death against potential tactical gains. This is a paradigmatic shift for both commanders and Soldiers.

Understanding Risk

The term “risk” carries with it a negative connotation. Most leaders see risk as something to be minimized or avoided altogether. According to FM 3-0 *Operations*, however, intentional risk-taking is critical to tactical success in large-scale combat:

Commanders seek to understand, balance, and take risks, rather than avoid risks. When commanders accept risk in large-scale combat operations, they create opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. Opportunities come with risks. The willingness to incur risk is often the key to exposing enemy weaknesses that the enemy considers beyond friendly reach.⁹

Risk is a balancing act. Taking risks increases exposure to threats and hazards, but it also offers opportunities for success. There are three primary sources of risk guidance in Army doctrine. The first is the Mission Command Philosophy. Accepting prudent risk is one of the principles of mission command. ADRP 6-0 *Mission Command* defines a prudent risk as “a deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost.”¹⁰ A second place we find guidance is FM 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*. During the Military Decision-Making Process, commanders and staffs must develop *acceptable* courses of action. Acceptable means a course of action that balances “cost and risk with the advantage gained.”¹¹ The third source of guidance is ATP 5-19 *Risk Management* which contains the risk management process—a procedure which helps commanders make risk decisions.¹²

There are two shortcomings in the Army’s risk doctrine. First, it provides little guidance on how commanders should judge risk against potential gains. The risk management process provides commanders a risk level—low, medium, high, or extremely high—but does not tell the commander if that risk is *worth taking*. Second, risk management doctrine does not consider ethical implications. A risk assessment may tell the commander the risk that some of his or her Soldiers will die, but it does not help the commander come to terms with whether a tactical objective is *worth dying for*.

Risk as an Ethical Dilemma

*The responsibilities of a combat leader represent a remarkable paradox.
To be truly good at what he does, he must love his men and be bonded to them
with powerful links of mutual responsibility and affection.*

And then he must ultimately be willing to give the orders that may kill them.

—Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Dave Grossman, *On Killing*¹³

The profession of arms is unique. Like other professions—medicine, law, and theology, for example—the profession of arms is a select group of experts who have a moral obligation to use their expertise in service of society.¹⁴ Unlike other professions, however, members of the profession of arms have two unique responsibilities. The first unique responsibility is the ethical application of violence to defend their fellow citizens. Professionals of arms—Soldiers—kill other human beings when ordered to do so. When not actively fighting, they prepare to kill. Importantly, Soldiers do not engage in wanton or unrestrained violence. Instead, they train to employ violence *ethically* according to just war tradition, international laws, and soldierly honor. Indeed, philosophers, academics, and soldiers have written extensively on these concerns.

The second unique responsibility of Soldiers is rarely talked or written about. Soldiers prepare to die. A Soldier's duty is to willingly give his or her life, if necessary, for their fellow citizens.¹⁵ This obligation is codified in the U.S. Armed Forces' *Code of Conduct*:

I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life.
I am prepared to give my life in their defense.¹⁶

Commanders play a critical role in the profession of arms. Although the professional Soldier is given the means to unleash violence, the decision to do so is not his. Instead, it is the commander who gives the order to kill the enemy and ensures the Soldier does so in an ethical manner. It is the commander's responsibility to orchestrate violence in a way that accomplishes her assigned missions in defense of the nation and does so ethically.

But the commander also has a second responsibility; providing for the care and general welfare of the Soldiers under her command. "Commanders are expected to balance, simultaneously, their responsibility to ensure due care is afforded to civilian with their responsibility to ensure due risk is required of their soldiers."¹⁷ Unsurprisingly, these two responsibilities can present commanders with an ethical dilemma when accomplishing the mission means risking Soldiers' lives.

An ethical dilemma is not a question of right vs. wrong. Rather, it means having to decide between two right choices. Author Rushworth Kidder highlights four frequent "right vs. right" dilemmas:¹⁸

- Truth vs. loyalty
- Individual vs. community
- Short-term vs. long-term
- Justice vs. mercy

Choosing between the mission and the Soldiers is an individual vs. community dilemma. On the one hand, the commander is obligated to care for the welfare of her Soldiers. On the other, sacrificing the lives of those Soldiers may contribute to the good of the community, whether the unit, the Army, or the American citizenry.

As previously discussed, the Army's risk management framework fails to resolve this dilemma. While a tactical risk assessment can tell give the commander a risk value, it does not tell her whether that risk is *worth taking*. Additionally, Army ethical training does not prepare commanders for these decisions. Current ethics training focuses nearly exclusively on how Soldiers should conduct themselves according to the Law of War. The risk assessment process likewise offers little assistance. This is all unsurprising. Most Soldiers would rather not think about the uncomfortable subject of their own mortality and that of their fellow Soldiers. Author James Toner observes that Soldiers tend to question the mortality of their enemy but rarely consider their own. "It is practically impossible for [Soldiers] to think of themselves as the objects of others' military actions."¹⁹

The Ethical Triangle

The callous man has no mental struggle over jeopardizing the lives of 10,000 men; the human commander cannot avoid this struggle...The average general envies the buck private; when things go wrong, the private can blame the general, but the general can blame only himself. The private carries the woes of one man; the general carries the woes of all. He is conscious always of the responsibility on

*his shoulders, of the relatives of the men entrusted to him, and of their feelings.
He must act so that he can face those fathers and mothers without shame or remorse.*

—General Joe Stilwell²⁰

The ethical triangle comprises three ethical bases which are conceptual lenses through which one can view an ethical dilemma. These lenses are *principles*, *consequences*, and *virtues*. Principles deal with rules, laws, and moral obligations. The virtues lens asks the decision-maker to consider what a ‘good person’ would do in the same situation. Finally, the consequences lens considers the likely outcome of actions in terms of what would do the most good for the most people.²¹ We can use these three perspectives to make an initial examination of the issues surrounding tactical risk in large scale combat.

Principles

Putting Soldiers at high risk is clearly ethical from the standpoint of rules, laws, and moral obligations. Soldiers are obligated to abide by the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Law of War. The Uniform Code of Military Justice is clear on this matter; Articles 90, 91, and 92 clearly establish the obligation of Soldiers to obey lawful orders. Moreover, the Uniform Code of Military Justice contains no prohibition against putting Soldiers at risk.²² Similarly, the Law of War clearly recognizes the lawfulness of risking Soldiers’ lives. Soldiers are combatants and as such may be lawfully attacked by enemy forces.²³

The law of war also provides three principles which aid commanders with interpreting and applying the law of war. The principles are *military necessity*, *humanity*, and *honor*. Military necessity justifies legal actions which are necessary to defeat the enemy as quickly as possible. It also justifies “incidental harms” which result from those actions.²⁴ Humanity forbids suffering, injury, or destruction which serves no military purpose.²⁵ Finally, honor speaks to a sense fairness and mutual respect between combatants.

Though these principles are intended to regulate conduct toward enemy forces, they can also be implied in the relationship between commanders and Soldiers. Such an implication suggests that a commander should knowingly put Soldiers at high risk only when militarily necessary and do so in a way that mitigates the risk to the extent possible. Moreover, the commander should conduct the action honorably. A commander must be honest with Soldiers about the risks involved, evenhanded in the way those risks are distributed, and not use rank to seek personal safety from those risks.

Virtues

When viewing an ethical dilemma through the virtues lens, the commander derives ethical guidance from other people rather than rules, laws, or moral obligations. The most immediate source of virtues are the Army Values: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage.²⁶ While the Army Values are a powerful collective statement of a Soldiers’ obligation to the Nation, Army, and fellow Soldiers, they are not intended to help commanders make risk decisions.

A more useful framework comes from the very first virtues-based ethical theory as posited by the Greek philosopher Plato.²⁷ In *The Republic*, Plato describes the four so-called “cardinal” virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice.²⁸ Examined in the context of tactical risk assessment, the cardinal virtues provide guideposts to help commanders make difficult tactical decisions.

- *Wisdom*: A wise commander has the *tactical skill* to know when to act and to do so decisively.
- *Courage*: A courageous commander must have the intellectual bravery to assume necessary risk and the personal courage to personally lead his or her Soldiers to accomplish the mission.

- *Temperance*: A temperate commander exercises proper restraint. A commander exercises restraint by eliminating unnecessary risks to Soldiers and mitigating necessary risks to the lowest possible level.
- *Justice*: Finally, a commander must act with fairness toward his or her Soldiers and subject them to high tactical risk only when the mission demands it.

A unique feature of virtues-based ethics is that unlike principles and consequences, there is no right or wrong answer. Instead, one must seek a middle ground—often known as the *golden mean*.²⁹ For example, decisiveness is a desirable virtue in a military leader. And while a lack of decisiveness is undesirable, an excess of decisiveness is no better. A leader who makes quick decisions without thinking clearly about their implications is prone to make careless choices.

When considered holistically, the cardinal virtues guide the commander toward a balanced approach to tactical risk assessment. Temperance and courage balance each other. A tactical action which is courageous but without temperance is reckless. That is, the commander accepts unnecessary tactical risk. The opposite condition is a tempered or restrained tactical action without courage, which is risk aversion if not cowardice. The balance between wisdom and justice is the linking of ways and ends. The commander must execute the tactical action skillfully (wisdom) and for the right reason (justice). A skillful action which serves no purpose is unethical and a waste of Soldiers' lives. Likewise, an unskilled action, even if the goal of the action is justified, is also wasteful and unethical.

Consequences

Tactical risk assessment from a consequences perspective must consider the probable outcomes of a tactical action. The portions of Army doctrine which address tactical risk do so from a consequential point of view. It is important to emphasize that the commander must consider two outcomes; the potential losses and the tactical gain. The Army's risk management process provides some of the information the commander needs, but not all of it. The primary shortcoming in the risk management process is that it considered only losses to the unit. ATP 5-19 *Risk Management* directs commanders to first estimate the probability of an occurrence and the consequences of that occurrence. Taken together, these two factors provide a risk assessment. (See Figure 1.) However, this assessment alone is not sufficient to inform a risk decision. In other words, supposing a risk is assessed as high or extremely high; should the commander accept that risk?

Balancing risk with advantage is a classic *individual vs. community* dilemma. The commander must balance the right of the Soldier to live against the potential benefit the Soldier's death might contribute to a larger community by securing some kind of advantage. An underpinning assumption is that the tactical action under consideration will, in fact, benefit a larger community in some way. That community may be other Soldiers, a different unit, the citizens of the U.S. or another country, or a combination of all of these.

Assuming there is a community benefit to be gained, the commander must weigh that benefit against the risks in achieving it. Here, a variation of the risk management framework is useful. As previously discussed, risk deals with the *costs* side of tactical action. It is a function of the probability a cost will be incurred and the consequences if it is. We can approach the other side of the equation—tactical advantage—using the same framework. Tactical advantage is a function of the potential gains a tactical action might achieve and the probability that action will be successful. (See Figure 2.) When examined through both frameworks, it becomes clear that the expected gain must be at least equal to the potential cost.

We can synthesize these various ethical viewpoints with Army doctrine to create a holistic approach to tactical risk. This approach, outlined below, takes the form of a three-pronged ethical test. To be considered ethical, a tactical action must meet all three standards.

Risk Assessment Matrix		Probability (expected frequency)				
		Frequent: Continuous, regular, or inevitable occurrences	Likely: Several of numerous occurrences	Occasional: Sporadic or intermittent occurrences	Seldom: Infrequent occurrences	Unlikely: Possible occurrences but improbable
Severity (expected consequence)		A	B	C	D	E
Catastrophic: Mission failure, unit readiness eliminated; death, unacceptable loss, or damage	I	EH	EH	H	H	M
Critical: Significantly degraded unit readiness or mission capability; minor injury, illness, loss, or damage	II	EH	H	H	M	L
Moderate: Somewhat degraded unit readiness or mission capability; minimal injury, loss, or damage	III	H	M	M	L	L
Negligible: Little or no impact to unit readiness or mission capability; minimal injury, loss, or damage	IV	M	L	L	L	L
Legend: EH – Extremely High Risk H – High Risk M – Medium Risk L – Low Risk						

Figure 1. The Army's Risk Assessment Matrix.
 Source: Department of the Army, *Risk Management (ATP 5-19), Change 1* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2014), figs. 1–1.




Figure 2. Tactical risk and tactical advantage frameworks.

- *Probability: The expected gained advantage is commensurate with the risk incurred.* This standard captures the FM 6-0 requirement to balance cost and risk with advantage. However, it also speaks to the idea of military necessity and community benefit.
- *Necessity: There is no other course of action which would deliver the same tactical advantage with less risk.* This standard accounts for the ideas of justice and honor. If Soldiers' lives are to be put at risk, it should be done fairly and for a justified reason.
- *Competence: The commander executes the action skillfully and boldly while accepting no unnecessary risk.* This final standard addresses the ideas of wisdom, courage, temperance, and humanity. Once a high-risk action is undertaken for the right reasons, the commander has an ethical obligation to lead that action with skill and decisiveness. This implies that officers have an implied obligation to become tactically skilled *before* having to make these kinds of choices.

Conclusion

*If we must die, O let us nobly die,
So that our precious blood may not be shed
In vain; then even the monsters we defy
Shall be constrained to honor us though dead!*

—Claude McKay, “If We Must Die”³⁰

The Army's shift to preparing for large-scale combat demands a parallel shift in the way Army leaders think about risk assessment. The character of large-scale combat demands commanders who are prepared to ethically risk Soldiers' lives to achieve tactical success. The stakes are high; commanders must think deeply about how to best manage tactical risk.

The three-pronged test recommended in this essay can help commanders think about how to go about balancing the risk to force with tactical advantage in large-scale combat. It incorporates the three perspectives of the ethical triangle—principles, virtues, and consequences—to ethically inform tactical risk decisions. The Army is Soldiers; to put them at high risk demands the very best in tactical and ethical thinking from Army leaders.

*IF I were fierce, and bald, and short of breath,
I'd live with scarlet Majors at the Base,
And speed glum heroes up the line to death.
You'd see me with my puffy petulant face,
Guzzling and gulping in the best hotel,
Reading the Roll of Honour: 'Poor young chap,'
I'd say—'I used to know his father well;
Yes, we've lost heavily in this last scrap.'
And when the war is done and youth stone dead,
I'd toddle safely home and die—in bed.*

—Siegfried Sassoon, “Base Details”³¹

End Notes

- 1 Martin Blumenson, *Bloody River: The Real Tragedy of the Rapido*, 63 (College Station: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), 133–34.
- 2 Mike Lundy and Rich Creed, “The Return of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations,” *Military Review* 97, no. 6 (December 2017): 14–21.
- 3 Alfred Lord Tennyson, *The Charge of the Light Brigade and Other Poems*, Dover Thrift Editions (New York: Dover Publications, 1992), 52.
- 4 Niall Barr, *Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein*, 1st ed (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2005), 386.
- 5 Barr, 386.
- 6 Ian Stanley Ord Playfair, C. J. C. Molony, and W. G. F. Jackson, *The Mediterranean and Middle East*, History of the Second World War (London: Naval & Military Press, 2004), 67. *The Mediterranean and Middle East*, History of the Second World War (London: Naval & Military Press, 2004
- 7 Forrest C. Pogue, *Pogue’s War: Diaries of a WWII Combat Historian* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 289.
- 8 Lundy and Creed, “The Return of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations.”
- 9 Department of the Army, *Operations (Field Manual 3-0)*, Change 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2017), B-1.
- 10 Department of the Army, *Mission Command (ADRP 6-0)*, Change 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2014), 2–24, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/adrp6_0.pdf.
- 11 Department of the Army, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (FM 6-0)*, Change 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2016), 9–17.
- 12 Department of the Army, *Risk Management (ATP 5-19)*, Change 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2014); Department of Defense, *Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0)* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2017), III–16.
- 13 Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1996), 90.
- 14 Department of the Army, “The Profession of Arms” (Government Printing Office, December 8, 2010), 2, <http://data.cape.army.mil/web/repository/white-papers/profession-of-arms-white-paper.pdf>.
- 15 James Hugh Toner, *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 24.
- 16 “Executive Order 10631--Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States,” 3 CFR § (1988), <https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/10631.html>.
- 17 James M. Dubik, “Human Rights, Command Responsibility, and Walzer’s Just War Theory,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 11, no. 4 (1982): 368.
- 18 Rushworth M Kidder, *How Good People Make Tough Choices: Resolving the Dilemmas of Ethical Living* (New York: Harper, 2009), 6.
- 19 Toner, *True Faith and Allegiance*, 23–24.

20 David Rooney, *Stilwell the Patriot: Vinegar Joe, the Brits, and Chiang Kai-Shek*. (Skyhorse Publishing, 2016).

21 Jack Kem, “Use of the ‘Ethical Triangle’ in Military Ethical Decision Making,” *Public Administration and Management* 11, no. 1 (2006): 22–43. Use of the Ethical Triangle in Military Ethical Decision Making, *Public Administration and Management* 11, no. 1 (2006)

22 U.S. Department of Defense, *Manual for Courts-Martial United States (2019 Edition)* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), accessed February 8, 2019, [https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/2019%20MCM%20\(Final\)%20\(20190108\).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610](https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/2019%20MCM%20(Final)%20(20190108).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610).

23 Office of General Counsel Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Law of War Manual” (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 1, 2016), 104–5, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190>.

24 Office of General Counsel Department of Defense, 53.

25 Office of General Counsel Department of Defense, 58.

26 Department of the Army, *Army Leadership (ADRP 6-22)*, Change 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2012), 3-1-3–3.

27 Kem, “Use of the ‘Ethical Triangle’ in Military Ethical Decision Making,” 31.consequences based ethics, and virtues based ethics.”, “author”:[{“family”：“Kem”, “given”：“Jack”}], “issued”:{“date-parts”:[["2006"]]}, “locator”：“31”}], “schema”：“https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”}

28 Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, Project Gutenberg EBook (Project Guterberg, 428AD), <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1497/1497-h/1497-h.htm>.

29 Kem, “Use of the ‘Ethical Triangle’ in Military Ethical Decision Making,” 32.consequences based ethics, and virtues based ethics.”, “author”:[{“family”：“Kem”, “given”：“Jack”}], “issued”:{“date-parts”:[["2006"]]}, “locator”：“32”}], “schema”：“https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”}

30 Poetry Foundation, “If We Must Die by Claude McKay,” text/html, Poetry Foundation, February 10, 2019, <https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44694/if-we-must-die>.

31 Siegfried Sassoon, *War Poems of Siegfried Sassoon*. (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004), 58.